

**PERCEPTIONS ON STRATEGY IN GENERAL AND STRATEGIC  
MANAGEMENT:**

**A SURVEY ON COMMON STRATEGIC PERCEPTION AMONG  
MEDIUM-HIGH LEVEL MANAGERS IN TURKEY**

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LEVEL MANAGERS IN TURKEY

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
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# PERCEPTIONS ON STRATEGY IN GENERAL AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:

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### **Abstract**

The usage of the notion of strategy, defined as the ways to be followed for the military units and the countries to reach specified goals has a history that can be traced back 2500 years. The theory of strategy is a process of development for the last 170 years related to fields of wars, international relations and state administration. During this development phase, the interrelation between politics and strategy, both in theoretical and practical domains, has been a subject of debate.

The strategic management of corporations has been in the limelight of academic and managerial circles as an area of scientific management for the last 50 years. Many important works have been related to multinational and large-scale corporations both in theoretical and practical areas.

However, it is observed that those works, carried out in the two different areas have been quite feeble, in the context of comparison of them and searching for the relationships between them.

The behaviour of human beings and societies are shaped under the influence of various concrete and abstract factors. There is no doubt that culture, conceptions and perceptions have a special position among the aforementioned abstract factors.

When the subject is approached from this aspect, it can be considered that the level of strategic culture-strategic management relation and the level of a common strategic perception that the managers of different organizations in a country have a special place in the determination of national, sectoral and organizational priorities

and the formation of policies to be applied. These levels can be defined as “strategic culture and perception capacity” or “total strategic thinking quality”.

Therefore, the behaviour of medium-high level managers of various organizations in a country has a specific importance. These people form the basis for the strategic decisions of upper level managers with their ideas and propositions while they also produce goods and services in their specific areas. It is natural that the cultures, understanding and perceptions of medium-high level managers of organizations of various sectors can have differences both in sectoral and organizational fields. However, it should also be specified at what areas those differences are accumulated and at what levels they are.

The purpose of this study is the determination of different and common areas of strategic perceptions of medium-high level managers that have contributions and effects in the strategic decision making process of different sectors.

The factors that determine the differences in strategic perception are specified by a literature survey covering the areas “historical background and development of strategic thought”, “the dimensions of strategy from military point of view and principles of war”, “strategy and strategic management in business world” and “methodological strategic foresight”.

Although the targeted area of this subject covers a wide area, the target population of this study is confined to three representative groups for the sake of brevity and specification. These three groups are “civilian bureaucratic managers”, “military bureaucratic managers” and “business sector managers”.

In order to clarify the views and perceptions of those groups, this study has used a descriptive method and applied the “purposive sampling” technique. Interviews have been carried out on the sampled groups under the headings of “strategic culture and understanding in general”, “relations between strategy in general and strategic management” and “level of the awareness of the problems on strategic perception” and the results have been evaluated accordingly.

# GENEL STRATEJİ VE STRATEJİK YÖNETİM ALGILAMALARI:

## TÜRKİYE'DEKİ ORTA-ÜST DÜZEY YÖNETİCİLERİN ORTAK STRATEJİ ALGILAMALARI ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA

### Özet

Strateji kavramının, askeri birliklerin ve ülkelerin yönetimi ve hedeflerine ulaşmaları kapsamında kullanılmaya başlanması yaklaşık 2500 yıl öncesine gitmektedir. Teori olarak ise strateji, savaşlar, dış ilişkiler devlet yönetimi alanlarında 170 yıldır gelişimini sürdürmektedir. Bu gelişim süresi içinde politika ve strateji arasındaki ilişkiler teorik ve pratik alandaki tartışmaların konusu olagelmıştır.

İşletmelerin Stratejik Yönetimi kavramı ise son 50 yıldır yönetim alanının bilimsel bir konusu olarak dünya akademik ve işletme çevrelerinin gündemini işgal etmektedir. Bu kapsamda, çok uluslu ve büyük ölçekli işletmelerin yönetimine ilişkin olarak teorik ve pratik alanda önemli çalışmalar yapılmıştır.

Ancak, devlet kurumları ve özel işletmeler gibi iki farklı alanın amaçlarına yönelik olarak sürdürülen bu çalışmaların birbiri ile karşılaştırılması ve aralarındaki bağın ortaya çıkarılması konusundaki gayretlerin oldukça zayıf kaldığı gözlenmektedir.

İnsanların ve toplumların davranışları somut ve soyut çeşitli faktörlerin etkisi altında şekillenmektedir. Soyut faktörler arasında kültür, anlayış ve algılamaların özel bir yer işgal ettiği kuşkusuzdur.

Konuya bu açılarından yaklaşıldığında, bir ülkenin farklı kurumlarındaki yöneticilerin sahip oldukları stratejik kültür - stratejik yönetim ilişkisi ve Ortak strateji algılamasının düzeyinin, ulusal, sektörel ve kurumsal önceliklerin belirlenmesinde ve uygulanacak politikaların oluşturulmasında önemli rolü olduğu düşünülebilir. Bu durum, bir ülkenin “stratejik kültür ve algılama kapasitesi” veya “toplam stratejik düşünce kalitesi” olarak da adlandırılabilir.

Dolayısıyla, ülkenin çeşitli kurumlarındaki orta-üst düzey yöneticilerin durumu özel bir önem arz etmektedir. Bunlar bir taraftan kendi alanlarında mal ve hizmet üretimlerini sürdürürken, diğer taraftan da geliştirdikleri fikir ve önerilerle üst düzey yöneticilerin alacakları stratejik kararlara alt yapı oluşturmaktadır. Çeşitli sektörlerle mensup Orta-üst düzey yöneticilerin kültür ve algılamalarının da sektörel ve kurumsal bazda bazı farklılıkların olması doğaldır. Ancak, söz konusu kültür ve algılama farklılıklarının derecesi ve hangi alanlarda yoğunlaştığının belirlenmesi önem arz etmektedir.

Bu çalışma, farklı sektörlerde stratejik kararların alınmasında katkıları/etkileri olan Orta-üst düzey yöneticilerin strateji algılamaları arasındaki farklı ve Ortak yönlerinin belirlenmesini amaçlamaktadır.

Strateji algılamasını belirleyen faktörler; “Tarihsel altyapı ve stratejik düşüncenin evrimi”, “askeri açıdan stratejinin boyutları ve harp prensipleri”, “ İş dünyası açısından strateji ve stratejik yönetim” ve “Yöntemsel stratejik öngörü” konularında yapılan literatür çalışmasından çıkarılmıştır.

Araştırmanın hedef kitlesi çok geniş bir alanı kapsamakla beraber, bu alanı bir ölçüde daraltmak ve belirginleştirebilmek için hedef kitle üç grup altında incelenmiştir. Bunlar; “sivil bürokrat yöneticiler”, “asker bürokrat yöneticiler” ve “şirket yöneticileri” dir.

Bu grupların görüş ve algılamalarını ortaya çıkarmak için araştırma yöntemi belirlenmiş ve “amaçlı örnekleme” uygulanmıştır. Örnek kütle üzerinde; “Genel strateji kültürü/anlayışı ve algılaması”, “Genel strateji- işletmelerin stratejik yönetimi ilişkisi” ve “Strateji algılaması konusundaki sorunların farkındalık düzeyi” ana başlıkları altında görüşmeler yapılmış ve sonuçlar değerlendirilmiştir.

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To Zehra, my inspiration.

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## **List of Abbreviations**

A.F.J.: Armed Forces Journal

ASAM: Avrasya Strategic Arařtırmalar Merkezi

BDD: British Defence Doctrine

CIS: Commonwealth of Independed States

FM :Field Manual

JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations

SAREN: Strategic Research Institute

SBU: Strategic Business Unit

SF: Strategic foresight

SSI: Strategic Studies Institute

SWOT: Strenght, Weakness, Opportunity and Threath

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

WEU: Western European Union

WFS: World Future Society

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

# **Chapter 1**

## **Introduction**

The word “strategy”, held to have been derived from ancient Greek, has a history of about 2500 years. Its original meaning is “using the army”. The first book ever written on the subject of strategy, Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War” is also approximately that old. Although this terminology has not been used in the following centuries, armies have been strategically led and military leaders have contested their strategic war skills.

State administration, international relations and the art of war, has been documented in the European literature within this context, following the Renaissance. The word “strategy has found a place in the dictionaries starting from the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The real expansion in the strategic thought took place in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially after the Napoleonic wars. This era has been recognized as the date of birth of the strategic theory. The theory has been developed in the following century, in the fields of art of war, state administration and international relations, as well as management. Strategy has also been defined and perceived in the same context today.

The structure of economic units has been radically changed following the industrial revolution and huge industrial facilities and economic units have emerged. Starting from the first years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the management of those larger units has been based on scientific rules. During the last 50 years, the growth of economic units and the level of competition have made it necessary that the military terminology that is 2500 years old is being taken over by corporate managers.

Present day concept of strategic management has been on the agenda of worldwide academic and managerial circles as a paradigm of administrative science for at least

50 years. Also great progress has been made related to the management of multinational and large-size corporations in theoretical and practical fields. Concomitantly, the command of larger military units and administration of states are also subject to strategic management. This approach has given rise to a concept called “Grand Strategy” or “National Strategy”, as the common strategic perception and strategic culture – strategic management relation envisaged by the intellectuals and especially the ruling elite of the country.

According to the observations, it seems that while one sector evaluates strategy thoroughly in the military field, it may ignore important progress that is particularly made in business administration, under “strategic management”. On the other hand, the adaptation of military strategic thought to strategic business administration is the subject of numerous works in the literature. However, it is also observed that a purely business environment tends to focus on the strategic administration matters and yet may neglect the security dimensions. Very rare works were found in the national literature. One of them is “Stratejik Düşüncenin Sivil ve Askeri Hayatta Kullanılması” published by Avrasya Strategic Araştırmalar Merkezi (ASAM) (Özdağ, 2000) in which two and a half pages are allocated to civilian use of strategic thought. The second one is “Milli Sivil Stratejik Konsept” (Şehsuvaroğlu, 2000).

Therefore, the lack of a common perception and language for the determination of national and institutional priorities and goals result in the delay of the required decisions to be taken in time. In societies where a common base of strategic communication has not been formed, proactive policies cannot be adopted, nor coordination can be achieved and correctly-phased actions be taken. Such societies either have to follow the lines of action decided by other powers or irrational reactions. When a problem is encountered, either the people who take the decisions are blamed for the unfavourable circumstances related to external sources or are shown as the source of the problem. This situation is not only peculiar at the macro level of state administration, but also public or private enterprises at smaller scale. People are unwilling to accept that such circumstances are caused by other reasons, such as the lack of a common culture of strategy and perception.

The behaviour of human beings and societies is shaped under the effects of various concrete and abstract factors. There is a consensus that cultures, perceptions and images have a specific place among the abstract factors.

Contemporary military thinker Colin S. Gray draws attention in his work “Modern Strategy” on this issue;

The subject of strategic culture matters deeply because it raises core questions about the roots of, and influences upon, strategic behavior. No one and no institution can operate beyond culture. Not all policy makers and warriors are able to act out of their cultural preferences....Strategy is universal. However, culture and perception may be different depending on the regions, nations and even sectors (Gray, 1999, p. 129).

Another observation comes from mass-media which has strong influence on public opinion. The work in this sector has an academic deformation on the subject in some sense, due to the ignorance of the difference among the dimensions or hierarchy of strategy, such as politics, strategy, operation, tactics etc, which are sometimes quite thin. For example, lots of magazines and periodicals published with the name of “strategy” are seen to deal only with current foreign affairs and domestic issues. This observation may be evaluated as the result of the differences on strategic culture and perception in the society or as one of the reasons of them or the both. On the other hand, another handicap may come from a terminological scarcity in current Turkish language. Beside the close relation between “strategy making” and “policy-making”, there is also a qualitative and hierarchic difference. The use of only the word “politika” in Turkish for the words “policy” and “politics” in English, -contrary to the old uses of “siyaset” and “siyasa”- and the use of the word “strategy” sometimes in confusion with these words reflect the effect of this ignorance and blur the perceptions.

### **1.1 Significance of the Study**

It is inevitable that the same situation would adversely affect managerial people when there is a lack of such a perception in the public opinion. The most important of the managerial echelons belong to the medium-high level since the solutions and

the proposals developed by this class form the reference to the upper echelons in taking decisions in important strategic decisions. Examples that the middle-level officials have an effect in those cases are abundant. Floyd and Woolridge draw attention to the role of medium level managers on strategic issues. “Contemporary theory and descriptions suggest that middle managers regularly attempt to influence strategy and often provide the impetus for new initiatives.” (1992)

## **1.2 Objectives of the Research**

The main objective of this study is to examine the perceptions on the general strategical concepts and the levels of understanding of the principles of strategic management of medium-high level managers who are known to have an influence on the strategic decisions and to determine the areas and sources of strategy perception differences. Therefore, conclusions will be related to the level of awareness of medium-high level managers about those differences and how those differences can be avoided.

## **1.3 Contribution of the Research**

The theoretical developments in the field of strategy have a history of about 170 years. The first one hundred years is almost entirely devoted to study of wars, military security issues and international relations. Topics related to non-military areas have been included during the last 50 years and studies related to “strategic management of economic units” have emerged at an ever-increasing rate. During this period, both sectors have continued their development however; the interrelations of those two sectors have not been examined thoroughly.

On the other hand, stress has been placed on the importance of “strategic culture and perception” when strategic level decisions are being made since the beginning of these studies. Clausewitz, in his book “On War” (vom kriege), published initially in 1832 in German and accepted to be the basic milestone of the theory, has mentioned about an inevitable difference of culture and perception between the civilian and military leadership and has proposed that education may slightly alleviate the problem (1976). Many of the following authors have also emphasized this point.

The most radical opinion has been expressed by Gray who has used the title “culture clash” in the chapter where he has mentioned the differences in perception and conceptions between civilian and military leaders (1999).

Academic work on this field dates back only to the last decade of the 20th century. At present, some graduate schools and certificate programs offer studies in related subjects. (For example, National Defense University, Naval Postgraduate School). Colin Gray who is the civilian professor of National Defense University points out this issue:

So limited is the empirical and theoretical scholarship currently available on this issue, that we would probably be best advised to look more for complementarities of approach, than to try and elect one or another view the methodological winner (Gray, 1999).

However, almost all published researches deal with the relationship between the strategic culture- national security/defence relationships. In those documents, the examples of strategic culture are given as a whole within a nationwide basis and a preliminary assumption is made that every nation has a homogeneous structure within itself, albeit admitting national differences. Such an assumption seems to be consistent when viewed from the point of view of international relations. However, as it is not possible that all social layers of a nation share the same strategic culture and perception level, different professional groups should not be treated alike either. It can be assumed that the national strategic culture, its structure of perception and level are the resultants of various social layers and professional groups. It is assumed that the medium-high level managers are at a determining position here as one of the components of this resultant since they have the capability of being influential in decision making mechanisms. The specific properties of strategic culture and perceptions of those classes can give an idea about the structural characteristics of the national strategic culture and perception of that nation, while differences can be taken as a measure of the strength or weakness of national perception. In order to reach a conclusion, the differences and common points in strategic culture and perception should be investigated thoroughly. Although very rare, some works that can be classified as sociological analysis exist in the literature (Roland, 1968)

No published work in the open literature has been encountered which investigates this subject within the upper-middle level managers of military, civilian bureaucratic or business circles and concentrates on the common and contradictory aspects of strategic culture and perceptions. The aim of this research is to investigate the general strategic culture/perception and to examine its relationship with strategic management principles among the civilian and military bureaucrats and business managers and specify the problems and possible solutions by a “descriptive” field research. It is expected that the conclusions drawn from this research and proposed remedies to be taken will form a bridge between those sectors and, thus, make a modest contribution to common strategic culture and perception at the national level.

Another sensitive issue should be pointed out here: The subject is very sensitive and carries the risk of “politicization” rather than being a scholarly field research. This situation requires care in designing the questionnaire. It is very clear that such a possibility will adversely affect the accuracy of research. Therefore, extra efforts have been spent while designing the questionnaire so as to stay in the academic field as much as possible. This has resulted in the questionnaire being limited field wise and an academic “dreariness”. On the other hand, it is hoped that further research in this area with the expectation of tolerance will dominate and prejudices will be reduced. Our hope is that the modest conclusions of this dissertation will form a basis for future research in this area.

#### **1.4 Outline of the Dissertation**

This study is composed of ten chapters. In Chapter 1-Introduction, the research topic, the significance and objectives of the research are introduced.

The second to forth chapters include literature review. Related subjects are presented under the headings of “Historical Background and Evolution of Strategic Thought”, “Strategy from Military Point of View”, “Strategy from Business Point of View and Methodological Strategic Foresight”. In these chapters, interferences among those subjects are also highlighted and brought into consideration according to the close-knit nature of the issues.



The fifth chapter includes “Further Reflections on the Literature Survey and Determinants for the Field Research”. The aim of this chapter is to purify some complex elements of the subject and drive the determinants of the factors to be examined in this study.

The sixth to eighth chapter covers the field study which aims to investigate “Perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management and awareness of the problems on common strategic perception among medium-high level managers in Turkey”.

The ninth chapter presents conclusions and evaluations.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Evolution of Strategic Thought and Historical Background**

In this chapter, the intention is to make surf on masters of strategic thought throughout of the history up to 19<sup>th</sup> century. There are numerous masters who were either thinkers or practitioners or both. It is clear that great majority of those masters were from the military. However, the objective of this work is not to examine the subject solely through the military point of view, but it aims to study the other aspects of strategy. Hence it is intended that the masters of strategy who have tried to constitute a bridge between politics, economics, and especially business management are to be examined. This principle draws the researcher to make a distinct selection among all the historical and even actual masters who served this aim.

#### **2.1 Introduction**

Evolution of the social life of humanity revealed a management requirement. Though it wasn't understood by those who had been ruled, the question of "how would the society be governed and what would be its future?" was the essential subject which occupied the managers' thoughts since the beginning. Thousands of years later, when we look back to the past, it is understood that the first problem for each society in history focused on the issues of "protection from invasion" or "attack", in other words, "foreign affairs" within the context of the parameters at the times. The main reason for foreign relations was "to preserve life" or "to reach a better life". In addition, it is also possible to see "foreign affairs" experienced for prestige, fame, and honour or only for satisfying the leaders' ego.

Issues of strategic thought transacted of military perspective and spread into the management science. Today, from the global international organizations to the independent states; from the multi-national corporations to the middle-sized

corporations; from the political parties to the football teams, almost every kind of organization has been using this terminology to shed light on their own complex problems and to obtain support for their future projects (Mathey, 1995, pp. 5-6).

Thoughts and actions which compose a foundation for today's notion of strategy had emerged almost simultaneously in two antique civilizations on two far ends of the biggest continent "Eurasia" during the fifth century B.C. There is no concrete evidence that they were co-impressed or co-inspired. Those two civilizations were antique Greece and China.

## **2.2 Origin of the Terminology and Early Applications**

A terminology started in B.C. 5<sup>th</sup> Century with the title "strategos", given to the officer of the highest level who was empowered with civilian and military authorities (Larousse, 2009), has become one of the most used management expressions today, at the end of an evolution process of more than 2500 years. This term, which was used almost only for military and security purposes from its first days until recent times, is now used for every aspect of social life as of the second half of the 20th century.

Etymological root of the word of strategy comes from "strate-agos" which meant "army user" in ancient Greece. However, it had been used as the meaning of "one who establishes mutual relations between civilian and military resources" at the time of Pericles of Athens (Mathey, 1995, p. 9). The army of Athens was administrated by a council which consisted of ten elected "stratagos" from ten clans. The authorization of those stratagos was extended to cover foreign affairs of the city (e.g. Pericles time) and from time to time restricted to only the military competencies (Larousse, 1999).

Eastern expression of the terminology involved the same meaning. An Arabic rooted word of "SevkuIceyş (Sevk-ul-ceyş) which was used in Ottoman era and early years of the Republic of Turkey meant "management and direction of army" (Larousse, 1999).

Although the root of the word goes so far back, and its principles were applied throughout ancient history, its appearance in terminology was in the XVII century A.D. which is surprisingly new. The first example is found in Harrington's dictionary in England in 1656 and the second in Trevoux' dictionary in France in 1721 (Mathey, 1995, p. 9)

There is no doubt the principles of the military strategy were applied throughout history by military leaders and chieftains from Hannibal of Carthage to Roman generals, from Mongol emperors to Islamic or Crusade kings, Attila the Hun and so on. However, almost all of them are considered as appliers and not thinkers. Some of them established principles for management of their tribes, armies or states. Their management principles were mentioned and published very lately (e.g. Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun, by Wess Roberts, Warner Books (1990) ) and not accepted as contributors to the theory.

### **2.3 Background of the Theory or Pre-Theory Period**

It is generally held that the essence of the theory of strategy was established in the first quarter of XIX century. However, according to almost all the resources in the literature the birth of strategic thought goes back to the 6th century BC.

The first milestone is "Art of War", the masterpiece of Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, who is considered to be the person to lay the foundations of strategic thought, mainly consisting of a military framework. Today, the "Art of War" is referenced not only by military literature but also in strategic business management literature (Rue & Byars, 2002, p. 103).

Starting from the time of Sun-Tzu, many of the Kings, Emperors and Generals, numbering several hundred, have taken their place in history as the appliers of strategies. Unfortunately, very few of the ideas of those people pertaining to strategic thought appear in the literature today. Various sources present different lists related to this subject. In the context of this study, it is deemed sufficient that only the authors of written sources whose works are known today and their ideas

should be mentioned in chronological order. However, when the works of strategic thinkers and their works are concerned, emphasis shall be put upon the relationships in view of different disciplines such as military strategy, politics, business, economics and sociology from the point of view of this dissertation.

### **2.3.1 Sun Tzu and “The Art of War”**

The Art of War is a Chinese military treatise that was written by Sun Tzu in the 6th century BC, composed of 13 chapters, each of which is devoted to one aspect of warfare. It has long been praised as the definitive work on military strategies and tactics of its time, and one of the basic texts on the subject.

The Art of War has had a huge influence on Eastern military thinking, business tactics, and beyond. Sun Tzu recognized the importance of positioning in strategy and that position is affected both by objective conditions in the physical environment and the subjective opinions of competitive actors in that environment. According to Michaelson, he thought that strategy was not planning in the sense of working through a to-do list, but rather that it requires quick and appropriate responses to changing conditions. Planning works in a controlled environment, but in a competitive environment, competing plans collide, creating unexpected situations (Michaelson, 2001).

The book was first translated into the French language in 1772 by French Jesuit Jean Joseph Marie Amiot, and into English by British officer Everard Ferguson Calthrop in 1905. It very likely influenced Napoleon. Leaders as diverse as Mao Zedong, Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, and General Douglas MacArthur have claimed to have drawn inspiration from the work (Griffith, 1971).

The Art of War has also been applied to business and managerial strategies. There is no doubt that Sun Tzu should not have known that his ideas initially asserted for the art of armed conflict shall inspire the principles of marketing management some 2500 years later. There are numerous examples on this application in the literature (e.g. Leslie W. Rude and Lloyd L. Byars’ “Management Skills and Applications”

(2002). Among these Gerald A. Michaelson’s “The Art of War for Managers” (2001) attempts a new translation with commentary, 50 rules for strategic thinking to shed a light for business strategies. Another example is “The Art of War & The Art of Marketing” by Gary Cagliardi (2002). Gagliardi tries a comparison between Sun Tzu’s 13 Chapters and 13 principles of marketing strategies. This comparison is structured and presented on table 2.1.

**Table 2.1 A Comparison between the Art of War and the Art of Marketing**

<b>Chapter</b>	<b>The Art of War</b>	<b>The Art of Marketing</b>
1	Planning	Market Analysis
2	Going to War	Selecting a Market
3	Planning an Attack	Planning a Campaign
4	Positioning	Product Position
5	Momentum	Market Momentum
6	Weakness and Strength	Need a Satisfaction
7	Armed Conflict	Marketing Contact
8	Adaptability	Adjusting to Market Conditions
9	Armed March	The Marketing Campaign
10	Field Position	Market Position
11	Types of Terrain	Market Conditions
12	Attacking With Fire	Targeting Market Desires
13	Using Spies	Using Research

Source: (Gagliardi, 2002)

Thinkers after him have also brought forward ideas related to the art of war and state administration. Most of the thinkers whose works are known today are statesman and military strategists. In the context of this dissertation, some examples both from

western and eastern worlds, were selected from the literature and are briefly presented with their treatise in the chronological order below.

### **2.3.2 Thucydides and Peloponnesian War**

Thucydides (c. 460 BC – c. 395 BC), was an ancient Greek historian, and the author of the “History of the Peloponnesian War”, which recounts the 5th century BC war between Sparta and Athens to the year 411 BC. Thucydides is considered by many to be a scientific historian because of his efforts in his History to describe the human world in terms of cause and effect, his strict standards of gathering evidence, and his neglect of the gods in explaining the events of the past. (“Military Strategy Gurus and Masters The Complete A to Z Guide,” n.d.)

### **2.3.3 Chanakya and Arthashastra**

Chanakya (350-283 BC) was a professor at Takshashila University of ancient India and lately an adviser and a prime minister to the first Maurya Emperor Chandragupta and was the chief architect of his rise to power. Chanakya has been considered as the pioneer of the field of economics and political science and has been called as "The Indian Machiavelli" in the strategy literature.

His famous work, “The Arthashastra” is an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, economic policy and military strategy. Arthashastra is divided into 15 books (chapters) and deals in detail with the qualities and disciplines required for a Rajarshi - a wise and virtuous king (“Arthashastra - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” n.d.)

### **2.3.4 Leo VI the Wise and the Imperial Laws**

Leo the Wise, or The Philosopher Byzantine co emperor from 870 and emperor from 886 to 912, whose imperial laws, written in Greek, became the legal code of the Byzantine Empire. Educated by the patriarch Photius, Leo was more scholar than soldier.

In addition to completing the “canon of laws”, he wrote several decrees (novels) on a wide range of ecclesiastical and secular problems. He also wrote a funeral panegyric on his father, liturgical poems, sermons and orations, secular poetry, and military treatises. Leo's image is in a mosaic over the central door of Hagia Sophia (“Military Strategy Gurus and Masters The Complete A to Z Guide,” n.d.)

### **2.3.5 Nizam al-Mulk and Siyasatnama**

Abu Ali al-Hasan al-Tusi Nizam al-Mulk (1018 – 1092), born in Tus in Persia (Iran) was a celebrated Persian scholar and vizier of the Seljuq Empire. He initially served the Ghaznavid sultans. From 1063, he served the Seljuks as vizier and remained in that position throughout the reigns of Alp Arslan (1063-1072) and Malik Shah I (1072-1092). He left a great impact on organization of the Seljuk governmental bodies and hence the title Nizam al-Mulk which translates as "the order of state". (“Nizam al-Mulk - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” n.d.)

Aside from his extraordinary influence as vizier with full authority, he is also well-known for systematically founding a number of schools of higher education in several cities, the famous Nizamiyyah schools. In many aspects, these schools turned out to be the predecessors and models of universities that were established in Europe.

Nizam ul-Mulk is also widely known for his voluminous treatise on kingship titled Siyasatnama (The Book of Government). Written in Persian and composed in the eleventh century, the Siyasatnama was created following the request by Malik Shah that his ministers produce books on government, administration and the troubles facing the nation. However, the treatise compiled by al-Mulk was the only one to receive approval and was consequently accepted as forming "the law of the constitution of the nation". In all it consists of 50 chapters concerning religion, politics, and various other issues of the day with the final 11 chapters. The treatise is concerned with guiding the ruler with regard to the realities of government and how it should be run. It covers "the proper role of soldiers, police, spies, and finance officials" and provides ethical advice emphasising the need for justice and religious piety in the ruler.



The earliest remaining copy is located in the National Library of Tabriz, in Iran. It was first translated into French in 1891 (“Siyasatnama - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” 2010).

### **2.3.6 Ibn Khaldoun and Muqaddimah**

Ibn Khaldoun (full name Abū Zayd ‘Abdu r-Rahman bin Muhammad bin Khaldoun Al-Hadrami, (1332 - 1406) was a North African polymath - an astronomer, economist, historian, Islamic scholar, Islamic theologian, hafiz, jurist, lawyer, mathematician, military strategist, nutritionist, philosopher, social scientist and statesman - born in North Africa in present-day Tunisia. He is considered a forerunner of several social scientific disciplines: demography, cultural history, historiography, the philosophy of history, and sociology. He is also considered one of the forerunners of modern economics, alongside the Indian scholar-philosopher Chanakya (Atiyeh & Oweiss, 1988; L. Jha & K. Jha, 1998). Ibn Khaldun is considered by many to be the father of a number of these disciplines, and of social sciences in general. He is best known for his Muqaddimah (known as Prolegomenon in the West and Mukaddime in Ottoman Turkish), the first volume of his book on universal history, Kitab al-Ibar (“Ibn Khaldun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,” n.d.) .

The work is based around Ibn Khaldun's central concept of 'asabiyyah, which has been translated as "social cohesion", "group solidarity", or "tribalism". This social cohesion arises spontaneously in tribes and other small kinship groups; it can be intensified and enlarged by a religious ideology. Ibn Khaldun's analysis looks at how this cohesion carries groups to power but contains within itself the seeds - psychological, sociological, economic, political - of the group's downfall, to be replaced by a new group, dynasty or empire bound by a stronger (or at least younger and more vigorous) cohesion. Ibn Khaldun has been cited as a racist, but his theories on the rise and fall of empires had no racial component, and this reading of his work has been claimed to be the result of mistranslations (Hannoum, 2003).

Perhaps the most frequently cited observation drawn from Ibn Khaldūn's work is the notion that when a society becomes a great civilization (and, presumably, the dominant culture in its region), its high point is followed by a period of decay. This means that the next cohesive group that conquers the diminished civilization is, by comparison, a group of barbarians. Once the barbarians solidify their control over the conquered society, however, they become attracted to its more refined aspects, such as literacy and arts, and either assimilate into or appropriate such cultural practices. Brzezinski draws attention on this subject as "The effect of Cultural Superiority" for the short lifespan of Mongol Empire dominancy over Persia in his book "The Grand Chessboard" (1997, pp. 16,17) Then, eventually, the former barbarians will be conquered by a new set of barbarians, who will repeat the process. Some contemporary readers of Khaldun have read this as an early business cycle theory, though set in the historical circumstances of the mature Islamic empire ("Ibn Khaldun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia," n.d.).

Some readings posit an anticipation of Marx's labour theory of value in Ibn Khaldun's work. Ibn Khaldun asserts that all value (profit) comes from labour, as Marx was later to write. He outlines an early (possibly even the earliest) example of political economy. He describes the economy as being composed of value-adding processes; that is, labour is added to techniques and crafts and the product is sold at a higher value. He also made the distinction between "profit" and "sustenance", in modern political economy terms, surplus and that required for the reproduction of classes respectively. He also calls for the creation of a science to explain society and goes on to outline these ideas in his major work the *Muqaddimah* (Dawood, 2004).

The British philosopher-anthropologist Ernest Gellner considered Ibn Khaldun's definition of government, "an institution which prevents injustice other than such as it commits itself", the best in the history of political theory. Egon Orowan, who termed the concept of "socioeconomy", developed the writings of Ibn Khaldun to forecast an eventual failure of market demand ("Ibn Khaldun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia," n.d.).

### **2.3.7 Niccolo Machiavelli, the New “Art of War”, the “Prince”, and the “Discourses”**

Evolution of Strategic thought brings us to the first milestone of modern international relations theory together with a very well-known philosopher and statesman. His name has been used to refer to deception and even opportunism for centuries. As a matter of fact the terminology of “Stratagem” has been referred to “War deceptions” since ancient Greek civilization. The author of the first “Art of War”, Sun Tzu also stressed the importance of “War deceptions” in military strategy.

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) was an Italian philosopher, writer, and is considered one of the main founders of modern political science. (Paret, Craig, & Gilbert, 1986). He was a diplomat, political philosopher, musician, and playwright, but, foremost, he was a civil servant of the Florentine Republic. In June of 1498, after the ousting and execution of Girolamo Savonarola, the Great Council elected Machiavelli as Secretary to the second Chancery of the Republic of Florence.

Like Leonardo da Vinci, Machiavelli is considered a typical example of the Renaissance man (Paret et al., 1986). He is most famous for a short political treatise, *The Prince*; originally called *De Principatibus* (About Principalities) is a political treatise. It was originally written in 1513, but not published until 1532, five years after Machiavelli's death. Although he privately circulated *The Prince* among friends, the only work he published in his life was *The Art of War*, about high-military science. Since the sixteenth century, generations of politicians remain attracted and repelled by the cynical approach to power posited in *The Prince* and his other works. Whatever his personal intentions, which are still debated today, his surname yielded the modern political word Machiavellianism—the use of cunning and deceitful tactics in politics or in general. Many scholars pointed out this undeserved jurisdiction. (e.g. Machiavelli, *A Man Misunderstood*, by Michael White (2005)).

Machiavelli's “Art of War” is divided into a preface (proemio) and seven books (chapters), which take the form of a series of dialogues detailing how an army should be raised, trained, organized, deployed and employed.

Machiavelli's *Art of War* echoes many themes, issues, ideas and proposals from his earlier, more widely read works, *The Prince* and *The Discourses*. While his theories are based on a thorough study and analysis of classical and contemporary military practices, some of his proposals may seem in hindsight to have been impractical for the time. However, his basic notion of emulating Roman practices was slowly and pragmatically adapted by many later rulers and commanders. They would lay the foundations for the system of linear tactics which would dominate the warfare of Europe and the world until after the Napoleonic Wars. As Voltaire has said: "Machiavelli taught Europe the art of war; it had long been practiced, without being known."

While Machiavelli's influence as a military theorist is often given a backseat to his writings as a political philosopher, he considered *Dell'arte della guerra* to be his most important work, since it was concerned solely with war, which to him was the most important aspect of statecraft.

The views expounded by Machiavelli in *The Prince* may seem extreme even for the time period in which they were written. It is the most remembered, and the work responsible for bringing "Machiavellian" into wide usage as a pejorative term. However, his whole life was spent in Florence at a time of continuous political conflict. Accordingly, Machiavelli emphasizes the need for stability in a prince's principality; at stake is its preservation. The book was written primarily as a guide for the prince to maintain his power and only secondarily as a guide for maintaining the principality.

Machiavelli stands strongly against the use of mercenaries. He believes them useless to a ruler because they are undisciplined, cowardly, and without any loyalty, being motivated only by money. Machiavelli attributes the Italian city states' weakness to their reliance on mercenary armies (Paret et al., 1986, p. 11).

### **2.3.8 Miyamoto Musashi and The “Book of Five Rings”**

Miyamoto Musashi (1584-1645), was a famous Japanese samurai, and is considered by many to have been one of the most skilled swordsmen in history. Musashi, as he is often simply known, became legendary through his outstanding swordsmanship in numerous duels, even from a very young age. He is the founder of the style of swordsmanship and the author of “The Book of Five Rings”, a book on strategy, tactics, and philosophy that is still studied today (“Military Strategy Gurus and Masters The Complete A to Z Guide,” n.d.).

### **2.3.9 Comte de Guibert; “Tactics in General” or Strategy**

There was a shaded period in the theory of strategic thought for a couple of centuries up to time of Napoleonic Warfare. However, there were few examples for this period. The most influencing one is Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert (1743 - 1790) who was a French general and military writer. In 1770 he published his *Essai général de tactique* in London, and this celebrated work appeared in numerous subsequent editions and in English, German and even Persian translations. It is accepted that Frederick the Great and Napoleone Bonapart were impressed with his new ideas of warfare strategy (Mathey, 1995, p. 26).

### **2.3.10 Napoleon Bonaparte, a Rich Resource for Followers**

Napoleon himself was not a theorist but no doubt a strategist, since he is one of the most glorious strategy applicers. He lived between 1769 –1821 and was a military and political leader of France whose actions shaped European politics in the early 19th century.

Born in Corsica and trained as an artillery officer in mainland France, Bonaparte rose to prominence under the First French Republic and led successful campaigns against the First and Second Coalitions arrayed against France. In 1799, he staged a coup d'état and installed himself as First Consul; five years later the French Senate proclaimed him Emperor of the French. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the French Empire under Napoleon, engaged in a series of conflicts - the Napoleonic

Wars - involving every major European power. After a streak of victories, France secured a dominant position in continental Europe and Napoleon maintained the French sphere of influence through the formation of extensive alliances and the appointment of friends and family members to rule other European countries as French client states.

The French invasion of Russia in 1812 marked a turning point in Napoleon's fortunes. His Grande Armée was badly damaged in the campaign and never fully recovered. In 1813, the Sixth Coalition defeated his forces at Leipzig; the following year the Coalition invaded France, forced Napoleon to abdicate and exiled him to the island of Elba. Less than a year later, he escaped Elba and returned to power, but was defeated at the Battle of Waterloo in June 1815. Napoleon spent the last six years of his life under British supervision on the island of Saint Helena. An autopsy concluded he died of stomach cancer, though Sten Forshufvud and other scientists have since conjectured that he was poisoned with arsenic.

The conflict with the rest of Europe led to a period of total war across the continent and his campaigns are studied at military academies the world over. While considered a tyrant by his opponents, he is also remembered for the establishment of the Napoleonic code, which laid the administrative and judicial foundations for much of Western Europe (Mathey, 1995; "Military Strategy Gurus and Masters The Complete A to Z Guide," n.d.).

Napoleon left no written philosophy of warfare. However, he left many judgement sentences and wise sayings, some of which include some sense of humour. A selection of quotations, chosen by the author from different resources, are as follows;

- Strategy is the art of making use of time and space.
- Politics of a nation lies under its geography.
- There are but two powers in the world the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind.
- Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.

- The secret of war lies in communications (“Napoleon Quotes. Napoleon Bonaparte Quotes and Quotations,” 2002).
- Strategy is the highest level of warfare (Mathey, 1995).
- Absurdity is not a handicap in politics. (Adm. Enrico Martinotti)

19<sup>th</sup> century military thinkers who were all military commanders and fought together with or against Napoleon Bonaparte made their reputations by defining the rules, art and the concepts of Napoleonic warfare and the staff system he developed. This subject is examined in detail and presented in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Strategy from Military Point of View and Principles of War**

In this chapter, the fundamental contributions of military strategy theoreticians found in the literature will be presented. In this context; principles of war and dimensions of strategy as well as the role of culture and perceptions regarding dimensions of strategy will be examined. The reflections of those elements to contemporary business will also be mentioned

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The fundamentals of the strategic theory were established by military authors during and following Napoleonic wars. Military thinkers who fought with and against him created considerable literature by compiling their experiences, observations and ideas (Gray, 1999). While strategy was defined as “art of war” in the first quarter of the XIX century, towards the mid-century, the ideas that the wars and revolutions served political aims began being emphasized. Following that stage, strategy was defined as “management of a nation’s general politics in the time and in the space” (Mathey, 1995, p. 11). That situation can be considered as a milestone of which strategy comes again as a terminology for the state level after 24 centuries. It is quite interesting that today’s widespread terminologies of “National strategy” and “Grand strategy” have an uninterrupted past of only 170 years.

#### **3.2 Master of Strategic Thought: Carl von Clausewitz**

Thought and applications in the science “economics” prior to the treatise “Wealth of Nations” by Adam Smith (1773) are named as “A Priory”, while the followings are named “A Posteriory”. If this consideration is reflected in strategic thought, all works prior to and after “On War” by Clausewitz may be named by the same logic.



The Prussian military thinker and intellectual Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz; (1780 –1831) is widely acknowledged as the most important of the major strategic theorists. He is most famous for his military treatise *Vom Kriege*, translated into English as *On War*. Even though he's been dead for over a century and a half, he remains the most frequently cited, the most controversial, and in many respects the most modern. He was very persuasive when he wrote: 'Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy' and "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means" (Gray, 1999).

Although Carl von Clausewitz participated in many military campaigns, he was primarily a military theorist interested in the examination of war. He wrote a careful, systematic, philosophical examination of war in all its aspects, as he saw it and taught it. The result was his principal work, *On War*, the West's premier work on the philosophy of war. His examination was so carefully considered that it was only partially completed by the time of his death. Other soldiers before this time had written treatises on various military subjects, but none undertook a great philosophical examination of war on the scale of Clausewitz's work.

"*On War*" is a long and intricate investigation of Clausewitz's observations based on his own experience in the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars and on considerable historical research into those wars and others. It is shaped not only by purely military and political considerations but by Clausewitz's strong interests in art, science, and education (Bassford, 2008).

Some of the key ideas discussed in *On War* (1976) include:

- the dialectical approach to military analysis
- the methods of "critical analysis"
- the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
- the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
- the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defence
- philosophical distinctions between "absolute" or "ideal war," and "real war"

- "war" belongs fundamentally to the social realm—rather than to the realms of art or science
- "strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art
- "tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science
- the importance of "moral forces" (more than simply "morale") as opposed to quantifiable physical elements
- the "military virtues" of professional armies (which do not necessarily trump the rather different virtues of other kinds of fighting forces)
- conversely, the very real effects of a superiority in numbers and "mass"
- the essential unpredictability of war
- strategic and operational "centres of gravity"

The term centre of gravity, used in a specifically military context, derives from Clausewitz's usage (which he took from Newtonian Mechanics). In the simplified and often confused form in which it appears in official US military doctrine, "Centre of Gravity" refers to the basis of an opponent's power (at either the operational, strategic, or political level).

### **3.3 Military Followers of Clausewitz**

As mentioned above, Clausewitz has been the most frequently cited thinker on strategy for the last one and a half centuries. He also has been a rich source of inspiration for generals, military thinkers as well as business gurus in the context of strategic management. His first generation followers were XIXth century military thinkers and commanders. A selection of them for a brief survey is made and introduced according to chronological order below. The criterion for this selection is that followers should be not only strategy appliers but also strategic thinkers. Their contribution to the strategic thought with their treatises will also be mentioned.

### **3.3.1 Baron de Jomini and “Summary of the Art of War/ Principles of Strategy”**

Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini (1779 - 1869) French general, military critic, and historian whose systematic attempt to define the principles of warfare made him one of the founders of modern military thought. (Jomini, Henri, baron de. (2009). In Encyclopædia Britannica online)

His greatest work was *Précis de l'art de la guerre* (Summary of the Art of War, 1838). In 1854 he served as adviser to Tsar Nicholas on tactics during the Crimean War and in 1859 advised Emperor Napoleon III on the Italian expedition.

As a critic of military policy, Jomini succeeded for the first time in fixing divisions between strategy, tactics, and logistics. Primarily interested in strategy, he found the central problem in successful planning to be the choice of correct lines of operation by which a general could dominate the zone of operations in which he is engaged. His other works include *Principles de la stratégie* (3 vol., 1818; “Principles of Strategy”); *Histoire critique et militaire des campagnes de la Révolution, de 1792 à 1801* (5 vol.; “Critical and Military History of the Campaigns of the Revolution from 1792 to 1801”); and *Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon* (4 vol., 1827; Life of Napoleon, 1864).

### **3.3.2 Mahan and “Influence of Sea Power upon History”**

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) is an American naval officer and historian who was a highly influential exponent of sea power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

In 1890 Mahan published his college lectures as *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*. In this book he argued for the paramount importance of sea power in national historical supremacy. The book, which came at a time of great technological improvement in warships, won immediate recognition abroad. In his second book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812* (1892), Mahan stressed the interdependence of the military and

commercial control of the sea and asserted that the control of seaborne commerce can determine the outcome of wars. Both books were avidly read in Great Britain and Germany, where they greatly influenced the build-up of naval forces in the years prior to World War I.

Mahan retired from the U.S. Navy in 1896 but was subsequently recalled to service. In *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (1897), he sought to arouse his fellow Americans to a realization of their maritime responsibilities. Mahan served as president of the American Historical Association in 1902. His other major books include *The Life of Nelson* (1897) and *The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence* (1913). Before his death in December 1914, Mahan correctly foretold the defeat of the Central Powers and of the German navy in World War I. (“Mahan, Alfred Thayer - Encyclopædia Britannica”, 2009).

### **3.3.3 Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart and “Indirect Approach”**

Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895 - 1970), British military historian and strategist known for his advocacy of mechanized warfare.

Liddell Hart became an early advocate of air power and mechanized tank warfare. Defining strategy as “the art of distributing military means to fulfil the ends of policy,” he favoured an “indirect approach” that aimed at dislocating the enemy and reducing his means of resistance. Drawing on his wartime experiences, he emphasized the elements of mobility and surprise.

Liddell Hart's writings were more influential in Germany than in France or England. His “expanding torrent” theory, along with the doctrines of General J.F.C. Fuller on employment of tanks, was adopted by German pioneers of armoured warfare.. For the duration of the war, Liddell Hart wrote for the Daily Mail. Dubious of nuclear deterrence, he stressed conventional defense forces during the post-war years and also opposed the concept of total war. In 1966 he was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II.

The indirect approach was a strategy developed by Basil Liddell Hart after World War I. His strategy called for armies to advance along the line of least expectation against the least resistance. His theory was the opposite of the tactics used during World War I. While he originally developed the theory for infantry, contact with J. F.C. Fuller helped change his theory more towards tanks. The indirect approach also emphasizes the effects of factors other than military ones such as sociological and economical, on the results of war. (“Liddell Hart, Sir Basil - Encyclopædia Britannica”, 2009)

Italian army general Giulio Douhet (1869 - 1930) was one of his major followers and named as “the father of strategic air power”.

### **3.4 Clausewitz in Contemporary Business**

In addition to his military followers, Clausewitz has been a long inspiration for business gurus in the context of strategic management. Among many others two distinctive examples are chosen and quoted below. The first one is Jack Welch who is one of the major theorist and practitioner on strategic management in business:

Clausewitz summed up what it had all been about in his classic *On War*. Men could not reduce strategy to a formula. Detailed planning necessarily failed, due to the inevitable frictions encountered: chance events, imperfections in execution, and the independent will of the opposition. Instead, the human elements were paramount: leadership, morale, and the almost instinctive savvy of the best generals.

The Prussian general staff, under the elder von Moltke, perfected these concepts in practice. They did not expect a plan of operations to survive beyond the first contact with the enemy. They set only the broadest of objectives and emphasized seizing unforeseen opportunities as they arose. Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances." (Welch, n.d.).

Another example comes from Henry Mintzberg, one of the famous gurus on contemporary management and the author of “the Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning”. In his work together with Ahlstrand and Lampel, he makes intelligent references to Clausewitz in six separate discussions (Mintzberg, 1998).

While many writers say quite bluntly that "business is war," it is obvious that, business is NOT war—not even metaphorically speaking. It's true that politics, business, and war belong to the same broad class of phenomena, and that there are events within business that correspond in significant ways to war. Indeed, wars have actually been waged at times by commercial corporations (think of the Hanseatic League or the East India Company) for essentially commercial objectives. For that matter, there have always been mercenary armies, which are essentially businesses that sell their military capabilities. But these are very specific instances of business and war occupying the same space at the same time. In general, just as war is a particular manifestation or subset of politics, business analogs to war are subsets of a larger phenomenon—thus, business as a whole is properly compared to politics, not war.

On the other hand, we've known some business thinkers who reject the business/war analogy altogether, claiming that business is about the creation of value, whereas war is pure destruction. This idea, too, is, in our view, in error. War—at least, when it is pursued with sense and skill—is about the creation of political value. Thus politics may involve "creative destruction" in much the same manner as business obviously does. "We are the blind people and strategy formation is our elephant..." (Mintzberg, 1998)

There are many other examples of business theorists drawing on Clausewitz, some interesting and insightful, others nonsensical.

### **3.5 Principles of War and Dimensions of Strategy**

Modern strategic thought has followed the path of Clausewitz. However, some strategic thinkers claim that the first milestone of this path goes back to Machiavelli (Paret et al., 1986). Some thinkers take it to Sun Tzu. A Business manager might consider Igor Ansoff or Henri Mintzberg as the first milestone for strategy. This differentiation is related to the understanding and perception of "Strategy" and this is the subject matter of this dissertation. If military or security strategies are in question, fundamental contributors belong to nineteenth century and first half of twentieth century, as mentioned above. On the other hand, second half of twentieth century security strategy thinkers might be considered as "commentators and further contributors" of their predecessor masters. Paul Kennedy, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Jack Attali and so on, are the great authors of the contemporary security strategy thought. They also accept and reiterate that they follow the path of historical masters and especially Clausewitz's school. Taking into account this consideration, this brief survey on the historical

evolution of strategic thought may be sufficient in the context of this dissertation. However, “the War Principles” which are extracted from historical experiences and masters’ explanations will be examined. Besides, “Strategy Family” and “Elements or Dimensions of Strategy” are also discussed in order to clarify and fix the variables of this research.

### **3.5.1 Principles of War as the Inspiration of Both Military Strategy and Strategic Management for Business**

The Principles of War were tenets originally proposed by Carl von Clausewitz in his essay Principles of War, and later enlarged in his book, On War. Since the mid-19th century, due to the influence of the Prussian Army, they have become a guide for many military organizations to focus on the thinking of military commanders and political leaders toward concepts and methods of successful execution of wars and smaller military operations. Although originally concerned with strategy, grand tactics and tactics, due to the changing nature of warfare and military technology, since the interwar period, the principles are largely applied to the strategic decision-making, and in some cases, to operational mobility of forces.

Principles of war are the evolved concepts, laws, rules and methods that guide the conduct of combat-related activities during conflicts. Throughout history, soldiers, military theorists, political leaders, philosophers, academic scholars, practitioners of international law and human rights advocacy groups have sought to determine fundamental rules for the conduct of warfare. Principles of warfare impact on the health and security of civilian populations in a zone of conflict, human and natural environment, social networks and groups, rural and urban societies, national and international economic relations, political structures and international diplomacy, and the means and methods by which conflicts are brought to conclusion. These approaches have been both prescriptive, stating what activities are forbidden in warfare by law, ethical considerations, or religious beliefs, and descriptive, analyzing the best practices and means by which armed forces can achieve victory.

### **3.5.2 Prescriptive Principles of War and National Variations**

Principles of war (or warfare) are extracted from the entire history of military strategy. Since the first quarter of the twentieth century, the rules of the art have been expressed by a restricted number of “Principles of War” (Mathey, 1995, p. 78). A survey proves that most of them include a wide commonality. However, they somewhat vary in accordance with national and even geographical experiences, culture and perceptions. Major prescriptive examples from some leading nations are summarized and listed below in order to shed a light on some national perceptions on strategy.

### **3.5.3 British Principles of War**

The British historian J.F.C. Fuller developed a set of eight principles of warfare between 1912 and 1924:

The definition of each principle has been refined over the following decades and adopted throughout the British armed forces. The tenth principle, added later, was originally called “Administration”. The first principle has always been stated as pre-eminent and the second is usually considered more important than the remainder, which are not listed in any order of importance.

The 2008 edition of British Defence Doctrine (BDD) states and explains the principles with the following preface: “Principles of War guide commanders and their staffs in the planning and conduct of warfare. They are enduring, but not immutable, absolute or prescriptive, and provide an appropriate foundation for all military activity. The relative importance of each may vary according to context; their application requires judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. Commanders also need to take into account the legitimacy of their actions, based on the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces, once committed.”



The ten principles as listed and defined in the 2008 edition of BDD, with their brief explanations are as follows:

**Selection and Maintenance of the Aim:** A single, unambiguous aim is the keystone of successful military operations. Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war (This principle has later reflected to strategic management for business as “Management by objectives (MBO)”).

**Maintenance of Morale:** Morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth and group cohesion.

**Offensive Action:** Offensive action is the practical way in which a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum and seize the initiative.

**Security:** Security is the provision and maintenance of an operating environment that affords the necessary freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives.

**Surprise:** Surprise is the consequence of shock and confusion induced by the deliberate or incidental introduction of the unexpected.

**Concentration of Force:** Concentration of force involves the decisive, synchronized application of superior fighting power (conceptual, physical, and moral) to realize intended effects, when and where required.

**Economy of Effort:** Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, material and time in relation to the achievement of objectives.

**Flexibility:** Flexibility – the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances – comprises agility, responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability.

**Cooperation:** Cooperation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.

**Sustainability:** To sustain a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.

These principles of war are commonly used by the armed forces of Commonwealth countries such as Australia.

### **3.5.4 United States Principles of War**

The U.S. Army's Field Manual FM 100-5 (Operations, 14 June 1993, Chapter 2, p.2-4) superseded by, US Army Field Manual FM 3-0, (Operations, June 2001, Chapter 4, p, 4-11) listed the following basic principles

**Objective:** Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's ability to fight and will to fight.

**Offensive:** Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war.

**Mass:** Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire.

**Economy of Force:** Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy

of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time on the battlefield. ...

**Manoeuvre:** Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Manoeuvre is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective manoeuvre keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat. ...

**Unity of Command:** For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.

**Security:** Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning of adequate security measures.


**Surprise:** Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort, and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise.

**Simplicity:** Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, parsimony is to be preferred.

An Illustrative view for War principles which embraces full spectrum of operation, which takes place in U.S. Army Field Manual FM: 3-0.is shown in Figure 3.1

In addition, five “tenets of operation” are built on the principle of war. Such as; initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, versatility.

**Figure 3.1 U. S. War Principles Which Embraces Full Spectrum of Operation**



Source: (U.S. Army FM: 3-0; p.4-3)

### 3.5.5 Principles of War in the Soviet Union and Russia

The Soviet principles of military science, as interpreted by the US Army in the Field Manual 100-61, 1998 are as follows: Similar principles continue to be followed in Commonwealth of Independent States CIS countries, mainly by the Russian federation after the disintegration of Soviet Union.

**Preparedness:** The ability to fulfil missions under any conditions for starting or the conduct of war.

**Initiative:** Utilizing surprise, decisiveness, and aggressiveness to continuously strive to achieve and retain the initiative. Initiative, in this sense describes efforts to fulfil the plan in spite of difficulties. This is in contrast to the western usage of the term which means attacking (or threatening to attack) to force enemy reaction, thus denying his ability to act.

**Capability:** Full use of the various means and capabilities of battle to achieve victory.

**Cooperation:** Coordinated application of and close cooperation between major units of the armed forces.

**Concentration:** Decisive concentration of the essential force at the needed moment and in the most important direction to achieve the main mission.

**Depth:** Destruction of the enemy throughout the entire depth of their deployment.

**Morale:** Use of political and psychological factors to demoralize opponents and break their will to resist.

**Obedience:** Strict and uninterrupted obedience. Orders are to be followed exactly and without question. Commanders are expected to directly supervise subordinates in a detailed manner in order to ensure compliance.

**Steadfastness:** Subordinate commanders are to carry out the spirit and the letter of the plan.

**Security:** Security complements surprise. All aspects of security, from deception and secrecy, to severe discipline of subordinates who through action or inaction allow information to fall into the hands of the enemy are to be vigorously carried out.

**Logistics:** Restoration of reserves and restoration of combat capability is of paramount concern of the modern, fast paced battlefield.

### **3.5.6 Comparison for the Principles of War among Some Leading Nations**

Some strategy thinkers propose comparisons among some leading nations' principles of war. Among them, Frost (1999) and Mathey (1995) proposed their comparisons in a structured table. Mathey added French's and Frost added China's principles of war to their lists. Taking into account both thinkers' work and British Defence Doctrine (BDD) and U.S. Army Field Manual 3.0, a comparison table is structured and presented drawing on the sources given below.

**Table 3.1 A Comparison for the Principles of War among the Some Leading Nations**

<b>Great Britain/ Australia</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>Former Soviet and Russia</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>People's Republic of China</b>
Selection & Maintenance of the Aim	Objective			Selection & Maintenance of the Aim
Offensive Action	Offensive			Offensive Action
Concentration of Force	Mass	Massing & Correlation of Forces	Concentration of Effort	Concentration of Force
Economy of Effort	Economy of Force	Economy, Sufficiency of Force		
Flexibility	Manoeuvre	Initiative, Mobility & Tempo		Initiative & Flexibility
Cooperation	Unity of Command	Interworking & Coordination		Coordination
Security	Security			Security
Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise
	Simplicity			
Sustainability, maintenance of Morale		Simultaneous Attack on all Levels, Preservation of Combat Effectiveness	Liberty of Action	Morale, Mobility, Political Mobilization, Freedom of Action

Source: (Mathey, 1995; Frost 1999; BDD; U.S. FM 3-0)

It can be seen that in Military art, the Soviet and Western systems are similar, but place their emphasis in wildly differing places. Western systems allow more control and decision-making at lower levels of command, and with this empowerment comes



a consistent emphasis. Offensive, mass, and manoeuvre principles for the western commander all place a sense of personal responsibility and authority to ensure these principles are followed by appropriate action. In contrast the Soviet system stresses preparedness, initiative, and obedience. This places more responsibility at the better prepared and informed centres of command, and provide more overall control of the battle.

### **3.5.7 Further Debates on the Principles of War**

There is a debate within the American military establishment to adopt flexibility as the tenth principle of war. Many, however, hold that the principle of Simplicity implicitly includes flexibility. One of the oldest dictum states that the simple plan is the flexible plan.

Robert S. Frost prepared a report on “The Growing Imperative to Adopt “Flexibility” as an American Principle of War, (1999)” and submitted to Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and endorsed by U.S. Army War College. In this report, Frost compared 1921 principles to 1993 principles (FM 100-5) and a new comment on the names of the nine principles. He proposed a new heading as “strategic principles” and changes the names of six principles to nine while keeping the three principles in their original names. Frost’s proposal is shown in Table 3. 2.


**Table 3.2 “Strategic” Principles versus Traditional Principles of War**

<b>Traditional Principles</b>	<b>“Strategic” Principles</b>
Objective	Objective
Offensive	Initiative
Unity of Command	Unity of Effort
Mass	Focus
Economy of Force	Economy of Effort
Manoeuvre	Orchestration
Simplicity	Clarity
Surprise	Surprise
Security	Security

Source: (Frost, 1999)

Frost also argues that the concept of flexibility should be integrated with America's war fighting doctrine. Americans soundly report that flexibility is a given that pervades all aspects of each principle. Frost's comment on "Flexibility's "Dual-Hatted" Role as a Principle of war and as a Synthesizer of the other Principles" is shown in Figure: 3.2.

**Figure 3.2 Flexibility’s “Dual-Hatted” Role as a Principle of War and as a Synthesizer of the Other Principles**



Source: (Frost, 1999)

Although the aim of Frost is to stress the role of flexibility on the principles of war, a point deserves attention that all the principles point to “objective” which is the oldest principle of war. This principle has emerged lately in the context of strategic management for business as “Management by Objectives” (MBO) (Drucker, 1954) which will be examined in chapter 4. This is one of the key argumentations of this dissertation.

In July 2007, Armed Forces Journal published a proposal by van Avery, “12 New Principles of War”. The article was subsequently forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Air Force Chief of Staff and an effort to overhaul current U.S. doctrine was initiated using van Avery's framework. There is still a debate on the thirteenth principle as “Legitimacy” in accordance with the arguments on recent operations and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.

There are numerous contemporary studies on principles of war in the literature taking into account new threats and the new security environment. As an example, Robert R Leonhard in his work on “Principles of War for the Information Age” (1998) argues;

“Today we are in the information age. Many of the principles of the art of war that were born of agrarian times and honed during the industrial age are hopelessly outdated.” As a matter of fact his work is also an adaptation of classical principles to the new technological environment. Some of fundamental classical principles, such as “Economy of efforts”, “Objective”, “Unity of Command”, “Security” can also be seen in his work. An illustrative table of this work is seen on Table 3.3

**Table 3.3 The Principles of War for the Information Age**

<b>LAWS OF WAR</b> The Law of Humanity The Law of Economy <span style="float: right;">The Law of Duality</span>		
<b>PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION AGE WARFARE</b> Principle of Knowledge and Ignorance (Independent Principle)		
Two Principles of “Aggression”:	Two Principles of “Interaction”:	Two Principles of “Control”:
Dislocation and Confrontation	Opportunity and Reaction	Option Acceleration and Objective
Distribution and Concentration	Activity and Security	Command and Anarchy

Source: (Leonhard, 1998)

These principles can be applied to non-military uses (such as business strategies) when Unity of command is separated into coordination and reality, Economy of Force is redefined as use of resources, Mass is separated into renewable and non-renewable resources, and relationships are separated from unity of command.

Of the twelve non-military principles of efficiency some have been formulated by Henry Ford at the turn of the 20th century, and are suggested to be: objective,

coordination, action, reality, knowledge, locations (space and time), things, obtaining, using, protecting, and losing. Nine, ten, or twelve principles all provide a framework for efficient development of any objective. In 1913 Harrington Emerson proposed 12 principles of efficiency, the first three of which could be related to principles of war: Clearly defined ideals - Objective, Common sense - Simplicity, Competent counsel - Unity of Command.

### **3.6 Basic Elements and Dimensions of Strategy**

Elements and dimensions of strategy have been discussed since 1832 with the work of Clausewitz. The arguments on this subject have been developed on two main considerations, namely “hierarchical” and “non- hierarchical” approaches. Early theorists who were all military thinkers produced ideas on the hierarchical elements or dimensions of strategy. Clausewitz himself and his followers also discussed other dimensions of strategy.

#### **3.6.1 Hierarchical Dimensions of Strategy**

Early military thinkers lead off the strategy family, as hierarchical dimensions, from strategy to tactics. As a matter of fact, there was solely one terminology in the very beginning as “Strategy” in ancient Greece. However the term of “Tactics” is as old as the previous one and was employed in similar meaning, as “Tactica” (Larousse, 1999). Re-birth of tactics was in XVIIIth century in France where they were expressed as the meaning of “War arrangements” (Mathey, 1995, p. 10). The emergence of the term of “Operative” was quite late. Reflections on the development of two concepts (or notions), namely “Tactics” and “Operative”, depending on the literature are presented below.

##### **3.6.1.1 The Concepts of Strategy and Tactics**

When the terminology related to military strategy emerged in antiquity, the sizes of the armies were very modest in terms of modern power, often measured in thousands. The theory was formed during the 19th century, long after the times when the size of the armies grew to be expressed in hundreds of thousands. The

theatres of operation thus have grown much out of the battlefields. The term “strategy” is still used to express the highest echelons of military actions. It is also in this era that Napoleon, not the great master of theory but more of the practice of warfare uses the concept “the highest echelon of war” when defining strategy (Mathey, 1995). Therefore, a need for a new terminology for lower echelons of action and thinking has arisen. The term coined for this need is “tactics”, which means “arrangement” in Greek (*tactica*). In antiquity, this term was also used for military purposes as arrangements of military means (Mathey, 1995), without a differentiation in size and extent. This word, used since the 17th century in France, is still used to express military and sometimes civilian actions at levels lower than that of strategy (Mathey, 1995). The main difference between those two terms arises when the size of the army or the corporation, time and extent, and the importance of mission are considered. For example, the operations of large sized and important military units are defined by the term “strategic”, while those of smaller units are “tactical”. This difference is also used in civilian areas as well: Even the investments of a sports club, aimed for longer periods and amounting to high sums are defined as “strategic”, while the manoeuvres within a single match are expressed by “tactic”. However, it is also observed that the writers commenting on a match sometimes use the term “strategic” for a single match. This can be taken as evidence that the conception and perception of strategy has not been formed yet in this realm.

### **3.6.1.2 Emergence of the Concepts of Operative**

It has been observed that the conceptual difference between strategy and tactics has widened after the 19th century theoreticians who contemplated on Napoleonic wars and have asserted that war and strategy should serve the political objectives of a country. From that time onward, the gap between the levels expressed by those two terms is denoted by the terms “operative” and “operational”. However, it is often observed that the levels merge together in daily language. This merging is often made by managers who over-emphasize the importance of their operational level work as “strategic”. Military regulations used by various nations include definitions which aim to differentiate the borders between those three levels. Similar considerations also exist in operational strategies of civilian business corporations. However, it is quite strange that the terms “operational” and “tactical” are sometimes

expressed by the single term “short range strategic planning” (Rue and Byars use the terminology of “Operational or tactical planning” in the same meaning (2002, p. 97)).

As a matter of fact, although there is a hierarchical relation among the notions of strategy, operative and tactics, they are also interrelated to each other. In Figure 3.3, a scheme, which showing the hierarchical and as well as interrelating positions of the two lower level elements of strategy is proposed.

**Figure 3.3 Interrelating Positions of Strategy and Its Lower Elements**



### **3.6.2 Notions for Upper / Lower Levels of Strategy**

Although the lower elements of the hierarchy of strategy have been completed as defined above, the development of terminology has not ceased. This time need for the definitions for upper elements has been felt. Initial names for the upper echelons


of strategy were “grand strategy”, “total strategy” and “national strategy”. Although those terms are still in use today, first the term “policy” followed by the term “vision” has taken their place in the upper level of strategic lexicon.

The hierarchical approach comprises a descending hierarchy of realms of behaviour and there is a strong argument for regarding these realms as being very substantially interdependent.

As an example, U.S. Army FM 3-0 describes this interdependency in the context of Hierarchical approach. An illustrative figure is shown in figure 3.4



**Figure 3.4 Hierarchy of Strategy as the Levels of War**




Source: (U.S. Army FM 3-0)

The hierarchical view, with its inevitable implication of a descent from matters of greater to lesser importance, can conceal the interdependencies that give integrity to the whole (Gray, 1999, p. 21).

On the other hand, according to Mathey's argument, the hierarchical approach from the top to the bottom begins with "vision" and follows with "policy", "grand strategy", "sectoral strategy" (such as military), "operations" and "tactics" (1995). An illustrative explanation for the "Hierarchical Approach of Strategy Family"

according to their decision versus employment level is designed and proposed in Figure 3.5.


**Figure 3.5 Descending Ladder Model for the Upper and Lower Elements of Strategy, Decision Level vs. Employment Level**



Relation between “Grand Strategy” and “Sectoral Strategy” is one of the key issues of this dissertation. Strategic perceptions of persons who are responsible to plan and execute sectoral strategies may or may not vary according to their sectoral or corporate culture and educations.

Gray (1999) also argues that those elements of strategy can be described as horizontally integrated dimensions. According to this explanation, the relationship among the elements depends on interaction hierarchy rather than a vertical hierarchy. Inspired by Gray’s Argument and depending on other argumentations in the literature, an explanatory figure for “interaction based relationship among the units in strategy family” is developed and proposed in Figure 3.6.

**Figure 3.6 Interaction Based Relationship among the Strategy Family**




Gray develops his argumentations via challenging each other;

That the hierarchy depends on the importance of the elements can be quite arguable. History is the witness of some dramatic occurrences which proves that the smallest element may affect strategy as a whole. My argument is there should be another explanation which takes into account all of the relations among the elements. This explanation should cover all the relationships among the elements and explain their functions on path to a strategic target. This kind of explanation should also serve to change the static meaning of “elements” to a dynamic meaning, such as “dimensions” (1999)

Depending on Gray’s argument and other argumentations in the literature, a target oriented model of the strategy family is developed and proposed in figure 3.7.

**Figure 3.7 Target Oriented Model of the Strategy Family**



### **3.6.3 Non- Hierarchical Dimensions of Strategy**

There are numerous arguments on dimensions of strategy. The hierarchical ones can be concluded in a way. However, since strategic thought will never conclude hence its dimensions also will never be. Strategic thinker Collin S. Gray touches on this matter in his article (Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) 52 Autumn/Winter 97/98);

There is no correct answer to the question: How many dimensions are there to strategy? The exact numbers or labels of the dimensions do not matter, but it is important that everything of significance about strategy has been included somewhere among them.

As a matter of fact, almost all the strategic thinkers unanimously agree on a number of non-hierarchical dimensions, such as, geography, weapons (or in broader meaning “technology”), type of violence, economic, social and so on. Reflections on this issue are as follows.

#### **3.6.3.1 Geography**

Among all the dimensions, geography is the most essential and it cannot be denied and will not outdate. In the time of Sun Tzu and Pericles “Land areas” occupied primary importance. Subsequently, “Sea areas” have come on the scene and never been left out. After 24 centuries “Air” has taken its role. Just after half a century “Space” appeared from the strategic horizon and threatened the “Life of Earth” during the Cold War. In the end a new space comes which is also named as “non-geographical” dimension of strategy, “cyberspace”.

### **3.6.3.2 Weapons or Technology**

As for weapons, from technological consequences come the following: from the primitive catapults, elephants, powder and Byzantine fire, cannons, armoured forces, fighter and strategic bomber aircraft, missiles and smart weapons, nuclear weapons and other WMD and in the end, computers.

### **3.6.3.3 Levels or Types of Violence (or Threat)**

Another classification on strategic dimensions might be focused on the levels or types of violence from the military point of view. Such as, general war, limited war, irregular war, asymmetric war, terrorism and cyber attack.

Above mentioned dimensions are certainly not hierarchical but might categorize as “Timely or technologically consequential”.

### **3.6.3.4 Clausewitz’s Elements of Strategy**

As a matter of fact, those thoughts are not totally new. We can find the roots of some qualitative dimensions of strategy in the immortal work of Clausewitz, “On War”. In the chapter titled “The Elements of Strategy” various elements were grouped under five headings.

- Geographical element includes; terrain, rivers, distances, etc
- Mathematical element includes; angle of lines of operations, convergent and divergent, movements and geometry into their calculation.
- Physical element consists of size of forces, compositions, armament and so forth.
- Statistical element mentioned about support and maintenance.
- In the end, the fifth one or in the context of this study, assumed to be the first one is “Moral” dimension. According to Clausewitz definition, moral

dimension is created by intellectual and psychological qualities and influences.

#### **3.6.3.5 Michael Howard's Four Dimensions**

Following Sir Basil Liddell Hart's work on the "Indirect Approach", new non-hierarchical dimensions have come in to strategic thought. Sir Michael Howard proposed four dimensions in "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy" (1979) i.e, social, logistical, operational and technological. In his argument he mentioned historical and cultural interests within the social dimension.

#### **3.6.3.6 Colin S. Gray's Seventeen Dimensions of Strategy**

Strategic thinkers propose many other elements or dimensions of strategy. In order to keep the main route of this study, it would be better to conclude with Colin S. Gray's "seventeen dimensions of strategy". Gray developed his dimensions through his articles and finalized them in his book of Modern Strategy. Those are the most comprehensive ones in the entire literature. The Seventeen Dimensions are clustered into three categories. A simplified form of the seventeen dimensions is structured and presented in Table 3.4.

**Table 3.4 The Seventeen Dimensions of Strategy**

<p>1<sup>st</sup>. CATEGORY: PEOPLE AND POLITICS</p>	<p>People Society Culture Politics Ethics</p>
<p>2<sup>nd</sup>. CATEGORY: PREPERATION FOR WAR</p>	<p>Economics and logistics Organization Administration Information and intelligence Strategic theory and doctrine Technology</p>
<p>3<sup>rd</sup>. CATEGORY: WAR PROPER</p>	<p>Military operations Geography Friction Command Adversary Time</p>

The dimensions clustered in the first category are the subjects which fall into the realm with which this study is interested. As a matter of fact, one of them, “culture” is the most important one which already embraces the other four dimensions in the category. Besides, almost all the dimensions or elements of the strategy are affected to some extent by “culture”.

### **3.6.4 The Role of Culture as a Dimension of Strategy**

Beginning from Clausewitz, along with classical concrete elements, abstract elements, concepts and dimensions of strategy have been examined by theorists and strategic thinkers. The latest and comprehensive work of Colin S. Gray gives utmost importance to “culture” as a dimension of strategy.

### **3.6.4.1 Culture, Perception and Behaviour**

The Oxford and Webster's dictionaries both define culture as embracing ideas and patterns of behaviour. Culture is a deeply contested concept. In an influential work on culture in early modern Europe, social historian Peter Burke defined culture as 'a system of shared meanings, attitudes and values, and the symbolic forms (performance, artefacts) in which they are expressed or embodied' (1994, p. X)

The most persuasively plausible definition of culture is that offered by sociologist Raymond Williams. Williams claims that the definition of culture has three general categories: the 'ideal,' the 'documentary,' and the 'social.' Respectively, Williams' categories include values pertaining to some 'timeless order,' "the artefacts" of intellectual and imaginative work in which human thought and experience are variously recorded,' and finally he advises that culture 'is a description of a particular way of life which finds expression in institutions and Ordinary behaviour (2009, p. 56).

Gray stressed the importance of the strong relationship between strategic culture and strategic behaviour;

The subject of strategic culture matters deeply because it raises core questions about the roots of, and influences upon, strategic behavior. No one and no institution can operate beyond culture. Not all policy makers and warriors are able to act out their cultural preferences' (1999, p. 129)

Skypek (2006) stressed the interdisciplinary nature of strategic culture and contributions of other realms of social sciences; "The field of strategic culture is interdisciplinary with substantial contributions made from the fields of business, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and international relations".

Gray also argues on the inconvenience for scholars who wish to study the distinctive influence of culture.

'If cultural phenomena cannot be readily identified and isolated, they may well prove too elusive for rigorous examination by social scientists. That caveat



duly recorded, it is most useful to approach the idea of strategic culture in terms of context, a term presented here in two senses. On the one hand, culture as context provides meaning for events. On the other hand, the human hosts of strategic culture are inalienably part of their own strategic context' (ibid).

#### **3.6.4.2 Categorization of Strategic Culture**

Strategic Culture can be variously categorized. Gray proposes seven non-exclusive categories, noticing that there is still much work to be done in theoretical realm (1999, p. 148). Those are;

- Nationality
- Geography
- Service, Branch, Weapons
- Functions
- Simplicity-complexity
- Generation
- Grand Strategy

There are numerous studies in the literature on the national category. As a matter of fact, “Principles of War”, which was examined above, is all at national level through military or security perspective. Geography also can be considered as related to the national category, since nations are located in a particular geography. “Generation” can be assumed in the context of the evolution of principles of war within the history of each nation. However this dissertation focuses on “Service”, “Branch” or “Sectorial”, in other words, “Corporate” or “Organizational” base. Hence the survey should continue on the path of corporate or organizational bases.

#### **3.6.5 The Role and Importance of “Corporate or Organizational Culture”**


Categorization of Strategic Culture is mentioned above. Organizational or corporate culture is also the subject matter for strategic business management beside the security dimension. Rue and Byars (2002, p. 325) define the culture as; “Set of

important understanding (often unstated) that members of a community share”. They also state the “Corporate culture” as follows; “Corporate culture communicates how people in an organization should behave by establishing a value system conveyed through rites, rituals, myths, legends and actions”.

Gray (1999) also notices on the relationship between culture and behaviour; “All human beings are culturally educated and programmed. So, all strategic behaviour is cultural behaviour”.

Frost (1999) proposes a conceptual model on “how organizational culture embraces and influences basic doctrines and leader development”. Frost’s model is shown in Figure 3.8.

Figure 3.8 The Cascading Influence of Basic Doctrine on Leader Development and Organizational Culture



Source: (Frost, 1999)

### **3.6.6 Other Discussions on the Dimension of Strategic Culture**

In the literature survey the overwhelming majority of the studies on strategic culture on national basis taking into account non-state actors, religion and sociological, psychological factors, qualitative values, perceptions and so on.

Thomas Skypek carried out a study for the U. S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, in order to determine “Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum” (2006). Skypek conduct the search in a variety of databases. They include: Journal Storage (JSTOR), the Open Source Center (formerly FBIS), LexisNexis, and Intelink, as well as standard Internet search engines. Over 114 sources were found in all. Most of the literature was in the form of scholarly publications published by Western academics, scholars and analysts. There appeared to be a shortage of non-Western perspectives on strategic culture. However, there were a few sources from British and Indian authors. Skypek’s list is examined by the writer of this thesis who found that all of them were related to only security issues, especially focused on non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). His conclusion is found meaningful from the point of view of the complex nature of strategic culture;

There is no shortage of literature on the subject of strategic culture. One challenge is distilling the information into a useful, policy-relevant framework. This is difficult since strategic culture is not universal. A parsimonious theory of strategic culture does not exist. Each state actor, non-state actor and organization has its own operational code, own history, own assumptions, and own strategic culture.

In the same work, his consideration in the field of strategic culture is as follows; “The field of strategic culture is interdisciplinary with substantial contributions made from the fields of business, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and international relations.”

Later, Jeannie L. Johnson and Jeffrey A. Larsen prepared a curriculum (2006) on strategic culture for the above mentioned agencies to teach in the strategic studies centres in the U.S. (e.g. Naval Postgraduate School’s Centre for Contemporary

Conflict). Johnson and Larsen proposed a definition for strategic culture and perception which is quite meaningful for this dissertation which is as follows;

Strategic Culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives (2006, p. 5).

On the other hand, one work on strategic culture, other than the subject of security or international relations is found relevant for this dissertation, since it is related to “Business Strategy”, prepared by Judith H. Katz and Frederick A. Miller (2005) Katz and Miller, in their work of “Road Map for the Path to Strategic Culture Change” pointed out; “Many organizations’ findings are that the old policies, rules and procedures no longer work, and they have to change to a new way of doing business” and proposed a comparison between old and new strategic culture for business environment. Table 3.5 shows the changing trends.

**Table 3.5 Culture – Change Trends**

<b>From</b>	<b>To</b>
Industrial Revolution Model	Information and Customer Model
Slow/Resistant to change	Adaptable to ever accelerating change
Rigid hierarchy	Flexible Structures
Command and Control Leadership	Leader as Enabler/Facilitator and everyone takes leadership
Top-down information flow on a need-to-know basis	Two-way information flow
Individual efforts rewarded	Teamwork rewarded
Internal competition	Status Quo is the competition
Turf/silos	Collaboration across, down, up organization
Peoples seen as replaceable cogs and primarily as a cost	People seen as critical asset and non-renewal resources
Variety of viewpoints seen as disruptive	Diversity of perspectives and experience essential for success

Source: (Katz & Miller, 2005)

## **Chapter 4**

### **Strategy from Business point of View and Strategic Management**

#### **4.1 Introduction: From “The Art of War” to “Scientific Management”**

The evolution of the theory has progressed on a path of wars, foreign affairs and state administration. This progress continued on the same path when another “milestone” “scientific management in business” emerged as another terminology in the beginning of 20th century. Some resources in literature initiate scientific management with Frederick W. Taylor. However, the majority of them consider Max Weber’s “Organizational analysis” as the beginning of scientific management (“Scientific Management in Encyclopaedia Britannica”, 2009). In order to follow the same methodology of reviewing historical background of strategic thought, it would be better to begin this chapter with German sociologist Max Weber, who is also a contemporary of Taylor.

##### **4.1.1 Max Weber and Organizational Analysis**

Contemporary organizational analysis and management science owe much of their early development to the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), who originated the scientific study of organizations. In work examining the relationship between bureaucracy and modernization (eventually published as “Theory of Social and Economic Organization”; 1947), Weber attributed the rise of organizations to the expansion of markets, to developments in the law, and especially to changes in the nature of authority.

The term authority applies to situations in which one person willingly accepts the direction of another. Until modern times, authority was inherited, meaning that princes begat princes and peasants begat peasants. Weber identified the institutional

structure of a new “rational-legal” authority, observing that rights of control increasingly derived from expertise rather than lineage. He documented the ways in which this development, which he called rationalization, underlay the rise of the modern state bureaucracy. According to Weber, organizations were able to develop unparalleled calculability and efficiency by combining two structures: (1) a system of explicit rules, upheld by clearly marked jurisdictions between offices and by permanent files documenting the processing of cases, and (2) a unique division of labour. The latter structure gave rise to the modern bureaucrat—a person who was required to be an expert in the relevant rules and who had to be shielded from inappropriate influences to guarantee fairness and objectivity. This shift away from tradition and inheritance permanently changed the nature of organizations. Weber thought that these two structures would cause organizations to follow, invariably and automatically, the objectives set down by political authorities.

One of Weber's contemporaries, the German-born Italian sociologist Robert Michels, vigorously disputed Weber's claim that organizations would pursue official objectives in machine like fashion. According to Michels's “iron law of oligarchy,” the top leaders of organizations—even those that are member-controlled—tend to develop a strong personal interest in maintaining their powers and privileges. Michels held that self-interest prevents such leaders from doing anything that would risk the survival of the organization—even if this means subverting the organization's original goals and principles. Michels made this claim in an attempt to explain why the leaders of the officially internationalist and antiwar German Social Democratic Party strongly supported Germany's declaration of war in 1914.

The essential point of the Weber-Michels debate has not been settled; questions persist over the degree to which the pursuit of official goals characterizes organizational action. Does the creation of organizations (such as churches, investment syndicates, or human rights groups) for the achievement of some collective goal subtly shape the agendas that will be pursued? This question—whether official or personal leadership is more influential—has considerable practical significance, because social movements (such as pacifism and environmentalism) almost always take shape as organizational structures in



contemporary societies. Organizational analysis identifies ways in which the personal goals of these groups inform their respective organizational structures.

While German scholars were examining the rise of modern organizations within a broad sociological perspective, American engineers and management consultants were initiating the study of the management of work in industrial settings. Close examination of work groups revealed that routine patterns of behaviour (“informal organization”) often did not match the organizational charts or other official depictions of the organization (“formal organization”). These findings led researchers to identify and describe patterns of informal organization. Their investigations, which have become part of the core literature of organizational analysis, demonstrated unequivocally that participation in organizations is influenced strongly by social ties and by unofficial networks of communication. (“Weber, Max. - Encyclopædia Britannica”, “Organizational Analysis - Encyclopædia Britannica”, 2009)

#### **4.1.2 Frederick W. Taylor and Scientific Management**

Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856 – 1915), American inventor and engineer who is known as the father of scientific management. His system of industrial management has influenced the development of virtually every country enjoying the benefits of modern industry.

In 1881, at 25, he introduced time study at the Midvale plant. The profession of time study was founded on the success of this project, which also formed the basis of Taylor's subsequent theories of management science. Essentially, Taylor suggested that production efficiency in a shop or factory could be greatly enhanced by close observation of the individual worker and elimination of waste time and motion in his operation. Though the Taylor system provoked resentment and opposition from labour when carried to extremes, its value in rationalizing production was indisputable and its impact on the development of mass-production techniques immense.

Studying at night, Taylor earned a degree in mechanical engineering from Stevens Institute of Technology in 1883. The following year he became chief engineer at Midvale and completed the design and construction of a novel machine shop. Taylor might have enjoyed a brilliant full-time career as an inventor—he had more than 40 patents to his credit—but his interest in what was soon called scientific management led him to resign his post at Midvale and to become general manager of the Manufacturing Investment Company (1890–93), which in turn led him to develop a “new profession, that of consulting engineer in management.” He served a long list of prominent firms ending with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation; while at Bethlehem, he developed high-speed steel production and performed notable experiments in shovelling and pig-iron handling.

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers elected him president in 1906, the same year that he was awarded an honorary doctor of science degree by the University of Pennsylvania. Many of his influential publications first appeared in the Transactions of that society, namely, “Notes on Belting” (1894); “A Piece-rate System” (1895); “Shop Management” (1903); and “On the Art of Cutting Metals” (1906). The Principles of Scientific Management was published commercially in 1911.

Taylor's fame increased after his testimony in 1912 at the hearings before a special committee of the House of Representatives to investigate his own and other systems of shop management. Considering himself a reformer, he continued expounding the ideals and principles of his system of management until his death. (“John F. Mee Taylor, Frederick W. - Encyclopædia Britannica”, 2009)

#### **4.2 From “Scientific Management “to Strategic Management**

Beginning of the second half of 20th century, huge economic and industrial corporations have become widespread; the terminology has begun to cover the civilian sector as “strategic management”. This is the first occurrence of the two sectors, namely “military” and “civilian” sectors came together under one terminological umbrella. After this stage, the 2500 year-old terminology has begun to

spread over almost all the area of human life. Prior to discussing the key elements of strategic management, it would be useful to make a brief survey on the subjects of “Historical development of strategic management” and “Masters and Gurus of Strategic Management”. Through the list of “Main Guru’s Index” (“Military Strategy Gurus and Masters The Complete A to Z Guide,” n.d.).

#### **4.2.1 Historical Development of Strategic Management**

Strategic management emerged as a discipline in the 1950s and 60s. Although there were numerous early contributors to the literature, the most influential pioneers were Alfred D. Chandler, Philip Selznick, Igor Ansoff, and Peter Drucker (“Military Strategy Gurus and Masters The Complete A to Z Guide,” n.d.).

Alfred DuPont Chandler, Jr. (1918 –2007) was a professor of business history at Harvard Business School, who wrote extensively about the scale and the management structures of modern corporations.

Alfred Chandler recognized the importance of coordinating the various aspects of management under one all-encompassing strategy. Prior to this time the various functions of management were separate with little overall coordination or strategy. Interactions between functions or between departments were typically handled by a boundary position, that is, there were one or two managers that relayed information back and forth between two departments. Chandler also stressed the importance of taking a long term perspective when looking to the future. In his 1962 groundbreaking work *Strategy and Structure*, Chandler showed that a long-term coordinated strategy was necessary to give a company structure, direction, and focus. He says it concisely, “structure follows strategy” (1962). He received a Pulitzer Prize for his work, *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (1977).

In 1957, Philip Selznick introduced the idea of matching the organization's internal factors with external environmental circumstances (1957). This core idea was developed into what we now call SWOT analysis by Learned, Andrews, and others at

the Harvard Business School General Management Group. Strengths and weaknesses of the firm are assessed in light of the opportunities and threats from the business environment.

Igor Ansoff (1918-July 14, 2002) was the first management strategy guru to recognize the need for strategic planning for firms operating in the increasingly complex and turbulent environment. Igor Ansoff built on Chandler's work by adding a range of strategic concepts and inventing a whole new vocabulary. He developed a strategy grid that compared market penetration strategies, product development strategies, market development strategies and horizontal and vertical integration and diversification strategies. He felt that management could use these strategies to systematically prepare for future opportunities and challenges. In his 1965 classic *Corporate Strategy*, he developed the gap analysis still used today in which we must understand the gap between where we are currently and where we would like to be, then develop what he called “gap reducing actions” (Ansoff, 1965).

Peter Ferdinand Drucker: (1909, Vienna - 2005, Claremont, California) made famous the term knowledge worker and is thought to have unknowingly ushered in the knowledge economy, which effectively challenges Karl Marx's world-view of the political economy. Peter Drucker was named as the founding father of the study of strategic management.

Peter Drucker was a prolific strategy theorist, author of dozens of management books, with a career spanning five decades. His contributions to strategic management were many but two are most important. Firstly, he stressed the importance of objectives. An organization without clear objectives is like a ship without a rudder. As early as 1954 he was developing a theory of management based on objectives (1954). This evolved into his theory of management by objectives (MBO). According to Drucker, “the procedure of setting objectives and monitoring your progress towards them should permeate the entire organization, top to bottom”. His other seminal contribution was in predicting the importance of what today we would call intellectual capital. He predicted the rise of what he called the “knowledge worker” and explained the consequences of this for management. He

said that knowledge work is non-hierarchical. Work would be carried out in teams with the person most knowledgeable in the task at hand being the temporary leader.

Some favourite quotations from Drucker are as follows. Extracted from; “The Practice of Management” (1954, p. 378), “The Effective Executive” (1967, p. 70), “The Five Most Important Questions You Will Ever Ask About Your Organization” (2008, p. 54)

- The best way to predict the future is to create it.
- Management is doing things right; leadership is doing the right things.
- Company cultures are like country cultures. Never try to change one. Try, instead, to work with what you've got.
- Rank does not confer privilege or give power. It imposes responsibility.
- To focus on contribution is to focus on effectiveness.
- Wherever you see a successful business, someone once made a courageous decision.
- Most of what we call management consists of making it difficult for people to get their work done.

Ellen-Earle Chaffee summarized what she thought were the main elements of strategic management theory by the 1970s (Chaffee, 1985).

Strategic management involves adapting the organization to its business environment.

- Strategic management is fluid and complex. Change creates novel combinations of circumstances requiring unstructured non-repetitive responses.
- Strategic management affects the entire organization by providing direction.

- Strategic management involves both strategy formation (she called it content) and also strategy implementation (she called it process).
- Strategic management is partially planned and partially unplanned.
- Strategic management is done at several levels: overall corporate strategy, and individual business strategies.
- Strategic management involves both conceptual and analytical thought processes.

#### **4.2.2 Other Masters of Strategic Management**

Contributors of Strategic Management are not limited to the founding masters. Resources depict the names of more than forty management gurus who contribute to the theory. Most of them are not only theorist but practitioners as well. They served as top managers of world's leading companies. They have the opportunity to test their ideas in the field and developed their theory with experiments extracted from real-life implementations. A brief survey for some of the rest of the management gurus is extracted from the following sources and presented below in alphabetical order ("Management & Strategy Gurus and Masters - the Complete A to Z Guide," n.d.):

##### **Chris Argyris and The Fifth Discipline:**

Chris Argyris (1923) has influenced our thinking about the relationship of people and organizations, organizational learning and action research. Other key concepts developed by Argyris include Ladder of Inference, Double-Loop Learning, Theory of Action/Espoused Theory/Theory-in-use, High Advocacy/High Inquiry dialogue, Actionable Knowledge.

##### **Warren Bennis and Leadership Studies:**

Warren Gamaliel Bennis (born 1925) is an American scholar, organizational consultant and author who is widely regarded as a pioneer of the contemporary field

of leadership studies. His work at MIT in the 1960s on group behaviour foreshadowed - and helped bring about - today's headlong plunge into less hierarchical, more democratic and adaptive institutions, private and public, management expert Tom Peters wrote in 1993 in the foreword to Bennis' *An Invented Life: Reflections on Leadership and Change*. His reputation goes on the famous motto of: "Managers do the things right, leaders do the right things"

### **Kaplan and Norton and Balanced Scorecard:**

In the realm of business, the concept of Strategy Maps was introduced by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton. The standard reference is the book *Strategy Maps* by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton. Kaplan and Norton are credited with developing the balanced scorecard in 1992. This appeared in a paper in the *Harvard Business Review*. The focus of the Balanced Scorecard is to provide organizations with metrics against which to measure their success. The underlying principle was that you couldn't manage what you cannot measure.

### **Ian Mitroff:**

Ian Mitroff is a well-known business policy professor, writer, editor, lecturer, and consultant on human-caused crises. In 1986, Mitroff established the USC Center for Crisis Management at the University of Southern California (Los Angeles) in the Graduate School of Business. He was the director of the USC Center for ten years whose purpose was to analyze human-caused crises and create state-of-the-art tools to better manage them. Mitroff has published over 250 papers and articles and over 25 books in 15 different fields of strategic study.

### **Henry Mintzberg and The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning:**

Professor Henry Mintzberg, (born 1939) is an internationally renowned academic and author on business and strategic management. Henry Mintzberg writes prolifically on the topics of strategic management and business strategy, with more than 140 articles and 13 books to his name. His seminal book, *The Rise and Fall of*

Strategic Planning, criticizes some of the practices of strategic planning today and is considered required reading for anyone who seriously wants to consider taking on a strategy-making role within their organization.

**Kenichi Ohmae and The 3C's model:**

Kenichi Ohmae (born 1943) is one of the world's leading business and corporate strategists. He is known as Mr. Strategy and has developed the 3C's Model. Having written what many people regarded as the bible of corporate strategy, Kenichi Ohmae moved on to the changing shape of the world of business.

**Michael Porter and Five Forces Analysis:**

Michael Porter (born 1947) is an American academic who focused on strategic management and economics. Porter's ideas on strategy are the foundation for modern strategy courses, and his work is taught at the Harvard Business School and at virtually every business school in the world.

**Tom Peters and Search of Excellence:**

Tom Peters (born 1942) is an American writer and expert on business, leadership and strategic management practices, best-known for co-writing the classic book, In Search of Excellence, with Robert H. Waterman, Jr.

**Peter Senge and The Fifth Discipline:**

Peter Michael Senge (born 1947) is an American scientist and director of the Center for Organizational Learning at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He is known as author of the book The Fifth Discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization from 1990.



## **Jack Welch:**

Jack Welch, Jr. (born 1935) was Chairman and CEO of General Electric between 1981 and 2001. Welch gained a solid reputation for uncanny business acumen and unique leadership strategies at GE. During his tenure, GE increased its market capitalization by over \$400 billion. He remains a highly-regarded figure in business circles due to his innovative management strategies and leadership style.

### **4.3 Main Elements of Strategic Management**

Elements of strategic management will be examined in the context of various definitions, strategic formulation, strategy implementation, strategy evaluation and strategy hierarchy found in the business strategic management literature.

#### **4.3.1 Definitions of Strategy and Strategic Management**

There are numerous definitions of strategy. Almost all of the resources on management refer to the ancient roots for the origin of terminology which already was examined in the beginning of this survey. Rue and Byars, (2002, p. 98) define; “The word of strategy originated with the Greeks about 400 B.C.; it pertained to the art and science of directing military forces”. As for the management strategy, Rue and Byars proposed a “Planning oriented” definition; “A strategy outlines basic steps that management plans to take to reach an objective or a set of objectives. In other words, a strategy outlines how management intends to achieve its objectives.”

Bryson, (1995, p.32) defines strategy from the organisational point of view;

“Strategy is the direction and scope of an organization over the long term: which achieves advantage for the organization through its configuration of resources within a changing environment, to meet the needs of markets and to fulfill stakeholder expectations”

There are also many definitions for the Strategic management in the literature, which focus on or orient different elements of strategy. Some of them overlap with the

notion of “Strategy” and “Strategic planning”. David (2008), proposed a decision-objectives oriented definition;

Strategic management is the conduct of drafting, implementing and evaluating cross-functional decisions that will enable an organization to achieve its long-term objectives. It is the process of specifying the organization's mission, vision and objectives, developing policies and plans, often in terms of projects and programs, which are designed to achieve these objectives, and then allocating resources to implement the policies and plans, projects and programs. A balanced scorecard is often used to evaluate the overall performance of the business and its progress towards objectives.

Another definition focused on “goals” and “strategy” which uses strategy with a very close meaning to road map;

Strategic management is an ongoing process that evaluates and controls the business and the industries in which the company is involved; assesses its competitors and sets goals and strategies to meet all existing and potential competitors; and then reassesses each strategy annually or quarterly [i.e. regularly] to determine how it has been implemented and whether it has succeeded or needs replacement by a new strategy to meet changed circumstances, new technology, new competitors, a new economic environment., or a new social, financial, or political environment (Lamb, 1984, p. ix).

Johnson and Scholes (2006) definition of strategic management begins from “position of the organization”. However, they prefer to define strategy quite close to “road map”;

"Strategic management is a means of understanding the strategic position of the organization: formulating courses of action, evaluating them and choosing between them; as well as planning how the choice of strategy can be put into effect and managing the resultant changes."

Rue and Byars definition focused on “Strategic Plans”;

Strategic management; formulation, proper implementation and continuous evaluation of strategic plans; determines the long run directions and performance of an organization. The essence of strategic management is developing strategic planning and keeping them current (2002, p. 100).

Rue and Byars noticed that different organizations may use somewhat different approaches to the strategic management process; most successful approaches share several common components and similar sequence. They proposed that strategic management process is composed of three major phases;

- Formulation phase is concerned with developing the initial strategic plan.
- Implementation involves implementing the strategic plan that has been formulated.
- Evaluation phase stresses the importance of continuously evaluating and updating the strategic plan after it has been implemented.

Contrary to this valuable contribution, the notion of “Strategic management” should cover a wider realm. Better definitions are met under the heading of “Strategic Formulation”.

#### **4.3.2 Strategic Formulation**

Strategic formulation is a combination of at least three main processes, namely “Performing a situation analysis”, “Setting objectives” and “preparing the strategic plan to take the organization to pre-set objectives” which are as follows:

- Performing a situation analysis, self-evaluation and competitor analysis: both internal and external; both micro-environmental and macro-environmental.
- Concurrent with this assessment, objectives are set. These objectives should be parallel to a timeline; some are in the short-term and others on the long-term. This involves crafting vision statements (long term view of a possible future), mission statements (the role that the organization gives itself in society), overall corporate objectives (both financial and strategic), strategic business unit (SBU), objectives (both financial and strategic), and tactical objectives.

- These objectives should, in the light of the situation analysis, suggest a strategic plan. The plan provides the details of how to achieve these objective(s).

An illustrative model is proposed and shown in Figure 4.1 aiming to clarify definition of strategy and strategic management:

**Figure 4.1 Strategy from Situation to Objectives**



#### **4.3.3 Strategy Implementation**

- Allocation and management of sufficient resources (financial, personnel, operational support, time, technology support)
- Establishing a chain of command or some alternative structure (such as cross functional teams)
- Assigning responsibility of specific tasks or processes to specific individuals or groups
- It also involves managing the process. This includes monitoring results, comparing to benchmarks and best practices, evaluating the efficacy and efficiency of the process, controlling for variances, and making adjustments to the process as necessary.
- When implementing specific programs, this involves acquiring the requisite resources, developing the process, training, process testing, documentation, and integration with (and/or conversion from) legacy processes.

Thus, when the strategy implementation processes, are put into use there may be many problems arising such as human relations and/or the employee-communication.

At this stage, the greatest implementation problem usually involves marketing strategy, with emphasis on the appropriate timing of new products. An organization, with an effective management, should try to implement its plans without signalling the fact to its competitors (Sweet, 1964).

In order for a policy to work, there must be a level of consistency from every person in an organization, including from the management. This is what needs to occur on the tactical level of management as well as the strategic.

A decision tree (or tree diagram) is a decision support tool that uses a tree-like graph or model of decisions and their possible consequences, including chance event outcomes, resource costs, and utility. Decision trees are commonly used in operations research, specifically in decision analysis, to help identify a strategy most likely to reach a goal. Another use of decision trees is as a descriptive means for calculating conditional probabilities.

#### **4.3.4 Strategy Evaluation**

Measuring the effectiveness of the organizational strategy, it is extremely important to conduct a SWOT analysis to figure out the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (both internal and external) of the entity in question. This may require to take certain precautionary measures or even to change the entire strategy.

In corporate strategy, Johnson and Scholes (2006) present a model in which strategic options are evaluated against three key success criteria:

- Suitability (would it work?)
- Feasibility (can it be made to work?)
- Acceptability (will they work it?)

#### **4.3.4.1 Suitability**

Suitability deals with the overall rationale of the strategy. The key point to consider is whether the strategy would address the key strategic issues underlined by the organization's strategic position.

- Does it make economic sense?
- Would the organization obtain economies of scale, economies of scope or experience economy?
- Would it be suitable in terms of environment and capabilities?

Tools that can be used to evaluate suitability include:

- Ranking strategic options
- Decision trees
- What-if analysis

#### **4.3.4.2 Feasibility**

Feasibility is concerned with the resources required to implement the strategy are available, can be developed or obtained. Resources include funding, people, time and information.

Tools that can be used to evaluate feasibility include:

- cash flow analysis and forecasting
- break-even analysis
- resource deployment analysis

#### **4.3.4.3 Acceptability**

Acceptability is concerned with the expectations of the identified stakeholders (mainly shareholders, employees and customers) with the expected performance outcomes, which can be return, risk and stakeholder reactions.

- Return deals with the benefits expected by the stakeholders (financial and non-financial). For example, shareholders would expect the increase of their wealth, employees would expect improvement in their careers and customers would expect better value for money.
- Risk deals with the probability and consequences of failure of a strategy (financial and non-financial).
- Stakeholder reactions deal with anticipating the likely reaction of stakeholders. Shareholders could oppose the issuing of new shares, employees and unions could oppose outsourcing for fear of losing their jobs, customers could have concerns over a merger with regards to quality and support.

Tools that can be used to evaluate acceptability include:

- what-if analysis
- stakeholder mapping

#### **4.3.5 The Strategy Hierarchy in “Strategic Management for Business”**

In the context of international relations or state administration, the strategy hierarchy from top to the bottom has been explained in Chapter 3. According to this explanation, the hierarchy begins from policy and grand strategy level to sectoral strategies and goes on to the operative and tactics. As for the business strategy, according to literature, it begins from corporate level. Literature survey shows that, contrary to the diversification on strategic thinking, there is a consensus on the hierarchy of business strategy. In most (large) corporations there are several levels

of management. Strategic management is the highest of these levels in the sense that it is the broadest - applying to all parts of the firm - while also incorporating the longest time horizon. It gives direction to corporate values, corporate culture, corporate goals, and corporate missions. Under this broad corporate strategy there are typically business-level competitive strategies and functional unit strategies (Rue & Byars, 2002, pp. 99-100).

Corporate strategy refers to the overarching strategy of the diversified firm. Such a corporate strategy answers the questions of "in which businesses should we be in?" and "how does being in these businesses create synergy and/or add to the competitive advantage of the corporation as a whole?"

Business strategy refers to the aggregated strategies of single business firm or a strategic business unit (SBU) in a diversified corporation. According to Michael Porter, a firm must formulate a business strategy that incorporates either cost leadership, differentiation or focus in order to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage and long-term success in its chosen arenas or industries.

Functional strategies include marketing strategies, new product development strategies, human resource strategies, financial strategies, legal strategies, supply-chain strategies, and information technology management strategies. The emphasis is on short and medium term plans and is limited to the domain of each department's functional responsibility. Each functional department attempts to do its part in meeting overall corporate objectives, and hence to some extent their strategies are derived from broader corporate strategies.

Many companies feel that a functional organizational structure is not an efficient way to organize activities so they have reengineered according to processes or SBUs. A strategic business unit is a semi-autonomous unit that is usually responsible for its own budgeting, new product decisions, leasing decisions, and price setting. An SBU is treated as an internal profit centre by corporate headquarters. A technology strategy, for example, although it is focused on technology as a means of achieving



an organization's overall objective(s), may include dimensions that are beyond the scope of a single business unit, engineering organization or IT department.

An additional level of strategy called operational strategy was proposed by Peter Drucker in his theory of management by objectives (MBO). It is very narrow in focus and deals with day-to-day operational activities such as scheduling criteria. It must operate within a budget but is not at liberty to adjust or create that budget. Operational level strategies are determined by business level strategies which, in turn, are informed and determined by corporate level strategies.

Since the turn of the millennium, some firms have reverted to a simpler strategic structure driven by advances in information technology. It is felt that knowledge management systems should be used to share information and create common goals. Strategic divisions are thought to hamper this process. This notion of strategy has been captured under the rubric of dynamic strategy, popularized by Carpenter and Sanders's textbook (David, 2008). This work builds on that of Brown and Eisenhart as well as Christensen and portrays firm strategy, both business and corporate, as necessarily embracing ongoing strategic change, and the seamless integration of strategy formulation and implementation. Such change and implementation are usually built into the strategy through the staging and pacing facets.

On the other hand, corporate strategy takes place as “Grand strategy” in some literature. Rue and Byars (2002, p. 98) define it as “The highest level of Strategy and divided into four types, such as;

- Stability strategy (or status quo strategy); which is used when the organization is satisfied with its present course.
- Defensive strategy (or retrenchment strategy); which is used when a company wants or needs to reduce its operations.
- Combination strategy; which is used when an organization simultaneously employs different strategies for different parts of company.
- Business strategies; which focus on how to compete in a given business.

The fourth types also divided into subtypes. Table 4.1 shows those major types and their subtypes.

**Table 4.1 Major Types and Subtypes of Corporate Strategies**

<b>CORPORATE STRATEGIES</b>	<b>SUBSTRATEGIES</b>
Growth Strategies	Concentration Vertical Integration Diversification
Stability Strategies	
Defensive Strategies	Turnaround Divestiture Liquidation
Combination	

Source: (Rue & Byars, 2002)

#### **4.4 SWOT Analysis**

SWOT is an acronym for an organization's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. A SWOT analysis is a technique for evaluating an organization's internal strengths and weaknesses and its external opportunities and threats. A major advantage of using a SWOT analysis is that it provides a general overview of an organization's strategic situation (Rue & Byars, 2002, p. 107).

There are a few Turkish translations of the acronym of SWOT: The most well-known is FÜTZ. FÜTZ is also an acronym which consists of four words in a similar method: "Fırsatlar, Üstünlükler, Tehditler, Zayıflıklar" (Ülgen & Mirze, 2004, p. 160).

Table 4.2 lists several factors that top level managers should consider when assessing an organization's strengths and weaknesses and the threats and opportunities posed

by the internal and external environment. The most important result of a SWOT analysis is the ability to draw conclusions about the attractiveness of the organization's situation and the need for strategic action.

**Table 4.2 SWOT Analysis-What to Look for in Sizing up a Company's Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats**

<b>POTENTIAL INTERNAL STRENGTH</b>	<b>POTENTIAL INTERNAL WEAKNESSES</b>
Core competencies in key areas Adequate financial resources Well-thought-of by buyers An acknowledged market leader Access to economies of scale Proprietary technology Cost advantages Product innovation skills Others?	No clear strategic direction Obsolete facilities Too narrow product line Weak market image Weak distribution network Below-average marketing skills Subpar profitability because ... Others?
<b>POTENTIAL EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITIES</b>	<b>POTENTIAL EXTERNAL THREATS</b>
Falling trade barriers in attractive foreign markets Competency among rival firms Emerging new technologies Integrating forward and backward Ability to grow rapidly because of strong increases in market demand Others?	Entry of lower-cost competitors Rising sales of substitute products Slower market grow Costly regulatory requirements Vulnerability to recession and business cycle Adverse demographic changes Others?

Source: (Rue & Byars, 2002)

Many sources in literature warn that SWOT analysis is a guide but not a prescription. On the other hand, there are many examples where SWOT analysis is applied to business firms, non-profit institutions and public sector institutions as well. CPS Human Resources Service presents some examples of the SWOT analyses prepared

for “Starbucks Company”, “State of Minnesota Department of Employee Relations”, “Social Work Education in Canada”, “Alaska Children Experiences Homelessness” and so on (“SWOT Analysis,” 2009).

As for military strategy, very similar methods for situation analysis are derived from the Principles of War. Those methods take into account the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses and one’s own capacity and ability.

## **4.5 Emergence of Methodological Strategic Foresight**

### **4.5.1 Introduction**

Human desire to know the future is not new. It goes back thousands of years, as one of the management paradigms which occupied leaders’ mind with blurred questions; “What will be the future of my tribe, country or my reign?” Ancient leaders attached great importance to the soothsayers’ and oracles’ words. Some of them had great fame and their reputations have extended to the present day, such as Nostradamus, while some of them are well-known with their deceptions such as Rasputin. However, the subject’s evolution from prophecy to foresight is very new. The first generation is “Futurists” who predict the future depending on their intelligence, knowledge and, of course, their imagination power. Trying to see the future with the benefits of some scientific methods goes back only a few decades.

Strategic foresight (SF) is the ability to create and maintain a high-quality, coherent and functional forward view and to use the insights arising in organisationally useful ways; for example: to detect adverse conditions, guide policy, shape strategy; to explore new markets, products and services. It represents a fusion of futures methods with those of strategic management.

Strategic Foresight is a fairly recent attempt to differentiate "futurology" from "futures studies". Futurology or futures studies (called futurism in the United States) is the study of the medium to long-term future, by extrapolating present technological, economic or social trends, or by attempting to predict future trends.

Futures studies or Futurism reflect on how today's changes (or the lack thereof) become tomorrow's reality (Statemaster.com, 2009).

It arises from the premise that:

- the future is not predictable;
- the future is not predetermined; and
- Future outcomes can be influenced by our choices in the present (Amara, 1981).

Most organisations operate primarily on the basis of priorities and principles laid down in the past, within a taken-for-granted worldview. They modify their underlying past-orientation with inputs from the current environment such as market information, economic signals and government regulations. But few attempt to bring these factors from the past and present into a coherent relationship with the forward view. Since the latter remains a collective blind spot this subject concentrates on the construction, maintenance and uses of the forward view (Slaughter, 2004).

#### **4.5.2 Relations between Strategic Management and Strategic Foresight**

Masters of strategic management, some of whom are mentioned above, also developed ideas on the foresight. One of the most clear and sharpest words belongs to Henry Mintzberg on the relations between "strategic management" and "strategic foresight"; 'Planning is future thinking' (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 7)

Strategic Foresight can also be practiced at three different levels through the lenses of strategic business management:

- Pragmatic Foresight - "Carrying out tomorrows' business better" (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994);

- Progressive Foresight - "Going beyond conventional thinking and practices and reformulating processes, products, and services using quite different assumptions"; and
- Civilisational Foresight - "Seeks to understand the aspects of the next civilisation - the one that lies beyond the current impasse, the prevailing hegemony of techno/industrial/capitalist interests" (Slaughter, 2004, p. 217).

### **4.5.3 Foresight Methodologies**

Today there are many institutions and professors who work on this subject. Among them, three major thinkers who have contributed to the literature and their proposed methodologies are presented in the following paragraphs.


### **4.5.4 Charles W. Taylor and “The Cone of Plausibility”**

Almost all the studies refer to Charles W. Taylor’s 1988 work. Taylor developed his method to predict the future named as “The Cone of Plausibility” in his book of “Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations” (1993).

Taylor explained his methodology with a group of cones. A wider base cone comes from the past –at least three decades- and a symmetric cone goes to future. Both cones include four narrower cones and each of them represents a particular scenario.

Although Taylor did not explain in detail, it is assumed that the examination of the past should depend on concrete parameters in order to clarify the “trend” which comes from the past and goes on to the future. As one of the earliest contributions, Taylor’s methodology assumed a smooth trend which comes from thirty years ago and goes to thirty years forward. A “trend brake” or “paradigm shift” was not foreseen in this period. Instead, “Wild-card scenarios” took place in his following works in order to fill this gap. (Çeşmeci, 2005). Taylor’s illustrative sketch is seen on Figure 4.2.

**Figure 4.2 The Cone of Plausibility**



Source: (Taylor, 1995)

#### **4.5.5 Richard A. Slaughter and Australian Foresight Institute**

Professor Richard A. Slaughter is the director of “Australian Foresight Institute-Swinburne University of Technology” which has a master’s degree program on strategic foresight (Integral World.com, 2009). Slaughter proposed a grouping of the foresight methodologies under four headings in his article on ‘Developing and Applying Strategic Foresight’ (2004).

#### **4.5.5.1 Input Methods**

Input methods are ways of gathering material relevant to organisational needs. One of the simplest methods for constructing the near-future context is through the device of posing a number of high quality questions, and then integrating the answers. This method usefully sketches in aspects of the broad arena of the near-term future. It will also highlight emerging issues that may need to be followed up in due course. The strength of the method is that it enables a fairly rapid scan to take place. The main drawback is that unless the work is carried out skilfully it can become merely impressionistic. The selection of key questions to research is an important determinant of the outcome.

#### **4.5.5.2 Analytic Methods**

Analytic methods tend to be not so much free-standing methods in their own right so much as stages in a larger piece of work. For example, cross-impact analysis comes into its own when a series of factors at work in an environment have been identified and the interrelationships among them must be explored. Hence cross-impact is used in scenario building and in the futures can process. Forecasting and trend analysis are less popular than they once were. There are quantitative and qualitative approaches to both. The former attempts to fit time-series data to one of a number of possible curves and to use them to look at future possibilities. The latter looks for theories that account for the observed behaviour of the trend, tests assumptions and attempts to understand the nature of the system. In this way possible future states can be explored. Both approaches are obviously vulnerable to unforeseen changes, and this may help to explain why forecasting and trend analysis has slipped from favour.

#### **4.5.5.3 Paradigmatic Methods**

Paradigmatic methods are relative newcomers to the futures methodologies arena. This is partly because they do not spring from the still-dominant North American context and partly because there are all-too-few places where they can be taught and learned. Advanced practitioners in futures methods have been aware of the role and importance of paradigms per se for many years. But this awareness has not yet



translated into a widely spread capability to employ paradigmatic methodologies or an understanding of their centrality in futures work generally. Hence, layered causal analysis probably sounds esoteric to most practitioners. In fact, it is quite straightforward. Phenomena can be understood in various ways. Conventionally, one finds simple empirical descriptions that capture surface features of, say, population, resources and environment issues.


#### **4.5.5.4 Iterative and Exploratory Methods**

Iterative and exploratory methods are those which permit a substantive definition or exploration of future states, future options or future strategies. The most well known, and certainly the most successful of these is the art and the practice of scenario building. This alone, of all futures methods can create convincing future worlds at a variety of levels of aggregation. To make good scenarios a great deal of preparation and analysis is needed (Slaughter, 2004).

#### **4.5.6 Joseph Voros, “From Future Cone” to “Strategy Development Process”**

Professor Joseph Voros, who is also a Senior Lecturer in futures studies and Strategic Foresight at the Australian Foresight Institute, Swinburne University of Technology and World Future Society, proposed “A Future Cone” developed and adopted from previous works on the literature, in his article of “A generic Foresight Process Framework”. The difference of his work from the Taylor’s “the cone of plausibility”, the future prediction is more than “plausible”. Future is defined in four categories with their interactions, such as “probable”, “preferable”, “plausible” and “possible” (Voros, 2003). Voros’ work is seen on Figure 4.3.


**Figure 4.3 The Future Cone**



Source: (Voros, 2005)

Voros has also proposed a “Strategy development process”. According to Voros’s work, “Foresight work” occupies a “central position” in strategy development. The illustrative design of the process is seen in Figure 4.4..


**Figure 4.4 A Generic Foresight Process Framework**



Source: (Voros, 2005)

Further, Voros detailed his model in four stages. Three of them are chosen in the context of the dissertation. The next stage is an explanation or deductive approach. He constructed a question form in order to find answers in each stage of the process. Foresight framework in question form is presented in Figure 4.5.


**Figure 4.5 Foresight Framework in Question Form**



Source: (Voros, 2005)

Voros' most detailed model of foresight framework includes detailed headings of each stage. The headings cover the most appropriate methodologies which can be employed to accomplish the whole foresight process. Voros's foresight framework, with some representative methodologies indicated is presented in Figure 4.6.


**Figure 4.6 Foresight Framework, with Some Representative Methodologies Indicated**



Source: (Voros, 2005)

If some of the studies are disregarded within the stage of “foresight”, the strategy work would be incomplete or insufficient. As an example; if interpretation (system thinking) stage is disregarded, strategy work becomes “narrow forward views” or “suspect perceptions”. In Figure 4.7, “narrow forward views” and “suspect perceptions of strategic options” is shown.

**Figure 4.7 A Shallow/Narrow Foresight Process**



There are many institutions and academicians currently engaged in the study on strategic foresight work. Recently, analytical techniques such as artificial neural networks, generic algorithms, relevance trees etc. for the fore-seeing of future.

Literature has been rapidly developing by many contributors. However, in order to follow the path of this dissertation, the survey on this subject is assumed to be sufficient to prove that strategic foresight work is developing on a scientific route rather than subjective means. This identification may serve to fix one of the variables of the research in the context of differentiation on perception of strategy within the target population.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Further Reflections on the Literature Survey and Determinants for the Field Research**

This chapter includes a brief review to the literature survey and further reflections on the matter in order to clarify indispensable elements and dimensions of strategy. They are expected to help to identify determinants of statistical research which will be presented in the following chapter.

#### **5.1 Brief Review**

Strategy, both as a scientific term and as an applied field has emerged some 25 centuries ago. The origin of the terminology is from ancient Greece, and the first book that is known to be related to strategic thought, Sun Tzu's "Art of War", was written in China at about the same period. This book by Sun Tzu, who was a general in the Chinese Imperial Army entered into Western literature in the 18th century as a source of inspiration for many military people. This book, translated from ancient Chinese many times, is still accepted to be the first work written on military strategy. It is also accepted as an inspiration source for business strategies by many of contemporary thinkers in the literature.

There have been many contributions to strategic thought in the fields of state administration and international relations, as well as wars both in the Western and Eastern Worlds. It is widely accepted that the greatest contribution to this area was made by Machiavelli in the time period at the end of middle Ages and the start of Renaissance. The emergence of strategy to be evaluated as a social science is dated to 19th century, when the Napoleonic Wars were ended. The book of Clausewitz, Prussian general and writer, "On War" is regarded as the starting point of theory. The following one hundred years has witnessed the development of theory related to

military strategy and national/international security. The theory has also been tested by practical work and experience from the battlefields and state administration. The theoretical work has shaped the lower and upper elements of strategy and also various dimensions of it. The upper and lower elements of strategy are named “hierarchic dimensions”.

Within this context, terms like:

- Policy
- Strategy (grand strategy, sectoral strategy),
- Operative,
- Tactics

have been coined.

Non-hierarchical dimensions where a consensus has been reached upon are:

- Status quo or current status or situation
- Power/availabilities (the dimensions of power and their importance)
- Location (geography and distances)
- Time (future perspective)
- Culture and perceptions
- Target/objective

The concept of “principles of war” has entered the literature starting from early 20th century. Those concepts, formed in accordance with the nations’ geographical and cultural values, have also universal aspects formed on international scale, exhibiting universality between nations. This situation has given rise to the thought that the concept of strategy has both different and common perceptions. Despite this fact on the international scale, the perception of strategy has been observed to have

differences within a nation on the sectoral and organizational scales. As it was mentioned in chapter 2; Clausewitz, a 19<sup>th</sup> century thinker, pointed out differences in perceptions of civilian and military managers and Gray, a modern thinker has radically named those differences as “culture clash”.

The concept of strategic management of organizations started its development following the commercial organizations having reached gigantic sizes and global economies having started to emerge, paralleling the development of the scientific management concept. This development has become clearly visible in the post World War II period and has been applied both in theory and practical applications towards the end of 20th century. This stage involves the inclusion of strategic management into the civilian sector, after being related to military and state administration areas for 2500 years, and it is now in a stage of its “golden age” during the last 150 years. Strategic management has now become an indispensable element of management for the modern organizations (Erdem, 2006). As a consequence, military terminology such as policy, operations, target (objective), tactics, strength, threat are now being widely used in civil organizations as well.

Time, that unchangeable element of strategy, no matter which sector it serves, and the need for long term strategic planning have resulted in the birth of the concept of “strategic foresight”. This task, performed by soothsayers throughout the history, has now turned into a scientific and methodological area of study. However, it is still observed that subjectivity has not yet been fully abandoned. The academicians who study that subject draw attention to this point.

## **5.2 Brief Reflections on the Inference and Commonality of Some Key Elements of Strategy**

Elements and dimensions of strategy are not totally independent from each other. On the contrary, they represent some inference and co-effects on many cases. Actual uses of some elements may result in misleading conclusions. Their implications will be presented in the following paragraphs.



### **5.2.1 Future Perspective**

The term “forming a strategy” has become a widely used phrase recently. Forming a strategy can be defined in its simplest form as “thoughts and plans to reach from the status-quo to a desired status”. The fundamental difference between those two states is in the “time” concept. “Status-quo” is defined; as the present time; while the “desired status” means a state where this status can be achieved. In other words, desired status shall be reached or achieved in the future. The difference in the two statuses in terms of time can be defined as “range”. The desired status should also be defined within the time dimension. “Range” is one of the most indispensable elements of strategy. It can be defined as “short”, “medium” or “long” range or can be expressed in units of years. The same considerations apply to the business strategies besides the military and public administration strategies. Rue and Byars (2002, p. 97) point out that the “strategic planning horizon consists of short range, intermediate and long range; short range generally covers one year, intermediate range spans 3 to 5 years and long range spans more than 5 years and up to 20 years”. Therefore, it should be viewed with some reservation if very short range thoughts and actions, for example, ranges less than one year, are termed as “strategic”.

### **5.2.2 Component of “Adversary” in Military Strategy vs. Component of “Competition” in Business Strategy**

As mentioned above, the theory of strategy has developed and matured mainly for military applications. The main goal of a soldier is to win victory. The greatest strategies are the ones that achieve that goal without war. As asserted by Sun Tzu some 2500 years ago, ‘Win without fighting; subdue the enemy’s army without fighting, capture the enemy’s cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations’ (Michaelson, 2001, p. 24).

The interpretation of those words from the point of view of business strategy should be “obtain a targeted level of profit with the minimum investment and operational costs”.

The basic elements to be taken into account when reaching that goal are the power, time and environment. Of course, the concept of power should be conceived in a relative sense. If there is a great difference in the powers of the two opponents, then one should not even mention war. There are numerous examples in history that a very powerful army is instrumental in preventing a war and national goals are achieved without war. However, the evaluation of superiority between two seemingly equal powers should be made with objective criteria. History also has a myriad of examples of the tragic ends of leaders and armies that overestimated their own powers.

The existence of the enemy, no matter whether it is superior or inferior in relative terms, is one of the basic elements of military strategy. This fact has an importance when determining the limits of the definition of behaviour and actions of military strategy. The use of the term “strategic” for routine military activities when there is no enemy has the risk of undermining the real meaning of this term. For example, in peace time relocation of a military unit within the country should not be defined as a strategic activity. Such relocation and transportation activities without the threat of the enemy are generally termed as “logistic activities”. However, as the size of the military unit gets larger, the same activity can be termed as “strategic”. Although this description is insufficient, it is not necessarily wrong. The problem is whether this conception is an element of the common strategic culture or perception. If the difference in conceptions is meaningful, one could conclude that the factor of culture has not been formed in its full meaning.

The positions of competitors in business strategy are similar to the position of enemies in the military strategy. This simulation refers to the words of Mintzberg which were mentioned in Chapter 2: “It is obvious that, business is not war..... It's true that politics, business, and war belong to the same broad class of phenomena, and that there are events within business that correspond in significant ways to war”

The “enemy” is replaced by the “competitors” within an “external environment” although it is obvious that competitors are not enemies. Corporations perform all of their major operations within a competitive environment to gain an advantageous

position over their competitors and those actions are based on a strategic planning. There is almost no corporation in the modern globalized economy not experiencing competition. It is an actual fact that production is relocated in the areas where the cost of labor is cheaper. There is no doubt that the main motive of those relocations is the pressure created by sectoral competition.

All activities termed as “Strategic” due to their size also need a time dimension. The purpose is either to gain superiority over the competitors or to prevent the superiority of the competitor. Activities such as "strategic" relocations, corporate mergers and acquisitions are common strategic activities in present day’s highly competitive world.

### **5.2.3 Road-map, as a non-hierarchical element of Strategy**

A strategical study starts with a situation analysis, where the environment, location, power and capabilities are determined. There is no doubt that the objective criteria should be taken into account while this determination is made. The second step is the determination of the goal. The third step is the determination of a “road map”.


Johnson and Scholes (2006) propose very similar three stages to construct a strategy;

- Where are we now? (What are the Internal and external factors?)
- Where do we want to go? (What is the vision?)
- How do we get there? (What do we need to do?)

Road map can also be defined as the ways of behaviour or ways of application. Therefore, a roadmap is one of the most important elements of the strategy. However, it should be an insufficient approach to see strategy solely as a roadmap. The two ends of the “road” in the roadmap are the status quo and the goal(s) to be achieved. Roadmap can be drafted after the determination of those two basic elements. However, there are other elements that affect the drafting of a roadmap: the possible threats and opportunities on the road.


In Figure 5.1, it is shown both non-hierarchical elements of strategy (such as current status, objectives, road-map or conception as well as time-frame) and hierarchical (such as operative and tactics) in a sole context.

**Figure 5.1 Non-hierarchical and hierarchical elements of strategy**



In order to reach the objective or goal starting from current status (status-quo), generally one road map is not sufficient and it would be necessary to think about the determinations in several roadmaps containing more than one alternative. This explanation is shown in figure 5.2.

**Figure 5.2 Roadmaps Corresponding to Alternative Scenarios.**



Those concepts are now prevalent in all areas of life. However, this expansion has resulted in a distortion in concepts and perceptions and differences in perception between different sectors. According to some observers who view this in a pessimistic way, the concept of strategy has now been adulterated and diverged from the truth due to the numerous assumptions made (Mathey, 1995, p. 73).

### **5.3 Concise Extractions**

Those results, excerpted from the literature can be listed as follows in order to aid to the determination of parameters for the following field research which will be presented in the next chapter;

- Historical path of strategy; “from warfare deception to all aspects of social life”
- Basic elements of strategy: objective or aim, future perspective, road map, threat, adversary or competition
- Strategic family and hierarchy: Policy, strategy, operative and tactics
- The terminology borrowed by strategic management (Business strategy) from military strategy: (interactions) aim, target, objectives, headquarter, threat, policy, opportunity
- Commonality of elements or the dimension of strategy between military strategy and business strategy
- Commonality of strategic management principles, in both military and business, such as SWOT analysis and management by objectives (MBO)
- Evolution of some elements of strategy and actual phenomena
- Need for methodological approaches on “strategic foresight” rather than subjective ones
- The need for coordination on the formation of “national strategy”
- Position of strategy among the social sciences

## **Chapter 6**

### **Research Methodology**

#### **6.1 Problem Definition and the Background of the Research Question**

The concept of strategy has been used for centuries to aid armies and countries in achieving their goals. The concept of strategic management of corporations has also been in the limelight of the world's academic and management circles as a paradigm of scientific management for the last 50 years. Important steps both in theoretical and practical dimensions have been taken towards the management of large-scale corporations.

The behaviour of human beings and societies is shaped under the influence of many material and abstract factors. There is a consensus on the belief that culture, perceptions and conceptions have an important place among those abstract factors.

When the subject is viewed from this stand point, it becomes evident that in general, the level of the strategic culture – strategic management relations and the level of common strategic perception of the intelligentsia and specifically of the managerial elite become a determining factor for the harmonization of national, sectoral and corporate priorities and for the maintenance of efforts to that effect. This fact can be defined as “grand strategy” or “national strategy”, which is used to define the total strategic quality and capacity of a country.

Within this context, the lack of a common conception and a communication language results in the failure to take the necessary decisions in time and in a coordinated way. In such societies where a media for common strategic communication has not been formed, proactive policies cannot be determined, no coordination can be formed and

no synchronous actions can be taken. Such societies have to follow the policies either dictated by other powers or display irrational reactions. When problems are encountered, it is the people in the managerial positions who are blamed, or it is believed that the adverse effects are caused by external powers. Such negative circumstances are not only typical of public administration, but also of private corporations. However, the incorrect diagnosis of the trouble can very likely be due to the lack of a common strategic culture and perception.

According to the observations, it is understood that, one sector evaluates strategy thoroughly in the military field and yet ignores magnificent progress that is particularly made in business administration, such as “strategic management”. On the other hand, the use of strategic thought in strategic business administration is the subject of numerous works in the literature. However, it is also observed that business circles focus on the strategic business administration matters and may neglect the security dimensions.

The author’s awareness of the problem goes back to 1989. He participated in NATO Defense College which is a graduate course for the medium- high level civilian and military officials of NATO member countries in 1989-1990. The course was performed with the participation of the officials who came from the 16 member countries of the alliance. The methodology of the education depended on the committee work in which military and civilian attendances took place in a balanced proportion. The committees studied subjects which mainly consisted of international matters, security and strategic issues and each committee tried to compose a committee solution during a workshop period. The composed views of the committees were presented and discussed in the following session of the general assembly of the course. During those works, numerous different views and opinion emerged naturally. Those differences mainly originated from the national positions or geographical locations of the countries involved. However, it was understood that some of the differences originated neither from national context nor were related to the interests of the alliance. A question mark emerged that there might be some other reasons such as cultural differences and/or perceptions among the nations and professions (It was the time of a turbulence period in the international realm related

to the ending of the Cold War and the academic circles which were interested in international relations and security were in a daze. The classical perceptions were resisting some radical changes).

The author served in NATO and Western European Union (WEU) International Headquarters and Strategy Division between 1993-98. During that period he participated in the works of “politico-military groups”, which consisted of both civilian and military medium-high level bureaucrats. Similar variables were observed during those works. It was observed that those variables were not homogenous and changed into sharp contradictions as well as surprising commonalities from time to time.

The author has discussed this matter with staff officers and civilian professors in the works of the Strategic Research Institute (SAREN). The discussions were carried out in the small groups and the problem areas designated. In the end, it was decided that the subject of “Perception of Strategy among medium-high level administrators” was important and worth examining.

Following these steps, a literature review was carried out. It was realized that the subject was quite new and had taken place in the works of foreign scholars since the 1990s. The work has relatively intensified in recent years as academic studies but, in depth and significant examples were rare. Those studies concentrated on national levels and aimed to clarify the national differences. In addition, they dealt with cultural matters rather than perceptions. Although the notions of “culture” and “perception” are very associative and interrelated, the aim of this research is not restricted solely to culture matters. The previous were works based on an assumption that national cultures are homogeneous. Literature survey showed that apart from national culture, sectoral and organizational culture and perceptions are also important factors in the context of strategy and strategic management. On the other hand, a few domestic examples seemed to be engaged in a political view to some extent rather than being academic (Şehsuvaroğlu, 2000).



## **6.2 Purpose of the Research**

The purpose of this research is to determine the level of differences in general strategic culture/perception and the awareness for the relationship of those with the principles of strategic management for the medium-high (or middle-upper) level managers (civilian and military bureaucrats and private corporate managers), together with related problems and remedies, by conducting a “descriptive” field survey.

## **6.3 Definition of Target Population**

Medium-high level managers of three sectors, namely, military, civilian bureaucrats and business managers were determined as the target population. Definition of medium-high level requires some specifications: Military bureaucrats should be senior staff officers from the four services (Army, navy, air force and gendarmerie) of armed forces. They should have graduated from war academies as the professional graduate school. Some of them may have a second graduate license from domestic or foreign universities. Civilian bureaucrats should be the ones working for the various ministries and integrated corporations. Business sector managers should consist of corporate managers from industry and banking. All of them should have higher education. Some of them also may have one or more graduate degrees.

The definition of “medium-high level” also reflects on the field with the ranking of the managers. As for the military ones, it is defined with the ranks from “major” as the lowest and to “colonel” as the highest. As for the civilian officials, “section chief” is the lowest and “deputy under secretary” is the highest. As for the business managers, “branch manager” is the lowest and “deputy general manager” is the highest. Lower rankings are excluded from the target population. There are three rationales for this limitation. The first rationale is, in case the lower rankings are included, a very large population would have been in question, and to reach a good sampling would be very difficult. Second rationale is, after those levels of official and executive ranks, they are subjected to the “on the job training” for the high-levels of administration. Besides, their age, service year and professional experience come close and these two factors provide a relatively “more homogeneous population” to

be examined. The third rationale is that, those level officials and executives, in fact, have a voice in the state administration, national security matters and strategic management in their corporations. The majority of the target population are working in the two biggest cities, such as Istanbul and Ankara. In the light of these factors, their knowledge level and sensitivity on the state administration, national security matters and corporate strategy are expected to be rather high. This makes it possible to evaluate emerging variances in depth and meaningfully. The higher rankings are also excluded since their positions and personalities are quite special and their attitudes and perceptions may be “sui generis”, besides reaching them is quite difficult.

#### **6.4 Research Questions and Determining Research Model**

In the light of above mentioned considerations; the main research question and its main topics as the research factors are determined as follows:

“Is there any significant difference in the perceptions of Turkish medium-high level managers on strategy in general and strategic management and as well as their awareness of the problems on common strategic perception?”

##### **6.4.1 Main Topics of the Research Question**

In the light of literature review and actual observations within society, three topics and one core concept which can serve to examine the main research question, were determined. The topics were determined by a chain of logic. The track that is followed is from the general case to the specific (deduction).

The first of those is strategic culture and understanding of strategy in general. There is no doubt that strategy has a wide coverage. However, in the minimal scale, it contains; “Information on the formation and development of the strategic thought and the indispensable (siné-qua-non) elements of strategy and thoughts on the daily changes and phenomena”.

Another factor is; “Being aware of the relationship between the general strategic concepts and “strategic management”, which has an important place in the modern corporation management”.

The third factor is; “The questioning of the awareness among the medium-high level managers of the problems that are often observed in Turkey”.

The main aim of this study is centred in the third topic. However, it is deemed that the evaluations related to the third topic without clarification of the first two topics would not be accurate. In other words, the first two topics form the soft infrastructure for the third topic.

The determinants related to those topics were extracted by a literature survey and by observations. The literature survey has a greater significance for the first two topics. The results gathered from observations have been the determinants of the third topic.

The core concept of the study represents the spirit of ideas which is placed in the research model and the questionnaire in an appropriate expression.

Those three topics are:

- Strategic culture and understanding of strategy in general
- Relations between strategy in general and strategic management
- Awareness of the problems on the common strategic culture and perception

Basic assumption of the research is that the first two topics may affect each other. On the other hand, each of the first two topics may affect the third one respectively.


Other topics of the research question are determined as follows:

- Relations between working sectors of the target population (such as military, civilian and private sector) and their understandings and perceptions on the subject matters.
- Relations between their professional experiences (working years) and their understandings and perceptions on the subject matters
- Relations between their higher education (under graduate-graduate) and their understandings and perceptions on the subject matters.

#### **6.4.2 Initial Research Model**

According to above mentioned research topics, the initial research model is constructed as follows:

**Figure 6.1 Initial Research Model**



### 6.5 Determining the Research Method

In order to establish such a complex and to some extent, qualitative research topic, it was decided to clarify its basic components such as values, perceptions, culture and knowledge; a series of discussions were carried out to that effect in a restricted academic circle. At the end of the discussions, 26 questions were structured with six-option Likert method and a pre-test was conducted in the Strategic Research Institute. The sample group was composed of military and civilian academicians. The recommendations of the sample group were also requested in order to find out whether the questions were clear and distinct and the applied method was proper for the aim of the research. Taking into account the results of that pre-test and consulting some experts, the questionnaire was re-structured. It was also reminded

that such a questionnaire would ideally consist of 15-25 questions (Yazıcıoğlu & Erdoğan, 2007, p. 77). In the end, a five-option “Likert” method was composed with 20 questions representing the variables of the survey.

### **6.5.1 Variables of the Research under the Headings of the Tentative Factors**

Twenty variables were grouped under three tentative factors in accordance with anticipated correlation and regression analysis in order to test respondents’ perceptions on strategy. The variables were also subjected to a “factor analysis” during statistical analysis of this survey. According to the results of that factor analysis, the variables could be grouped in a different way. Those variables under the headings of tentative factors are presented below.

#### **6.5.1.1 Strategic Culture and Understanding of Strategy in General:**

- Historical evolution of strategic thought
- Relations between strategy and future perspective
- Component of “adversary” in military strategy
- Component of “competition” in corporate strategy
- The concepts of strategy and tactics
- The concepts of strategy and operative
- Relations between strategy and road-map
- Evolution of the notion of “threat” in strategy
- Effect of globalization phenomenon on strategy

#### **6.5.1.2 Relations between Strategy in General and Strategic Management:**

- Scope of strategic management
- Commonality of strategic management principles
- Level of understanding and acceptance of strategic management
- Reflection of the notion of “objective” on corporate strategy

- Negligence of strategic management on the strategic argumentation

### **6.5.1.3 Level of Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Culture and Perception:**

- Clutter of ideas on the publications on strategy
- Confusion on the concepts of “strategy” and “policy”
- Subjective approaches on “strategic foresight” rather than methodological
- The need for coordination on the formation of “national strategy”
- The need of a new social science on strategy
- The status of common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey

### **6.5.2 Rating Scale**

As it is mentioned in the previous paragraph, the five-option “Likert” method was applied. Respondents were asked to indicate their preferences as opinions using in the scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 3 (neither agree nor disagree) and to 5 (Strongly agree). The remaining six questions were re-structured as open ended questions at the end of the questionnaire in order to take the participants opinions freely. Besides, those open-ended questions would serve as an opportunity to evaluate and comment separately by the author and to check the perceptions in question to some extent.

Evaluation of the open-ended questions will be submitted at the end of the statistical work of the 20 variables.

## **6.6 Sampling**

The method of this dissertation is “Descriptive Study”. This method is chosen since ‘the goal of a descriptive study, is to offer to the researcher a profile or to describe relevant aspects of the phenomena of interest from an individual, organizational, industry oriented or other perspective’ (Sekaran, 2003). As for the sampling method,

“Purposive Sampling” (Also called “Purposeful sampling”) is chosen. Purposive sampling is a non-random method of sampling where the researcher selects “information-rich cases for study in depth (Patton, 2002). Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance for the purpose of the research.

Purposive sampling is particularly relevant when the initial concern is exploring the universe and understanding the audience (Patton, 2002). This means using common sense and the best judgement in choosing the right habitations, and meeting the right number of right people for the purpose of the study. Purposive sampling is best used with small numbers of individuals or groups which may well be sufficient for understanding human perceptions, problems, needs, behaviours and contexts, which are the main justification for a qualitative audience research (Erimiř, 2009).

As a purposive sampling method, convenience sampling is useful in getting general ideas about the phenomena of interest. It saves time, money and effort. However, it yields information-poor cases. (Patton, 2002).

Deciding on a sample size for qualitative inquiry can be more difficult than quantitative because there are no definite rules to be followed (Patton, 2002). It will depend on what the researcher wants to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility and what can be done with available time and resources. With fixed resources, which are usually the case, researcher can choose to study one specific phenomenon in depth with a smaller sample size or a bigger sample size when seeking breadth.

### **6.6.1 Sample Description**

The sample for this study consists of middle-upper level executives from the staff officers of the armed forces, government officials and business managers.

For the military executives, attendants of Armed Forces College were preferred to be the participants. The rationale of this preference is;



- They all are senior staff officers from the four services (Army, navy, air force and gendarmerie) of armed forces.
- They have graduated from war colleges that are their professional graduate schools.
- Some of them have a second graduate degree from foreign or domestic universities.
- They have served in both headquarters and at military units in the field.
- Their ranks span from major to colonel. This means their work experiences are between ten to thirty years.
- They are expected to have sufficient strategic culture and aware of strategic matters and as well as management science.
- They are selected from various headquarters and units in both institutional quota and randomization (in their services and units) basis.

As for the civilian bureaucrats, attendants of National Security College were preferred to be the participants. The rationale of this preference;

- They all have an undergraduate degree.
- Some of them have one graduate degree (Few of them have a second graduate degree or doctorate).
- They all work at the ministries or at associated corporations.
- Their duty posts span from section chief to deputy under-secretary.
- Their work experiences are expected to be between five to thirty-five years.
- They are expected to have sufficient strategic culture and awareness of strategic matters and as well as management science.
- They are selected from various ministries and associate corporations in both institutional quota and randomization (in their institutions) basis.

As for the business managers and executives, the respondents were selected from the leading companies of Turkey. Leading firms were selected from the list of 'Capital

500' developed by Capital Monthly (Capital, August 2009) and 'Bank Rankings' developed by the TBB (Türkiye Bankalar Birliği) published in 2009. Firms are chosen among those with top rankings in terms of annual turnover. Companies that met the following criteria were selected for this study.

- They had to be in the list of Capital 500 Index, in terms of annual net turnover.
- They had to be the top 20 banks in the list of TBB, in terms of annual net turnover.

The demographic profile of the respondents for business sector is similar to those of military and civilian bureaucrats;

- They all have an under-graduate degree.
- Some of them have one graduate degree, a few of them. have second graduate degree or doctorate.
- They all work in the headquarters or one stage lower units of their company.
- Their duty posts span from branch chief to deputy general manager.
- Their work experiences are expected to be between five to thirty-five years.
- They are expected to have sufficient strategic culture and awareness of strategic matters and there is no doubt that of the management science.
- However, there is no chance to select them in institutional quota but instead a reachable basis which can be considered as a kind of randomization. In the context of this work, five industrial/commercial institutions (Mannessman-Borusan, Arçelik, Doğuş, YA-SA Yalçın Sabancı Shipping Industry, GSK Glaxosmithkline medicine), and three banks (Garanti, İş, ING) were able to respond to the questionnaire with their medium- high level managers.

As it is mentioned above, the sample size is not a primary consideration in purposive sampling. Some 75 respondents can be accepted for the purposive sampling in the context of a descriptive study (Erimiř, 2009). However, it is aimed to reach over 100 respondents totally since this study covers three separate sectors.

During the survey work, it was reached to 47 civilian bureaucrats, 57 military bureaucrats and 47 private sector managers whose specifications were as described above. As a matter of consistency, ten of the 57 respondents of the military bureaucrats' survey papers were selected and excluded randomly. In the end, data processing was implemented with the total number of 141 responses which was equal to the sum of 47 responses from the each of the three sectors.

### 6.6.2 Descriptions of the Respondents and Demographic Variables

Distribution of the respondents according to their working sectors is indicated in Table 6.1. The number of respondents from each sector is equal to 47 and the percentage of each is 33%.

**Table 6.1 Distribution of the Respondents According to Their Sectors**

	frequency	%
Military bureaucrat	47	33,3
Civilian bureaucrat	47	33,3
Private sector manager	47	33,3
Total	141	100,0

Distribution of the respondents according to their education level is indicated in Table 6.2.

90 respondents graduated from various universities with under graduate degree and 51 respondents have graduate degree; from domestic or foreign universities. The percentages of these are % 63, 8 and % 36, 2

**Table 6.2 Distribution of the Respondents according to Their Education Level**

	Frequency	%
Undergraduate	90	63,8
Graduate	51	36,2
Total	141	100,0

Distribution of the respondents according to their professional experience (working years) is indicated in Table 6.3.

**Table 6.3 Distribution of the Respondents according to Their Working Years**

	Frequency	%
Less than 10 years	9	6,4
Between 10-19	77	54,6
Between 20-29	38	27,0
30 years and more	17	12,1
Total	141	100,0

## **Chapter 7**

### **Statistical Analysis of the Data**

#### **7.1 Data Analysis Method**

The data obtained through the questionnaire was analyzed using the Statistic Programme for Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows. The SPSS is a package programme designed to be used in statistical calculations. It can generate frequencies, descriptive statistics such as standard deviation, correlation/regression analysis, factor analysis, reliability analysis, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and is convenient for drawing the tables and graphs. The analyses have been performed at a 95% confidence level. The statistical methods used in this research for analyzing the data are:

- Factor Analysis: For the grouping of different variables meaningfully and for the explanation of the variation among a set of interrelated groups.
- Reliability Analysis: For measuring the internal consistency of both the different factors and the criteria that form these factors.
- Regression Analysis: For measuring the significance of relationship between dependent and independent variables.
- Analysis of Variance (ANOVA): For detection of significant mean differences among the multiple groups.

##### **7.1.1 Factor Analysis**

As mentioned above, factor analysis is used in order to reduce the numbers of variables in the model. This method analyzes the variables according to their mutual relations and explains them according to their common determinants (Sekaran,

2003). The reason for the reduction of the variables is necessitated by the limitation posed by regression analysis. Factor analysis classifies the variables to form in new common meaningful groups as an input to the next stage.

Three headings were specified at the beginning of this research which contained the parameters of “initial research model”. The outcomes of this study will form the “final research model” and the following analyses will be made according to this model.

### **7.1.2 KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity and Reliability Analysis**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity tests are used to analyze the factors as they indicate the adequacy of the sampling. It was expected that the value of KMO is close to unity and the level of meaningfulness of Bartlett's test is  $p < 0.05$ . After this stage, factor analysis is performed in order to specify the lower dimension of the scale and reliability tests for each of the emergent factors are made. In addition, the variance explanation percentage is also investigated.

The results were evaluated within a confidence interval of 95% and the meaningfulness in  $p < 0.05$  level two-tailed.

Reliability is the state of consistency and stability between the independent measurements of the same variable (Ergün, 2009; Sekaran, 2003). In other words, reliability is the exclusion of the random errors that may occur when a study is being made. If a study is multiply repeated in different times and the same responses are being taken, it means that the study is reliable (Sekaran, 2003). The methods developed in order to evaluate the reliability of the scale are termed as reliability analysis. The analysis of the questions that occur in that analysis is termed as “item analysis”. The most widely used method of reliability analysis is the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient. The evaluation criteria used in the evaluation of Cronbach's Alpha coefficient are as follows (Özdamar, 2004):

- If  $0,00 \leq \alpha < 0,40$  the scale is not reliable.
- If  $0,40 \leq \alpha < 0,60$  the scale has a low reliability.
- If  $0,60 \leq \alpha < 0,80$  the scale is quite reliable.
- If  $0,80 \leq \alpha < 1,00$  the scale is highly reliable.

The most common and preferable scale is;  $0,70 \leq \alpha$

## 7.2 Results of the General Reliability and Factor Analysis

As a result of the analysis for general internal consistency of the scale made for this purpose the reliability figure of  $\alpha = 0,774$  is obtained, as shown in Table 7.1.

**Table 7.1 General Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,774	20

The effects of the items of the scale to the reliability level are presented in Table 7.2.

**Table 7.2 Item-Total Statistics (Reliability Statistics if Item Deleted)**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
1. Historical evolution of strategic thought:	76,702	59,711	0,272	0,768
2. Relations between strategy and future perspective	76,858	59,794	0,235	0,771
3. Component of “adversary” in military strategy	78,113	58,287	0,195	<b>0,78</b>
4. Component of “competition” in corporate strategy :	77,418	55,974	0,353	0,764
5. The concepts of strategy and tactics	77,305	59,556	0,233	0,771
6. The concepts of strategy and operative	77,511	57,68	0,362	0,763
7. Relations between strategy and road-map	76,922	58,344	0,455	0,759
8. Evolution of the notion of “threat” in strategy	76,993	58,664	0,447	0,76
9. Effect of globalization phenomenon on strategy	76,816	57,451	0,497	0,756
10. Scope of strategic management	77,305	57,242	0,395	0,76
11. Commonality of strategic management principles	77,397	56,084	0,444	0,756
12. Level of understanding and acceptance of strategic management	77,156	57,261	0,427	0,758
13. Reflection of the notion of “objective” on corporate strategy	77,468	58,922	0,311	0,766
14. Negligence of strategic management on the strategic argumentation	77,348	56,9	0,376	0,762
15. Clutter of ideas on the publications on strategy	77,092	58,113	0,378	0,762
16. Confusion on the concepts of “strategy” and “policy”	77,56	59,791	0,173	<b>0,777</b>
17. Subjective approaches on “strategic foresight” rather than methodological	77,291	60,551	0,218	0,771
18. The need for coordination on the formation of “national strategy”	76,702	60,539	0,331	0,766
19. The need of a new social science on strategy	77,22	56,816	0,445	0,757
20. The status of common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey (C.C.)	76,943	58,382	0,402	0,761



When the “Cronbach’s Alpha if Item Deleted” values are analyzed, it was noted that the deletion of the 3rd (0,780> $\alpha$ ) and the 16th( 0,777> $\alpha$ ) items shall increase the reliability.

Therefore, 18 items of the scale thus formed was re-analyzed and the result seen in Table 7.3 is obtained.

**Table 7.3 General Reliability Statistics (Repeat)**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,782	18

The result of  $\alpha = 0,782$  obtained by this deletion has indicated that the general “Strategic Perception” level of the questionnaire with 18 questions is more reliable.

When this process is repeated once more, the result of Table 7.4 indicating the effects of items on the reliability level is obtained:

**Table 7.4 Item-Total Statistics (Reliability Statistics if Item Deleted-Repeat)**

	<b>Scale Mean if Item Deleted</b>	<b>Scale Variance if Item Deleted</b>	<b>Corrected Item-Total Correlation</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</b>
1. Historical evolution of strategic thought:	69,837	50,037	0,263	0,778
2. Relations between strategy and future perspective	69,993	50,164	0,221	0,782
4. Component of "competition" in corporate strategy :	70,553	46,835	0,329	0,777
5. The concepts of strategy and tactics	70,44	49,805	0,231	0,781
6. The concepts of strategy and operative	70,645	48,002	0,367	0,771
7. Relations between strategy and road-map	70,057	48,797	0,445	0,767
8. Evolution of the notion of "threat" in strategy	70,128	48,898	0,458	0,767
9. Effect of globalization phenomenon on strategy	69,95	47,805	0,505	0,763
10. Scope of strategic management	70,44	47,677	0,395	0,769
11. Commonality of strategic management principles	70,532	46,536	0,449	0,765
12. Level of understanding and acceptance of strategic management	70,291	47,522	0,441	0,766
13. Reflection of the notion of "objective" on corporate strategy	70,603	48,998	0,329	0,774
14. Negligence of strategic management on the strategic argumentation	70,482	47,08	0,395	0,769
15. Clutter of ideas on the publications on strategy	70,227	48,634	0,364	0,771
17. Subjective approaches on "strategic foresight" rather than methodological	70,426	50,875	0,202	0,782
18. The need for coordination on the formation of "national strategy"	69,837	50,637	0,341	0,774
19. The need of a new social science on strategy	70,355	47,316	0,443	0,766
20. The status of common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey (C.C.)	70,078	48,787	0,396	0,77

When Table 7.4 is analyzed again, it is concluded that further deletion of items shall not further increase the reliability as indicated by Cronbach's Alpha values and thus it is decided to keep the 18 item questionnaire as it is.

Based on this conclusion, KMO and Bartlett tests to indicate the adequacy of the sampling made is performed. The result obtained is seen in Table 7.5.

**Table 7.5 KMO and Bartlett's Test**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		,735
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	511,895
	df	153
	Sig.	,000

The fact that the KMO value is close to unity and the level of meaningfulness of the Bartlett's test is  $p < 0.05$  provides the possibility to perform the analysis of factors. Therefore, a factor analysis is made to determine the lower dimensions of the scale and the reliability tests of each of the factors obtained were made.

The result of the general reliability analysis is the factorial structure shown in Table 7.6.

**Table 7.6 Structure of the Factor - Rotated Component Matrix**

	1	2
14. Negligence of strategic management on the strategic argumentation	0,686	
15. Clutter of ideas on the publications on strategy	0,661	
12. Level of understanding and acceptance of strategic management	0,603	
7. Relations between strategy and road-map	0,586	
18. The need for coordination on the formation of “national strategy”	0,511	
19. The need of a new social science on strategy	0,468	0,334
17. Subjective approaches on “strategic foresight” rather than methodological	0,464	
20. The status of common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey (C.C.)	0,404	0,309
10. Scope of strategic management		0,625
5. The concepts of strategy and tactics		0,594
13. Reflection of the notion of “objective” on corporate strategy		0,547
8. Evolution of the notion of “threat” in strategy		0,531
11. Commonality of strategic management principles		0,496
4. Component of “competition” in corporate strategy :		0,484
9. Effect of globalization phenomenon on strategy	0,418	0,465
1. Historical evolution of strategic thought:		0,435
6. The concepts of strategy and operative		0,385
2. Relations between strategy and future perspective		0,362

Based on this result, the variables are collected under two meaningful factor groups. The first group of questions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 were concluded to contain the first two factors of the “initial research model”. In other words, the factor


analysis made joins the two factors. Therefore, the name of the factor was altered as “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management”.

On the other hand, the factor named as “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception” forms a meaningful entity and contains the questions 7, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20.

### 7.2.1 Final Research Model

Based on those results, the initial research model is revised and re-structured as can be seen below and it is decided that the following analyses of the research should be made on this model.

**Figure 7.1 Final Research Model**



After the final research model is so structured, each factor was tested for internal consistency.

### 7.2.2 Analysis of the Factors According to Final Research Model

In accordance with this result, the reliability test of the first factor, “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management” is seen in Table 7.7.

**Table 7.7 The Reliability of “Understanding of Strategy and Perceptions on Strategy in General and Strategic Management”**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,693	10

A result of reliability of  $\alpha = 0,693$  from the internal consistency analysis of the factor “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management” is obtained. According to this result, it is decided that the Alpha value is reliable.

The effects of the items that form the dimension “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management” to the level of reliability is presented in Table 7.8.

**Table 7.8 Results of the “if Item Deleted” Analisis for the Dimension of “Understanding of Strategy and Perceptions on Strategy in General and Strategic Management”**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach’s Alpha if Item Deleted
10. Scope of strategic management	36,957	18,255	0,423	0,656
5. The concepts of strategy and tactics	36,957	18,984	0,331	0,674
13. Reflection of the notion of “objective” on corporate strategy	37,121	19,207	0,345	0,671
8. Evolution of the notion of “threat” in strategy	36,645	19,559	0,422	0,663
11. Commonality of strategic management principles	37,050	17,933	0,424	0,656
4. Component of “competition” in corporate strategy :	37,071	17,509	0,357	0,673
9. Effect of globalization phenomenon on strategy	36,468	19,065	0,438	0,658
1. Historical evolution of strategic thought:	36,355	19,788	0,292	0,680
2. Relations between strategy and future perspective	36,511	19,909	0,237	0,689
6. Strategic and Operative Concepts	37,163	19,109	0,309	0,678

When the table is examined, it is seen that when an item is deleted, the Cronbach Alpha values indicate that the reliability is not further improved. Therefore, the 10 item “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management” questionnaire is kept as it is.

The reliability test of the second factor, “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception” is shown in Table 7.9.

**Table 7.9 The Reliability of “Awarenesses of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception”**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,717	8

The internal consistency analysis of the dimension “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception” yields a reliability value of  $\alpha = 0,717$ . This Alpha value is deemed as reliable.

The effect of the items forming the dimension “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception” on the reliability level is presented in Table 7.10.



**Table 7.10 Results of the “if Item Deleted” Analysis for the Dimension of “Awarenesses of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception”**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach’s Alpha if Item Deleted
14. Negligence of strategic management on the strategic argumentation	29,560	10,605	0,479	0,673
15. Clutter of ideas on the publications on strategy	29,305	11,542	0,446	0,680
12. Level of understanding and acceptance of strategic management	29,369	11,263	0,473	0,674
7. Relations between strategy and road-map	29,135	12,160	0,447	0,683
18. The need for coordination on the formation of “national strategy”	28,915	13,064	0,362	0,700
19. The need of a new social science on strategy	29,433	11,561	0,399	0,691
20. The status of common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey (C.C.)	29,156	12,247	0,370	0,696
17. Subjective approaches on “strategic foresight” rather than methodological	29,504	12,566	0,308	0,708

When the table is examined, it is seen that when an item is deleted, the Cronbach Alpha values indicate that the reliability is not further improved. Therefore, the 8 item “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception” questionnaire is kept as it is.

### 7.3 Research Questions and Hypothesis

Within the context of the factor of “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management” and in the light of above mentioned determinants, the first research question of the dissertation is fixed as follows:

Research Question 1: Does Turkish medium-high level managers’ Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management vary significantly according to their sectors, education level and work experience?

Depending on this research question, the first, the second and the third hypotheses were generated as follows:

- Hypothesis I (H1): There is significant difference in Turkish medium-high level managers’ Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management according their working sectors.
- Null Hypothesis I (Ho1): There is no significant difference in Turkish medium-high level managers’ Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management according their sectors.
- Hypothesis II (H2): Turkish medium-high level managers’ Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management vary significantly according their education level.
- Null Hypothesis II (Ho2): Turkish medium-high level managers’ Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management do not vary significantly according their education level.
- Hypothesis III (H3): Turkish medium-high level managers’ Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management vary significantly according to their work experience.
- Null Hypothesis III (Ho3): Turkish medium-high level managers’ Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and

strategic management do not vary significantly according their work experience.

Research Question 2: Is there significant difference Turkish medium-high level managers' "Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception vary significantly according to their sectors, education level and work experience?"

Depending on this research question, the fourth, the fifth and the sixth hypotheses were generated as follows:

- Hypothesis IV (H4): There is a significant difference among the three sectors of Turkish medium-high level managers' Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception.
- Null Hypothesis IV (Ho4): There is no significant difference among the three sectors of Turkish medium-high level managers' Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception.
- Hypothesis V (H5): The Turkish medium-high level managers' Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perceptions vary significantly according their education level.
- Null Hypothesis V (Ho5): The Turkish medium-high level managers' Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perceptions does not vary significantly according their education level.
- Hypothesis VI (H6): The Turkish medium-high level managers' Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception varies significantly according their work experience.
- Null Hypothesis VI (Ho6): The Turkish medium-high level managers' Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception does not vary significantly according their work experience.

According to above described research model, it is assumed that there may be a relation between the factors, namely "Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management" and "Awareness of the Problems on

the Common Strategic Perception”. This assumption led to following research question:

Research Question 3: Is there any substantial relation between Turkish medium-high level managers’ “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management” and “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception”.

In accordance with this research question, the following hypotheses come out:

- Hypothesis VII (HVII): There is a substantial relation between Turkish medium-high level managers’ “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management” and “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception”.
- Null Hypothesis VII (HoVII): There is no substantial relation between Turkish medium-high level managers’ “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management” and “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception”.

Considerations on the Core Concept:

The last variable of the survey is structured as “core concept (C.C.)”. The aim of the core concept is questioning “the status of common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey” which is directed to the respondents as the last question. The last research question is also generated from the core concept.

Research Question 4: Has a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey realized yet in a satisfactory level?

Depending on this research question, the following hypotheses were generated:

- Hypothesis VIII (HVIII): According to their opinion, a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has already been realized in a satisfactory level.
- Null Hypothesis VIII (HoVIII): According to their opinion, a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has not been realized yet in a satisfactory level.
- Hypothesis IX (HIX): The opinion of the medium-high level managers in Turkey on “a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has already been realized in a satisfactory level” varies significantly according to their working sectors.
- Null Hypothesis IX (HoIX): The opinion of the medium-high level managers in Turkey on, “a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has already been realized in a satisfactory level” does not vary significantly according to their working sector.
- Hypothesis X (HX): The opinion of the medium-high level managers in Turkey on “a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has already been realized in a satisfactory level” varies significantly according to their education level.
- Null Hypothesis X (HoX): The opinion of the medium-high level managers in Turkey on “a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has already been realized in a satisfactory level” does not vary significantly according to their education level.
- Hypothesis XI (HXI): The opinion of the medium-high level managers in Turkey on “a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has already been realized in a satisfactory level” varies significantly according to their work experience.
- Null Hypothesis XI (HoXI): The opinion of the medium-high level managers in Turkey on “a common strategic perception among the

medium-high level managers in Turkey has already been realized in a satisfactory level” does not vary significantly according to their work experience.

## Chapter 8

### Findings of the Research Based on the Statistical Analysis

#### 8.1 The Comparison of the Means

The comparison of the means of the two factors is made and presented in Table 8.1.

**Table 8.1 The Means of Lower Dimensions of the Scale of Strategic Perception**

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	S.d.
Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management	141	2,800	5,000	4,092	0,475
Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception	141	2,375	5,000	4,185	0,483

As can be seen in the Table, the mean of the dimension “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception” is higher than the mean of the dimension “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management”.

#### 8.2 Testing of Hypotheses

Hypothesis I (H I) and Hypothesis IV (H IV) are aimed to indicate if there is a difference in the perceptions of the two factors depending on the professional sectors. The results of the statistical analysis made for this purpose is presented in Table 8.2.

**Table 8.2 The Differentiation of the Two Dimensions of “Strategic Perception” Depending on Professional Sectors**

	Group	N	Mean	Ss	S.Error	F	p
Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management	Military bureaucrat	47	3,883	0,455	0,066	11,566	0,000
	Civilian bureaucrat	47	4,321	0,450	0,066		
	Private sector manager	47	4,072	0,425	0,062		
Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception	Military bureaucrat	47	4,040	0,471	0,069	7,558	0,001
	Civilian bureaucrat	47	4,394	0,465	0,068		
	Private sector manager	47	4,122	0,449	0,065		

As can be seen in the first part of the table above, the variance analysis (ANOVA) performed to indicate whether if there is a meaningful difference in the professional sectors for understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management dimension has *indicated a statistically meaningful difference* (F = 11.566; p<0.05).

According to this result, **hypothesis I (HI)** (*There is a significant difference between Turkish medium-high level managers’ understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management according their working sectors*) **is accepted** and the relevant nulhypothesis I (HoI) is rejected.

As can be seen in the second part of the Table, a one-dimensional variance analysis (ANOVA) was made to indicate if the “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception” dimension changes relative to the variable of professions has



denoted a **statistically meaningful difference** in the averages of the professional groups ( $F=7,558$ ;  $p<0.05$ ).

According to this result, **hypothesis IV** (H.IV) (*There is a significant difference among the three sectors of Turkish medium-high level managers' awareness of the problems on the common strategic perception*) **is accepted** and the null hypothesis IV (HoIV) is rejected.

Hypothesis II (HII) and hypothesis V (H.V) are aimed to indicate whether there is any difference in the perceptions or not depending on the two factors relating to the level of education. The results of the statistical analysis made for this purpose is shown in Table 8.3.

**Table 8.3 Changes in Strategic Perception Depending on the Level of Education**

	Group	N	Mean	S.d.	t	P
Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management	licence	90	4,058	0,480	-1,143	0,255
	graduate	51	4,153	0,466		
Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception	licence	90	4,129	0,434	-1,850	0,066
	graduate	51	4,284	0,548		

As can be seen in the first part of Table 7.16, according to the result of the independent Group t Test which aimed to indicate whether there is a meaningful difference of the participants' "understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management" dimension, the level of education has denoted no meaningful difference in the arithmetic averages of the two groups ( $t= 1,143$ ;  $p>0.05$ ).

According to this result, **hypothesis II** (H.II) is rejected and nulhypothesis II (Ho.II) (Turkish medium-high level managers' understanding of strategy and perceptions on

strategy in general and strategic management do not vary significantly according their education level) **is accepted.**

As can be seen in the second part of Table 7.16, according to the result of the independent Group t Test which aimed to indicate whether there is a meaningful difference of the participants' "awareness of the problems on the common strategic perception" dimension, the level of education has denoted no meaningful difference in the arithmetic averages of the two groups ( $t= 1,850$ ;  $p>0.05$ ).

According to this result, **hypothesis V (H.V) is rejected and null hypothesis V (Ho.V)** (Turkish medium-high level managers' Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perceptions do not vary significantly according their education level) **is accepted.**

Hypothesis III (HIII) and hypothesis VI (HVI) were aimed to indicate whether there is any difference in the perceptions, depending on the years of professional experience. The results of the statistical analysis made for this purpose is shown in Table 8.4.

**Table 8.4 Differentiations in the Strategic Perception Depending on the Work Experience in the Sector**

	Group	N	Mean	S.d.	F	p
Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management	Less than 10 years	9	3,900	0,377	1,572	0,199
	10-19	77	4,051	0,450		
	20-29	38	4,147	0,515		
	30 years and more	17	4,259	0,516		
Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception	Less than 10 years	9	4,194	0,520	0,548	0,651
	10-19	77	4,205	0,483		
	20-29	38	4,207	0,501		
	30 years and more	17	4,044	0,437		

As can be seen in the first part of Table 7.17, the one-dimensional variance analysis (ANOVA) which aimed to indicate whether there is a meaningful difference of the participants' "understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management" dimension, depending on the duration of work experience has denoted no meaningful difference statistically ( $F=1,572$ ;  $p>0.05$ ).

According to this result, **hypothesis III (HIII) is rejected and null hypothesis III (HoIII)** (Turkish medium-high level managers' understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management do not vary significantly according their work experience) **is accepted.**

As can be observed from the second part of Table 7.17, the one-dimensional variance analysis (ANOVA) which aimed to indicate whether there is a meaningful difference of the participants' "awareness's of the problems on the common strategic perception" dimension, depending on the duration of work experience has denoted no meaningful difference statistically ( $F=0,548$ ;  $p>0.05$ ).

According to this result, **hypothesis VI (H.VI) is rejected and null hypothesis VI (Ho.VI) “Turkish medium-high level managers’ awareness of the problems on the common strategic perception does not vary significantly according their work experience” is accepted.**

Hypothesis VII (HVII) was aimed to test whether the first factor (Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management) had any effect on the second factor (Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception) or not, according to the respondents opinion.

The results of the relevant regression analysis are presented in Table 8.5.

**Table 8.5 The Effects of the Factor “Understanding of Strategy and Perceptions on Strategy in General and Strategic Management” on the Factor “Awarenesses of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception”**

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Coefficient		t	p	F	Model (p)	R2
		B	Std. Error					
Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception	Fix	2,345	0,318	7,374	0,000	33,928	0,000	0,190
	Understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management	0,450	0,077	5,825	0,000			

It can be seen that the respondents’ “understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management” has a positive effect on the

respondents' "awareness of the problems on the common strategic perception" ( $t=5,825$ ;  $p<0.05$ )

According to this result, **hypothesis VII (H. VII)** (There is a substantial relation between Turkish medium-high level managers' "Understanding of strategy and perceptions on the relations between strategy in general and strategic management" and "Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception") **is accepted and null hypothesis VII (Ho. VII) is rejected.**


It can be observed that when "understanding of strategy and perceptions on strategy in general and strategic management" is increased by one unit, "awareness of the problems on the common strategic perception" increases by 0.45 units ( $B=0,450$ ).

### **8.3 Analysis of the Core Concept:**

In the core concept, appearing as the question number 20 of the questionnaire, the participants are asked their opinion on "whether a common strategic perception among the civilian bureaucrats, military bureaucrats, private sector managers and academicians has been realized in Turkey at a satisfactory level or not". The four hypotheses created to get answers for the relevant questions, one of which general in nature and the remaining three depending on demographic parameters, (Hypotheses VIII, IX, X, and XI) were presented in paragraph 7.7.

In order to measure the general opinion (Hypothesis VIII) a skewness test was performed and the results are shown in Figure 8.1.

**Figure 8.1 Histogram for the variable of “the status of common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey”**



Histogram has a substantial negative skewness. Therefore, **Hypothesis VIII (HVIII) is rejected and null hypothesis VIII (HoVIII)** (According to their opinion, a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has not realized yet in a satisfactory level) **is accepted.**

Hypothesis IX (HIX) was aimed to indicate whether the relevant opinion had a meaningful difference depending on the sector or not. The results of the statistical analysis made for this purpose is shown in Table 8.6.

**Table 8.6 The Differentiation of the Core Concept Depending on the Sectors**

Group	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	F	Sig.
Military bureaucrat	47	4,064	1,030	7,663	0,001
Civilian bureaucrat	47	4,660	0,479		
Private sector manager	47	4,255	0,642		

As can be observed from Table 8.6, the one-dimensional variance analysis (ANOVA) to indicate whether the status of common strategic perception between the medium-upper level managers and the intelligentsia showed a difference depending on the professional variable has denoted a statistically meaningful difference between the professional groups ( $F=7,663$ ;  $p<0.05$ )

According to this result, **Hypothesis IX (HIX)** (The opinion of the medium-high level managers in Turkey on, “a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has already realized in a satisfactory level”, varies significantly according to their working sectors) **is accepted and null hypothesis IX (HoIX) is rejected.**

Hypothesis X (HX) was aimed to indicate whether this opinion changed with the level of education of the participants or not. The results of the statistical analysis made for this purpose is shown in Table 8.7.

**Table 8.7 The Differentiation of the Core Concept Depending On the Level of Education of the Participants**

	Group	N	Mean	Sd	t	P
The status of common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey (C.C.)	Undergraduate	90	4,289	0,782	-0,746	0,457
	Graduate	51	4,392	0,802		

As can be observed from Table 8.7, an independent Group t test made to indicate whether the common strategic perception dimension of the medium-upper level managers and intelligentsia of Turkey showed a meaningful difference depending on the level of education has revealed no statistically meaningful difference between the arithmetic averages of the groups ( $t=0,746$ ;  $p>0.05$ )

According to this result, **Hypothesis X (HX) is rejected and null hypothesis X (HoX)** (The opinion of the medium-high level managers in Turkey on, “a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has already realized in a satisfactory level” does not vary significantly according to their education level) **is accepted**.

Hypothesis XI (HXI) is aimed to indicate whether there is a meaningful difference in this creed of the respondents depending on their work experience in their sectors. The results of the relevant statistical analysis are shown in Table 8.8..

**Table 8.8 The Differentiation of the Core Concept Depending On the Work Experience of Respondents in Their Sectors**

Group	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	F	Sig.
Less than 10 years	9	3,889	1,054	2,214	0,089
10-19	77	4,260	0,865		
20-29	38	4,553	0,602		
More than30 years	17	4,353	0,493		

As can be observed from Table 8.8, one-dimensional variance analysis (ANOVA) made to indicate whether the common strategic perception dimension of the medium-upper level managers and intelligentsia of Turkey showed a meaningful difference depending on the work experience variable or not has revealed no statistically meaningful difference between the arithmetic averages of the groups ( $F= 2,214$ ;  $p>0.05$ ).



According to this result, **Hypothesis XI (HXI) is rejected and null hypothesis XI (HoXI)** (The opinion of the medium-high level managers in Turkey on, “a common strategic perception among the medium-high level managers in Turkey has already realized in a satisfactory level” does not vary significantly according to their work experience) **is accepted.**

#### **8.4 Considerations on the Open-Ended Questions**

Apart from the 20 questions with five choices asked with Likert’s method of which the statistical analyses were presented above, six open-ended questions were asked to the participants. The purpose of this section is to provide the participants to express their views on the questions in a more detailed and free format and also to propose solutions to the relevant problems. It was thought that this should provide extra-reliability to the results and also to form a basis of ideas for the subsequent researches.

Before the survey, the participants were told that they could answer whichever they wished of the six open-ended questions. The most notable point is that the managers of private sector are more inclined to answer those open-ended questions and feel free to express their views in long and detailed passages.

#### **8.5 Summary of the Responses Given to Open Ended Questions**

Those questions, rate of the answers given by the respondents and the summarized evaluation are presented below. The document containing all the responses is presented in Annex 2.

**(Q. Nr. 21) Your opinion on “the differences between “policy” and “strategy” on both national and corporate level, including which one should have the priority.**

a) RATE OF THE ANSWERS:

- Military bureaucrats: 34/47
- Civilian bureaucrats: 23/47
- Private sector managers: 28/47

b) SUMMARY OF THE ANSWERS:

The difference between “policy” and “strategy” and which one has the priority is a topic of discussion and conception dating back to the era of Clausewitz which was detailed in the literature survey. The answers obtained reveal that this debate is still continuing. Another noteworthy point is that there is no difference between the civilian and military bureaucrats related to their professional field. However, it is observed that the managers of private corporations are more concentrated on the importance of strategy concept.

**(Q. Nr. 21) Your opinion related to the context of building “national strategy”; the effects of “assessing national objectives” and allocation of national resources “together with attaining national interests”.**

a) RATE OF THE ANSWERS:

- Military bureaucrats: 21/47
- Civilian bureaucrats: 15/47
- Private sector managers: 23/47

b) SUMMARY OF THE ANSWERS:

Both military and civilian bureaucrats have asserted that the responsibility should be taken at the highest level possible related to this subject. This evaluation is also close to the classical interpretations existing in the literature. The managers of the private sector have stated that a clarification between the intelligentsia and managers is required also related to this subject.

**(Q. Nr. 23) Your opinion about the “strategic cooperation” and “strategic partnership” concepts both at the national and corporate level.**

a) RATE OF THE ANSWERS:

- Military bureaucrats: 27/47
- Civilian bureaucrats: 12/47
- Private sector managers: 25/47

SUMMARY OF THE ANSWERS:

A general agreement on the both definitions (“strategic cooperation” and “strategic partnership”) has been observed related to this topic. However, civilian bureaucrats are observed to tend to reactionary answers, probably affected by the daily politics. Private sector managers are observed to have a more clear vision, with rational prospects involving strategic cooperation and partnership between companies.

**(Q. Nr. 24) Your general and/or other opinion on the strategy.**

a) RATE OF THE ANSWERS:

- Military bureaucrats: 19/47
- Civilian bureaucrats: 5/47
- Private sector managers: 25/47

b) SUMMARY OF THE ANSWERS:

An ambiguity about “whole strategy” versus “elements of strategy (future perspective, roadmap, etc)”, which is also existent in the literature has been observed, when the definition of strategy is being made.

**(Q. Nr. 25) Your opinions about the existence and ways of elimination of the gaps or the “gray areas” between the strategic perceptions of Civilian manager, Military bureaucrat and Private Sector Managers**

a) RATE OF THE ANSWERS:

- Military bureaucrats: 21/47
- Civilian bureaucrats: 4/47
- Private sector managers: 20/47

b) SUMMARY OF THE ANSWERS:

It has been observed that the responses to this question include very positive proposals. The frankness of the proposals is attributed to the uneasiness felt due to differences in perceptions of strategy in the society. It has been observed that military bureaucrats and private sector managers attribute more importance to this matter compared to civilian bureaucrats. The proposals related to the elimination of

differences and voids in conception concentrate more on dialogues, trainings and seminars and symposia at academic platforms.

**(Q. Nr. 26) Your opinion on the effects of globalization on developing strategy on both national and corporate level.**

a) RATE OF THE ANSWERS:

- Military bureaucrats: 23/47
- Civilian bureaucrats: 4/47
- Private sector managers: 25/47

b) SUMMARY OF THE ANSWERS:

The responses given to this question also indicate the pattern that the military and private sector managers attribute more importance to the matter compared to civilian bureaucrats. It is noteworthy that of the four responses given by the civilian bureaucrats, two agree that globalization is an important factor, as the actual phenomena on developing strategies while the other two state that globalization is a lie and an illusion.

Above mentioned considerations are tabulated in a more summarized form and presented as Table 8.9.

**Table 8.9 Brief Responses to Open-Ended Questions**

	Differences between policy and strategy on both national and corporate level including priority ranking aspect	Building of “national strategy”; the effects of “assessing national objectives” and allocation of national resources “together with attaining national interests”	Strategic cooperation and strategic partnership both national and corporate level	Your general and/or other opinion on the strategy	Existence and ways of elimination the gaps and grey areas in the perception of strategy among the civilian bureaucrats, Military bureaucrats and private sector managers	Effects of globalization on developing strategy on both national and corporate level
Military bureaucrat	R:34/47 <u>Priority:</u> Policy: 15 Strategy: 17 Equal:2	R:21/47 Highest level’s responsibility Synergy is needed	R:27/47 Cooperation is limited by time or subject. Partnership has strong ties. No need	R:19/47 Level, Long Range, Ways to target	R:21/47 Need common education, discussions, conferences in academic circles	R:23 /47 Globalization is a phenomena, should be taken into account on developing strategies
Civilian bureaucrat	R:23/47 <u>Priority:</u> Policy:8 Strategy: 10 Equal:5	R:15/47 A central coordination is important	R:12/47 Partnership is one step forward. The both are trickeries	R:5/47 Future perspective, serious, solidarity	R:4/47 Coordination. No need for a common understanding. Civilian authority’s responsibility	R:4 /47 2/4: Globalization is effective. 2/4: It is a lie/submissiveness
Private sector manager	R:28/47 <u>Priority:</u> Policy: 10 Strategy: 14 Equal:4	R:23/47 Clarification of national interests and objectives are important	R:25/47 Partnership is stronger and extensive. Cooperation is limited.	R:25/47 Need for success, Road map, Long Planning	R:20/47 Gap is evident and crucial. Education, Effective dialog	R:25/47 Globalization is unavoidable, proposes opportunities and threats

## **Chapter 9**

### **Conclusions and Evaluations**

#### **9.1 Discussion of Findings**

The behaviours of human beings and societies are shaped under the effects of various concrete and abstract factors. There is a consensus that cultures, perceptions and images have a specific place among the abstract factors.

The main objective of this study is to examine the perceptions on the general strategical concepts and the levels of understanding of the principles of strategic management of medium-high level managers who are known to have an influence on the strategic decisions, and as well as to determine the areas and sources of strategy perception differences. Therefore, conclusions will be related to the level of awareness of medium-high level managers about those differences and how those differences can be avoided.

The existing studies in the literature mainly center on the differences in perception, conception and cultural matters of the strategy at international and at national level. This approach is mainly based on an assumption that the countries have homogeneity in this area. However, it is inevitable that the various professional groups and various sectors that form a nation have different perceptions and conceptions. From the first years of the theory of strategy, the authors have noted the differences in the strategic perception and conceptions of upper level military and civilian people, in other words, between politicians and military commanders. However, it is also natural that the same differences in strategic perception and conceptions exist among the medium-upper level managers. Such managers have the potential of influencing the upper level managers and guiding them in strategic decisions. The main topic of

this research is to investigate if there are apparent and meaningful differences in the strategic culture, perception and conceptions as well as in the awareness of the problems on this area of those managers depending on their working sectors.

The target population of this study is confined to three representative groups which are “civilian bureaucratic managers”, “military bureaucratic managers” and “private sector managers”.

The literature survey made to clarify the parameters of this study has focused on the definitions of components and sine-non-qua elements of strategy from the point of view of general strategy and corporate strategy, paralleling the historical development of strategic thought. Current observations have been taken into account when identification of some parameters is being made.

In the end, 20 parameters have been identified in order to obtain a measure of differences in strategic perceptions between those groups. As the result of reliability analysis made, two of those parameters have been deleted. The parameters were then grouped as two meaningful groups including a Core Concept and the questions were formulated according to those factors. The headings of those factors are; “Understanding of strategy and perceptions on the relations between strategy in general and strategic management” and “Awareness of the Problems on the Common Strategic Perception”. According to those factors, the hypotheses were generated and tested. The discussions of the findings are presented below.

It has been found that significant meaningful differences exist in the perceptions of military bureaucrats, civilian bureaucrats and business sector managers related to both dimensions of “understanding of strategy and perceptions on the relations between strategy in general and strategic management” and “awareness of the problems in the common strategic perception”. There is no doubt that these middle-upper level managers of the three sectors have differences in their education, business environments and responsibilities. Thus, it is natural that those differences are also reflected in their understandings and perceptions in many areas. However, in accordance with the objectives of this research, the existence of the differences on



their understandings and perceptions of strategy were questioned and significant differences were detected. It is considered that the existence of those meaningful differences among the managers of the three sectors who have significant influences on the strategic decisions needs special attention due to the consequences they might have.

It is considered noteworthy that those “three groups of managers” strategic perceptions and awareness of the problems related to perceptions do not have meaningful differences depending on their level of education or their professional experience. It can be asserted that some of the graduate-level educations do not have sufficient contribution to this area and that the better qualities of education of younger managers have compensated partially for their shortage of professional experience.

When the two factors “understanding of strategy and perceptions on the relations between strategy in general and strategic management” and “awareness of the problems on the common strategic perception” were analyzed together through regression analysis, it has been found that the first factor has a meaningful positive influence on the latter. This finding is regarded as a rational result. When the factor “understanding of strategy and perceptions on the relations between strategy in general and strategic management” is increased by one unit, the second factor “awareness of the problems on the common strategic perception increases by 0.45 units. It is estimated that the remaining 0.55 units originate from other factors such as personal qualifications, the environment, origin, etc. However, the percentage of 0.45 is regarded as a non-ignorable rate. As a brief expression, it can be evolved that as the culture, understanding, perception and knowledge on strategy increases, the level of awareness of the related problems also increases. It is thought that this finding will illuminate the path of the planners to work on eliminating the problems encountered in this area.

In the analysis of the variable identified as the “Core concept”, or, the question “whether or not a common strategic perception among the civilian bureaucrats, military bureaucrats, private sector managers and academicians has been realized in

Turkey at a satisfactory level”, the skewness test has resulted in a significant rightward skewness (mean: 0.433, Standard deviation: 0.788), implying that the respondents believe that “a common strategic perception among the middle-upper class managers has not been realized in Turkey at a satisfactory level yet”. Despite this consensus, meaningful differences in the following analyses of the core concept have been detected depending on the sectors of the participants. However, it has once more been observed that the differences in education and training do not create a meaningful difference.

The section at the last part of the survey including the six open-ended questions is arranged to get more free and detailed answers related to the relevant questions of the questionnaire, and also to generate views about related problems and remedies. It is considered that the answers will provide an opportunity for a “double-check” for the results of the survey and also shed some light for the path for further studies. The responses, rich and detailed in content, involve unanimity in some areas while also exhibiting contradictory views in some. Those questions have both helped to illuminate some topics and also have created new questions. Therefore, it is regarded that this section has served the aim which was expected in the beginning. On the discussion context of this chapter, the topics that require special attention are briefly touched on below.

The difference between “policy” and “strategy” and which one has the priority is a topic of discussion and conception dating back to the beginning of the theory in XIX century. It is no surprise that same discussion still exists among the middle-upper level managers in Turkey, based on their working sectors. However, it can be considered as an interesting finding that this difference of perception exists among the members of each sector. This finding can be acceptable for the respondents of private sector managers who have come from different sources and educational disciplines. However, it may not be as reasonable as the previous one, for the respondents of other two sectors, namely civilian and military bureaucrats, have more homogeneous education and working environment. However there may be a reasonable justification on this contradiction that comes from the Turkish language. The word of “politika” is used for two different meanings in English such as “policy”

and “politics”. Taking account of this fact, this question was asked with an explanation on this subject shown in a bracket, such as “politika (policy). Against this elaboration the responses taken were almost half-and-half different. (It should be noted here that two different terminology were used in old Turkish diplomacy language such as “siyaset” and “siyasa” in order to clarify this difference). Another noteworthy point is that there is no significant difference between the civilian and military bureaucrats related to their professional field. However, it is observed that the managers of private corporations are more concentrated on the importance of the strategy concept.

A general agreement on the definition has been observed related to the topic of “Strategic cooperation and strategic partnership at both the national and corporate level” for both between the groups and within the groups. However, civilian bureaucrats tend to reactionary answers, probably affected by the daily politics. Private sector managers are observed to have a clearer vision, with rational prospects involving strategic cooperation and partnership between companies.

An ambiguity about “whole strategy” versus “elements of strategy (future perspective, roadmap, etc)”, which also exist in the literature has been observed, when the definition of strategy is made.

The responses given to the question of “effects of globalization on developing strategy on both national and corporate level” also indicate the pattern that the military and private sector managers attribute more importance to this matter compared to civilian bureaucrats. It is noteworthy that of the four responses given by the civilian bureaucrats, two agree that globalization is an important factor while the other two state that globalization is a lie and an illusion.

It has been observed that the responses to the question of “Your opinion on the elimination of the gaps and grey areas in the perception of strategy among the civilian bureaucrats, military bureaucrats and private sector managers” include very positive proposals. The frankness of the proposals is attributed to the uneasiness felt due to differences in perceptions of strategy in the society. It has been observed that

military bureaucrats and private sector managers attribute more importance to this matter compared to civilian bureaucrats. The proposals related to the elimination of differences and voids in conception concentrate more on dialogues, trainings and seminars and symposia at academic platforms. As a matter of fact that Clausewitz, in his book “On War”, published initially in 1832 in German (vom kriege) and accepted to be the basic milestone of the theory, has mentioned an inevitable difference of culture and perception between the civilian and military leadership and has proposed that education may slightly alleviate the problem. Many of his followers have also emphasized this point. However, no finding is observed as a radical opinion which has been alleged by Gray (1999) such as “culture clash”, neither opinion is observed that this difference is “inevitable”. Contrarily, the responses emphasize that those differences may and should be alleviated.

Another noteworthy observation is about the reactions of the respondents to the survey. Implementation of the survey is planned via the face to face interview method. Majority of the responses were taken via this method by the benefits of in advance verbal explanation by the candidate. Only 14 responses were taken via the e-mail and the rest were face to face. In this context, reaching private sector managers was quite hard owing to their time constraint. The questionnaire could be implemented only after a tiring appointment procedure. However, it was gladly observed that private sector managers were very eager and enthusiastic to respond to the questionnaire compared to the other sectors’ representatives (once they were reached). They did not refrain to write their long and detailed arguments for the open ended questions. Besides, they said sincerely that they found the subject very interesting.

## **9.2 Limitations of the Research**

The first noteworthy limitation of this study is the sensitivity of the subject. This sensitivity had the risk of “politization” rather than being a scholarly field research. As it was mentioned in chapter I, this risk was anticipated at the beginning of the work. It is very clear that such a possibility would adversely affect the research. Therefore, extra efforts were made in designing the questionnaire in order to remain in the academic field as much as possible. Two pre-tests were implemented within

the restricted groups and afterwards the questionnaire was restructured. The risky questions were sorted out and asked to the respondents as open ended questions in the last part of the questionnaire. Very politized responses were taken to these questions. It was hoped that this way statistical analysis could be safeguarded, to some extend thus finding an opportunity to evaluate the risky questions separately.

Another limitation is generalizability of the research findings. Researchers mostly prefer to implement probabilistic or random sampling methods over non-probabilistic ones, and consider them to be more accurate and rigorous. Non-probability samples such as purposeful and quota samples cannot depend upon the rationality of probability theory. However, in applied social research there may be circumstances where it is not feasible, practical or theoretically sensible to do random sampling (Patton, 2002). Since this dissertation had the specific purpose of analyzing the perception of middle-upper managers of the three sectors in Turkey about the strategic matters, non-probabilistic sampling method was implemented. Although some 141 respondents were reached which is a sizable figure and appropriate statistical methods could be applied, this aspect of the survey would be considered as a limitation.

### **9.3 Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Studies**

Present day concept of strategic management has been on the agenda of worldwide academic and managerial circles as a paradigm of administrative science for at least 50 years. Great progress has been made related to the management of multi-national and large-size corporations in theoretical and practical fields. Concomitantly, the command of larger military units and administration of states are also included as a topic of strategic management. This angle of view has given rise to a concept called “Grand Strategy” or “National Strategy”, as the common strategic perception–strategic management relationship envisaged by the intellectuals and especially by the ruling elite of the country.

“Grand Strategy” or “National Strategy” depends on the national powers. The reflection of national power on the business sector is national competitiveness which

is also a dimension of the national power. In addition to numerous thinkers, both military and civilian, as a management guru Michael E. Porter has examined this situation in his work “Competitive Strategy (1998).The concepts of national power and national competitiveness cover not only concrete resources but also some abstract dimensions such as sociological and psychological factors and as well as understandings and perceptions of the community. Those are called as “Components of Ideational Resources” (Measuring National Power in the Post-industrial Age, Tellis et all, RAND Corporation (2001))

Therefore, the lack of a common perception and language for the determination of national and institutional priorities result in the delay of the required decisions to be taken in time. In societies where a common base of strategic communication has not been formed, proactive policies cannot be adopted, coordination cannot be achieved and correctly-phased actions cannot be taken.

When the subject is approached from this angle, the level of strategic culture-strategic management relationship and the level of a common strategic perception among the managers of different organizations in a country can be considered one of the elements of national power and national competitiveness. In this context, at the end of this study two new definitions have been revealed and proposed for further studies; “strategic culture and perception capacity” and “total strategic thinking quality”.

Further research could be made to measure not only a “snap shot” survey like the one in this dissertation but also to find out variations and developments on the understandings and perceptions in future time intervals. Our hope is that the findings of this dissertation will form a basis for future research in this area. There is no doubt that diminishing prejudices and increasing tolerance within the society will be very helpful in making these kinds of studies

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## Appendix A

### Survey

#### ORTAK STRATEJİ ALGILAMASINA YÖNELİK ARAŞTIRMA

...../...../2010

#### Değerli Katılımcı,

Bu araştırma, orta üst düzey yönetici pozisyonunda bulunan kişiler arasında;

- Strateji ile ilgili genel kavramların anlaşılma düzeyi,
- Stratejik kültür - stratejik yönetim ilişkisi
- Ortak strateji algılaması ihtiyacının farkındalık düzeyi
- Muhtemel farklılık ve boşlukların hangi alanlarda yoğunlaştığı ve
- Bu boşlukların giderilmesi ile ilgili **görüşleri** ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır.

20 sorudan oluşan ilk bölümde aklınıza en çok yatan seçeneğin üzerindeki kutucuğa işaret koyunuz. Soldan sağa; 1 nolu kutucuk “Kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 3 nolu kutucuk “Kararsızım” ve 5 nolu kutucuk “Kesinlikle katılıyorum” şeklindedir.

6 sorudan oluşan ikinci bölümde görüşlerinizi serbestçe ifade ediniz.

Kişisel bir ölçüm söz konusu değildir. Kişiler tanınmış olsa bile kişisel bilgiler kullanılmayacaktır.

**Değerli zamanınızı ayırıp anketteki soruları cevapladığınız için şükranlarımızı sunarız.**

## BİRİNCİ BÖLÜM

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum					
2. Katılmıyorum					
3. Kararsızım					
4. Katılıyorum					
5. Kesinlikle Katılıyorum					
1. “ <b>Strateji</b> ” tarih boyunca daha çok askeri alanda kullanılmış bir kavram olmasına rağmen günümüzdeki kullanım alanı sürekli genişlemektedir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Strateji konusundaki her düşünce daima bir “gelecek perspektifi” içermelidir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Ülke içinde ve barış zamanında bir askeri birliğin 300 Km. uzaklıktaki yeni konuşlanma yerine intikali stratejik bir harekettir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Fransa’da konuşlu 100.000 araç kapasiteli bir ticari araç fabrikasının Türkiye’ye nakli stratejik bir harekettir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. “ <b>Strateji</b> ” ve “ <b>taktik</b> ” kavramları arasındaki farklar; “birliğin veya işletmenin büyüklüğü”, “baz alınan zaman birimi”, “mekan faktörleri” ve “görevin niteliği” konularında ortaya çıkar.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Tarih boyunca orduların ve işletmelerin çok büyük ölçeklere ulaşmaları sonucu “Stratejik” ve “Taktik” seviyeler arasındaki fark giderek açılmıştır. Bu durumda ortada kalan boşluğun “Operatif (Operasyonel)” olarak adlandırılması uygun bir yaklaşımdır.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Güncel kullanımlarda “Strateji” ve “Yol Haritası”nın birbirlerinin yerine kullanıldığına tanık olunmaktadır. Gerçekte ise strateji daha geniş bir alanı kapsayan bir terimdir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Güncel bir konu olan “asimetrik tehdit”, önemi giderek artan ve strateji oluşturmada ihmal edilmemesi gereken bir konudur.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Küreselleşme, kaçınılmaz bir tarihi süreç olup, devletler ve büyük işletmeler varlıklarını sürdürmek ve gelişebilmek için “Küresel Stratejiler” geliştirmek zorundadırlar.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum					
2. Katılmıyorum					
3. Kararsızım					
4. Katılıyorum					
5. Kesinlikle Katılıyorum					
10. “ <b>Stratejik Yönetim</b> ” denince, devlet yönetimi, askeri birliklerin yönetimi, kamu ve özel sektör işletmelerinin yönetimi dahil, <b>belirli bir büyüklüğün üzerindeki her türlü kurum</b> için söz konusu olabilen bir yönetim tarzı akla gelmelidir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. “İşletmelerde Stratejik yönetim”de “Durum Belirleme” analizi olan “SWOT” Analizi mantalite açısından silahlı kuvvetlerin yönetiminde de geçerli olabilecek elemanları içerir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Pek çok kurum stratejik yönetim ilkelerine uygun bir şekilde yönetilmemektedir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. “Amaçlara Göre Yönetim” (Management By Objectives. MBO), işletme yönetiminde bir “Stratejik Yönetim” yaklaşımıdır	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. Yerli medyada tanık olduğunuz ve içinde “strateji” terimi geçen tartışmalar daha çok; dış politika ve güvenlik ağırlıklı konular olup, “işletmelerin stratejik yönetimi” konusu dünyadaki ağırlığı ile orantılı bir yer işgal etmemektedir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Özellikle medyada olmak üzere, “strateji” başlığı altında yapılan yayınlara bakıldığında, kapsamı anlaşılabilen bir bilimsel çalışmadan çok, genellikle güncel iç ve dış siyasi konuların yer aldığı dağınık görüş ve düşüncelere rastlanmaktadır...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. Güncel gözlemlerinize göre, bir derginin adının <b>Güvenlik Politikaları</b> veya <b>Güvenlik Stratejileri</b> olması derginin içeriğinde belirgin bir fark ortaya çıkarmamaktadır.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17. Bilimsel yöntemlere dayanarak yapılması gereken “Stratejik Öngörü” çalışmalarının çoğunlukla, kişilerin deneyimlerine ve öznel yeteneklerine göre yapılan tahminler şeklinde cereyan ettiğine tanık olunmaktadır.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Ulusal strateji oluşturma konusunda, toplumun ilgili kesimleri arasında etkin bir eşgüdüm kurulması gereklidir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

1. Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum					
2. Katılmıyorum					
3. Kararsızım	1	2	3	4	5
4. Katılıyorum					
5. Kesinlikle Katılıyorum					
19. “ <b>Strateji</b> ”nin bir “ <b>sosyal bilim disiplini</b> ” olması konusunun akademik ortamda tartışılması gereklidir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. Türkiye’de, Sivil Bürokrat, Askeri Yönetici, Şirket/Kurum yöneticiler ve Akademisyenler arasında ortak bir strateji algılamasının tatmin edici düzeyde henüz gerçekleşmemiş olduğu değerlendirilmektedir.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

## İKİNCİ BÖLÜM AÇIK UÇLU SORULAR

21. Ulusal düzeyde ve işletme düzeyinde “**politika (policy)**” ve “**strateji**” arasındaki farklar ve hangisinin öncelikli olması gerektiği hakkındaki görüşleriniz.

- Ulusal Düzeyde

- İşletme Düzeyinde

22. “Milli Strateji”nin belirlenmesinde, “milli hedeflerin saptanması” ve “tahsis edilecek milli güç unsurlarının koordinasyonu” ile bu koordinasyonun “milli menfaatlerin sağlanması” konusundaki etkileri hakkındaki görüşleriniz. (Görüşlerinizi örnek üzerinde açıklayabilirsiniz.)

23. “**Stratejik İşbirliği**” ve “**Stratejik Ortaklık**” kavramları hakkındaki görüşleriniz. (Ulusal strateji ve işletme stratejisi düzeylerinde değerlendiriniz)

24. “**Strateji**” kavramı hakkındaki genel/diğer görüşleriniz.

25. Sivil yönetici, askeri yönetici ve özel sektör yöneticileri arasındaki “strateji algılamaları” konusunda var olduğu tahmin edilen “boşlukların” ve “gri alanların” **mevcudiyeti** ile **giderilme yolları** hakkındaki görüşleriniz.

26. **Küreselleşme** olgusunun, **ulusal** ve **işletmeler** düzeylerinde strateji oluşturma konusu üzerindeki etkileri hakkındaki görüşleriniz.

## ÜÇÜNCÜ BÖLÜM: DEMOGRAFİK BİLGİLER

27. Mensup olduğunuz Kurumun alanı:	Banka	Sınai İşl	Ticari İşl	Diğer		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	.....		
28. Pozisyon/Makamınız:	Gn. Md. Yrd.	Daire Bşk. / Birim Md.	Şube Md.	Şef	Uzman	Diğer
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	.....
29. Eğitim durumunuz:	Lisans	Y. Lisans	2 Y. Lisans veya Doktora			
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
30. Toplam iş tecrübeniz (Yıl):	10 Yıldan Az	10-19 Yıl	20-29 Yıl	30 Yıl ve Üstü		
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		



## Appendix B

### Responses Given to Open Ended Questions

KOD NO	SEKTÖR	İŞ TECRÜBESİ	EĞİTİM DURUMU	21. Ulusal düzeyde ve işletme düzeyinde "politika (policy) ile "strateji" arasındaki farklar ve hangisinin öncelikli olması gerektiği hakkında görüşleriniz	22. Milli stratejinin belirlenmesinde "milli hedeflerin saptanması" ve "tahsis edilecek milli güç kaynaklarının koordinasyonu" ile bu koordinasyonun, "milli menfaatlerin sağlanması" konusundaki etkileri hakkındaki görüşleriniz	23. "Stratejik iş birliği ve stratejik ortaklık kavramları hakkındaki görüşleriniz.	24. Strateji hakkındaki genel görüşleriniz	25. Sivil yönetici, askeri yönetici, özel sektör yöneticileri ve akademisyenler arasındaki strateji algılamaları konusunda var olduğu ileri sürülen boşlukların ve gri alanların mevcudiyeti ile giderilme yolları hakkındaki görüşleriniz.	26. Küreselleşme olgusunun ulusal ve işletmeler düzeyinde strateji oluşturma konusu üzerindeki etkileri hakkındaki görüşleriniz.

A1	A	2	2	Önce politika olmalı. Strateji politikanın bir vasıtasıdır.	Hedef: Kendi bilgisayarımızı üretmek (örn: Silah sistemleri için). Milli güç unsurları üniversite sanayii ve TSK koordinatör msb. Strateji her kurumu bu konuda ne yapacağını gösterir.	Ortaklık iş birliğinin daha gelişmiştir.	Hedefe ulaştıran en etkili yol yöntem.	Farklı algılamıyor ama herkes bunun bir yol yöntem olduğunu biliyor. Ancak stratejinin nasıl belirleneceği (metodolojisi) konusunda bilgi-tecrübe eksik.	Firmalar işletmeler stratejilerini belirlerken artık yalnızca iç pazarı veya iç firmaları değil dış dünyayı da dahil etmek zorundadır. İletişim anahtar kelimedir.
A2		2	1	Politikanın öncelikli olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum.	.....	.....	Strateji; gücün oluşturulması, kullanılması ve geliştirilmesidir. Seviyenin stratejik mi, operatif mi olduğu cevabı burada aranmalıdır. Dz.K.K.lığı, gücü oluşturduğu için stratejik seviyededir. Donanma Komutanlığı ise gücü kullanır ve geliştirir. Bu kapsamda operatif seviyedir. Seviyeye ilişkin örneklerin yukarıda belirtilen merkezde verilmesi uygun mütalaa edilmektedir.	.....	.....

A3		2	2	Strateji öncelikli olmalıdır. Politika, stratejiye göre yapılmalıdır.	.....	Stratejik işbirliği; iki veya daha çok ülke /şirket arasında aynı konudaki, stratejik ortaklık ise tüm konulardaki birlikteliktir.	.....	Üst düzey toplantılar ile çözülebilir.	.....
A4		1	2	İkisi arasında uygulama açısından seviye farkı mevcuttur, aynı önceliğe sahiptir.	.....	"Stratejik ortak" teriminde çok fazla ortak payda mevcuttur. Stratejik işbirliği ise daha gevşek ilişkiyi ifade eder.	.....	.....	Küreselleşme, büyük şirketlerin, güçlü ülkelerin emperyal düşüncelerini legalleştirmek için üretilmiş kavramlardır.
A5		2	2	Strateji, yapılan plan, politika ve ona ulaşmak için yapılan uygulamadır. Strateji önceliklidir.	Kesinlikle önce amaçlar belirlenmeli ve çok uzun bir süreyi tahmine (bilimsel incelemeler ile) dayanmalıdır.	İşbirliği kısa süreli olabilir, ortaklık ise uzun süreli ve ortak amaçlar (sürekli) ın elde edilmesi için kullanılabilir.	Strateji, geleceği görerek geleceği kendi istediğimiz gibi yönlendirme sanatıdır.	Çok sıkı bir işbirliği ve koordinasyon ile bu boşluklar doldurulabilir.	Günümüzde ulusal- işletme stratejisi oluşturmak için öncelikle tüm dünyayı irdelemek gerekmektedir.
A6		2	1	Strateji öncelikli olmalıdır.	Milli hedefler önceden belirlenmeli ve mevcut milli güç unsurları bu hedeflere belirlenen ihtiyaç ve önceliklerine göre tahsis edilmelidir.	Stratejik işbirliği belli konularda ve geçici bir dönem için yapılabilir, daha sınırlı bir çerçeveyi kapsadığını düşünüyorum. Stratejik ortaklık daha geniş kapsamlı, daha uzun sürelidir.	Strateji öncelikle seviye belirleyen bir kavramdır.	Strateji her bir konu alanına göre farklı algılanabildiği için bu farklar ortaya çıkabilir. Müşterek çalışma artıkça farklılıkların azalacağını düşünüyorum.	Küreselleşme etkileşimi artırdığı için strateji oluşturma konusuna etkisi vardır.

A7		3	1	Önce strateji tespiti, müteakiben politika geliştirilmelidir. Strateji uzun vadeli tüm milli güç unsurların koordinesi ile tespit edilmelidir.	.....	Stratejik İşbirliği: Ülke menfaatleri gerektiğinde işbirliğine gidilir. Stratejik Ortaklık: Her türlü faaliyette ortak hareket edilir.	Ülkelerin milli hedeflerine ulaşmak maksadıyla izledikleri uzun vadeli yoldur.	Strateji ile siyaset aynı şekilde kullanılabilir.	Küreselleşme, strateji oluşturma üzerinde etkenlerden bir tanesidir.
A8		2	1	Politika öncelikli olmalı. İşletmenin kimliği, vizyonu, amacı, anlayışları, politikasını oluşturmalı. Müteakiben, zamanla da değişebilecek stratejiler ile hedeflerlenmeli.	Koordinasyonsuzluğun ve kurum kültürünü her şeyin üstünde (milli menfaatlerin dahi) görmek gibi çok zararlı neticelerini gözlemek mümkün oluyor.	Ulusal stratejide "ortaklık" olmayacağını değerlendiriyorum. Bunu bir istisnası T.C. ile K.K.T.C. olabilir. "Ortaklık" çok daha güçlü bir bağ ve menfaatlerin kaynaşması durumunda olabilir.	.....	Akademik çevrelerde, stratejinin tarihsel gelişimi ve tanımı ile çok meşgul olunmaktadır. Örnekleme veya uygulama mevcut olmadığından kavramın yerleşmediğini düşünüyorum. Oysa her insan ve işletme bunu bilinçsiz ya da bilinçli yapıyor. Bazen keyfi de olabiliyor.	Küreselleşmenin en önemli etkisinin ve getirdiği gerekliliğin, 1-Stratejiyi dinamik olarak tutmak maksadıyla gizli sorgulamak, 2-Geleneksel hale gelmiş düşünce ve fikirlerin dışına çıkabilmek, olduğunu düşünüyorum.

A9		3	1	Stratejik amaçlara ulaşmada izlenecek yöntemler ve takip edilecek yalın politika olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bu kapsamda strateji hiyerarşik olarak politikanın üzerindedir.	.....	.....	.....	Konuya açıklık getirecek terimlerin ve açıklamalarının Türk Dil Kurumu Sözlüğüne ithal edilmesi.	Bu konuda çok kısa bir örnek vermek gerekirse, yöneticilerden birisini tanıdığım bir otoyol inşaat firması Türkiye'de otoyolların yeni yapıldığı bir dönemde kurulmuş büyümüş ancak Türkiye'deki iş hacmi küçülünce yurt dışına açılmak zorunda kalmış, bu gün ağırlıklı olarak Kuzey Afrika olmak üzere 6-7 ülkede faaliyet göstermektedir. Bu firma küreselleşme olgusunu çok iyi özümseyip iş yapabileceği ülke sayısını, varlığını sürdürmek ve gelişmek için artırmak durumundadır.
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A10		2	2	Strateji, politikaya göre belirlenmelidir.	.....	Ortaklık kavramının işbirliğine göre daha bağlayıcı, daha sıkı bir ilişki olduğunu düşünüyorum.	.....	Farklı düşüncelerin olmasını normal ve hatta gerekli olduğunu düşünüyorum. 2+2 nin 4 olup olmadığı bile tartışıldığına göre sosyal bir konuda farklı bakış ve algılamaların olması kaçınılmazdır.	Küreselleşmeyi dikkate almayan uluslar ve işletmeler hedefe götürecek, sağlıklı ve uzun vadeli stratejiler oluşturamaz.
A11		3	1	Strateji hedefi, policy bu hedefe giden ayrıntılar belirler.	Milli güç unsurlarının müşterekliğinin sağlanması.	Bu konularda hiçbir ülke ile ortaklık olmayacağını ancak menfaatler doğrultusunda işbirliği yapılabileceğini değerlendiriyorum.	Strateji bir bilim olarak milletlerin kendi geleceklerini güven altına alma çalışmalarıdır.	Karşılıklı güven, memleket sevgisinin tek elde olmadığı, darbe sendromu ve dominant güç psikolojisinden kurtulma.	Oluşumda etkisi olmaz, faktörlerden biridir.

A12		2	2	Politika üst düzeyi ifade etmesi nedeniyle önceliklidir. Ancak, strateji geliştirilmeden belirlenen politika güdük kalmaya mahkûmdur.	Milli hedefler milli çıkarlara dayanmalı. Ancak her iki hususun tespitinde bilimsel yaklaşımlara yer verilmeli. "Şebekeleşme" (networking) ulusal çıkar ve hedeflerin belirlenmesinde yeni bir küreselleşme perspektifi dikkate alınmalı.	Stratejik işbirliği verimli alanlar için geçerli iken, stratejik ortaklık her alanda geçerlidir. İşbirliği kısa süreli çıkar birliğini, ortaklık ise, hedef birliğini gerekli kılmaktadır.	Politika, strateji, taktik hiyerarşik bir zincir oluşturmaktadır. Ancak gelişim sürecinde karşılıklı etkileşim çok önemlidir. Bu üç alanı birbirinde ayırık düşünmemeli. "Pozitivist Ötesi Yorumlamacı Paradigma" kapsamında karşılıklı "nedensellik" içerisinde geliştirilmelidir.	"Birbirimizi anlamak" en büyük zaafımız. O nedenle ortak çalışma yapılmalı. Ayırık çalışma alanları "ortak akıl" yürütülmesini zorlaştırmaktadır. Yeni bilimsel yaklaşım "holografik" birlikteliği gerekli kılmaktadır.	Küreselleşme tarihsel ve kaçınılmaz bir olgudur. İdeolojik gözlükten arındırılarak irdelenmelidir. Küreselleşme tüm bilimsel yaklaşımların tekrar sorgulanmasına yol açmıştır. Mekânı referans alan klasik "jeopolitik" kavramı dahi, küreselleşme nedeniyle yeniden kavramsallaştırılarak "eleştirel jeopolitik" adını almıştır.
A13		2	1	Politikanın stratejiden öncelikli olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum.	Yunanistan'ın Megola-İdea'sını örnek verebiliriz. Tam dış politikasını almasa da Türkiye'ye karşı politika ve stratejisinin temelini bu fikir alt yapısından almaktadır.	Stratejik işbirliği bazı konularda menfaat birliğini içerirler. Stratejik ortaklık her konuda menfaatleri içerir.	Geçmişte çekilmiş resimlerden gelecekte olabilecek yeni resmi tahmin etme diye tanımlayabiliriz, bu yeni resmin oluşması veya bizim işlediğimiz resmin oluşması için aradaki resimleri bizler oluşturabiliriz.	Tüm kesimlerin milli politika çerçevesinde şekillendirilmesi (sadece güvenlik değil) yapılan her işin milli güç unsurlarını etkilemesi çerçevesinde düşünülmesi halinde boşluklar ve gri alanlar giderilebilecektir.	Küreselleşme ekonomiyi çağrıştıran bir kelime. Ulusal strateji ve işletmeler konuya bu görüş açısı ile bakıyorlar.(Bu konu bir tez konusu kadar geniş bir konu)

A14		2	2	Strateji mevcut imkânları nasıl kullanılacağını ifade eder. Politika da (policy) anlamında aynı şeyi ifade eder. Ancak policy devlet düzeyinde ve gerekli seviyede iken strateji kaynak yönetimidir. Bu nedenle policy önceliklidir.	Milli hedefler kamuoyunun benimsediği ve aslında devlet stratejisidir. Bunun için milli güç unsurlarının koordinasyonlu (Hükümet veya MGK-icra erki) tarafından önem arz etmektedir.. Bu koordinasyon milli menfaatlerini sağlaması açısından en önemli gereksinimdir.	Stratejik işbirliği, eşgüdüm ve danışmayı öngörür. Ortaklıkta ise işlemlerdeki kayıp ve kazançları da yani sonuçları paylaşma vardır. Ülkelerin ortaklığı söz konusu olamaz. Çıkarlar ortak değildir.	Strateji belirli bir hedefe ulaşmak üzer, mevcut kaynak imkânlarla şartları örtüştürebilme sanatıdır.	Ortak eğitim.	Tanımlı yapılmadığından, algılama ve çıkarsama farklılığı vardır.
A15		2	1	Politika belirlenmeli ona uygun strateji ve veya stratejiler belirlenmelidir.	Günümüz harekâtlarında kısıtlı kaynakların en uygun şekilde kullanılması zorunluluğu göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır. Etki Odaklı Harekât bunun güncel örneğidir. Olmazsa olmazlardır.	İşbirliği her zaman mevcuttur. Ortaklık ortak paydanın sağlandığı tavizler verilmesini gerektiren bir kavramdır.	Strateji her alanda güçlü olmanın temel ögesidir. Öngörüye dayalı stratejiler muadiller arası fark yaratır.	Karşılıklı görüşmeler, konferans, seminer ve sempozyumlar Harp oyunlarında Etki Odaklı Harekât kapsamında harekât planı yapılması ve icrası aşamasında ilgili sivil organların sistemin içine dâhil edilmesi gerekmektedir.	Kesinlikle etkisi mevcuttur. Strateji olmadan ayakta durulamayacağı bilinmelidir.
A16		3	1	Strateji önde olmalı ve ona yönelik politikalar geliştirilmelidir.	Tamamen doğru orantılıdır.	Stratejik Ortaklık menfaatler uyuşturduğu sürece vardır. Güven olunmaz.	.....	Ortak terminoloji belirlenmeli ve müfredatlara ilave edilmelidir.	Küreselleşme kaçınılmaz bir gerçektir. Strateji oluşturulurken mutlaka dikkate alınmalıdır.



A17		2	2	Politikanın daha kısa süreli, stratejinin ise uzun vadeyi içerdiğini düşünüyorum. Öncelik belirlenmemeli, birbirini tamamlayıcı nitelikte olmalıydılar.	Önemli bir konudur. En üst seviyede belirlenmelidir. Birimler, kuruluşlar kendi başlarına strateji belirlememelidirler.	.....	.....	Akademik ortamlarda tartışılarak, ortak bir anlayış oluşturulmalıdır.	Çok etkili olmuştur. Artık teknolojinin de sağladığı imkânlar ile kurumların strateji oluştururken tüm dünyada olan gelişmeleri takip etmek zorunda kalmaktadırlar.
A18		2	1	Öncelikle politika belirlenmeli bu istikamette stratejiler oluşturulmalıdır.	Milli gücün bütün unsurları etkin bir şekilde kullanılması sinerji yaratabilir.	.....	Bence bütün kamu kurumlarındaki temel eksiklik uygun stratejilerin (uzun vadeli) oluşturulmamasıdır.	.....	.....
A19		3	1	Politika önce tespit edilir, bu politikaya ulaşılacak stratejiler uygulanır.	Buna etki odaklı harekât deniliyor. Şu anda ABD.'nin ortaya çıkardığı ve diğer devletlere empoze ettiği bir kelime oyunu. Sakarya Meydan Muh.ve Büyük Taarruz bu eşgüdüm için örnektir.	Stratejik Ortaklık: politika ve stratejide kesin birlikteliktir. Stratejik işbirliği: menfaatlere göre seviyesi belirlenir.	Herkes tarafından bilinçsizce kullanılan bir deyim halini aldı. Artık simit satanın bile stratejisinden bahsediliyor. Oysa bir devletin, bir kurumun veya bir işletmenin ayakta kalabilmesi veya gelişmesi için alması gereken tedbirler bütünüdür.	Strateji ile ilgili algılama bütünlüğü sağlayacak bir seminer veya sempozyum düzenlenmesi.	Küreselleşme ile birlikte riskler ve tehditler artmıştır. Ayakta durabilmek ancak akıllı ve bilimsel stratejilerle mümkün olabilecektir.

A20		2	1	Strateji öncelikli olmalı, strateji genel bir çerçevedir. Politika ise bunun uygulanması ile ilgili alt birimlerdir.	Kıbrıs'ın kesinlikle elde bulundurulması milli hedefimizdir. Buradaki milli menfaatlerimizi, güvenlik, milli bağlar vs.dir. Bu konudaki milli hedeflerimiz, iki kesimlilik, toprakların korunması vs. dir.	İşbirliği karşılıklı çalışabilirliktir. Görüş ayrılıkları olabilir fakat ortak noktada buluşmak amaçtır. Ortaklık ise aynı görüş ve çıkarları olan ayrı güçlerin oluşturulabileceği durumdur.	Neyi, ne için ne zaman ve ne şekilde yapılacağını belirten yönetim, askeri ve sivil faaliyetler temel alınacak yoldur.	Milli Güvenlik Akademisi'nde eğitim, seminerler, üniversitelerde stratejik eğitimler verilmesi vs.	Şu anda göz önünde tutulması şart olan bir gerçektir.
A21		2	1	Strateji belirlenir ondan sonra politika yapılır.	Türkiye'nin Milli stratejisi belirlenirken Milli güç unsurlarından Askeri güç, politika, güç(dış oluş) bir araya gelmeli gelmez ise milli strateji belirleyemeyiz düşünceleri olmaz eksik kalır.	İşbirliği menfaate dayalı her zaman kaygan zemindedir. Stratejik ortaklık ise daimi ve değişkendir.	.....	.....	.....
A22		2	1	Stratejiye uygun yapılır.	.....	Stratejik ortaklığın daha kapsamlı olduğunu düşünüyorum.	.....	.....	Küreselleşme stratejinin oluşturulmasını güçleştirmektedir.
A23		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A24		2	2	Strateji öncelikli olmalı, politika stratejinin öngördüğü hedefe ulaşmak için yapılmalı.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

A25		2	1	Strateji öncelikli olmalı ve politikayı yönlendirilmelidir.	.....	Stratejik İşbirliği kısa bir dönem ve bir olaya yönelik olabilir. Diğeri ise daha uzun dönem ve farklı olayları kapsar.	.....	.....	Oyunun kuralını belirleyen ülkeler şu anda küreselleşmeyi ön planda tutmakta, şayet gücümüz rekabet edecek düzeyde değilse stratejide küreselleşmeyi göz önüne almalısınız.
A26		2	1	.....	.....	.....	Türkiye'de askeri konular da dâhil olmak üzere gerçek anlamıyla strateji kelimesinin kullanımının uygun şekilde gerçekleşmediği inancındayım.	.....	.....

A27		2	1	Önce stratejinin belirlenmesi ve buna uygun politikalar geliştirilmesi gerekir. Strateji politika	Önce milli menfaatler tespit edilir. Buna uygun olarak milli hedefler tespit edilir. Bu hedefler ulaşmak için milli stratejiler oluşturulur. Bu stratejilere göre milli güç unsurları yönlendirilir.	Stratejik ortaklık birbirine denk imkân ve kabiliyetlere sahip denk güçler arasında gerçekleşir. Ancak işbirliği için tarafların ortak amaçlarının olması yeterlidir.	Strateji; tespit edilen amaçlara ulaşmak için oluşturulan KONSEPT yani düşüncedir.	Aslında bu boşluk ve gri alanların olması normaldir. Çünkü her birim olaya kendi açısından bakmaktadır. Kendi alanını göz önüne alarak fikir üretmektedir. Ancak milli güvenlik ve milli strateji denilince ortak bir dilde anlaşmak gerekir. Bunun için de ortak çalışmalar öncesi bu fikir birliğini sağlayıcı açıklamalar yapılmalıdır.	Küreselleşme; sistem anlayışının boyutunun GLOBAL seviyeye çıkması ile gündeme gelmiştir. Eskiden bölgesel ve bölgesel olan çıkarlar, menfaatler ve politikalar tüm dünyayı kapsayacak şekilde genişlemiştir. Bu sebeple global düşünmeden ve politika geliştirmek mümkün değildir. Çünkü yaptığımız her şeyin global bir etkisi, dışarıda yapılan her şeyin de kendi üzerinde bir etkisi vardır.
A28		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A29		3	1	.....	.....	Ortaklık daha üst bir kavramdır. Yapılan faaliyetler ortaklaşa yapılır. İşbirliği belirli konularda olur.	.....	.....	.....
A30		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A31		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A32		2	1	.....	.....	.....	Amaca giden yolda izlenen yol.	.....	.....

A33		3	1	.....	.....	İşbirliği stratejiyi paylaşımında bağlayıcı olmayıp taraflara esneklik sağlar. Ortaklık ise stratejiyi paylaşımında bağlayıcıdır. Daha çok sorumlulukların paylaşımını gerektirir.	.....	.....	.....
A34		2	2	Politikanın öncelikli	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A35		2	1	Strateji uzak geleceğe dönük öngörülen hedefler bütünü politika ise bu hedeflere ulaşmak için uygulanan yöntemlerdir.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A36		2	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

A37		2	1	Strateji belirlendikten sonra (policies) politikaların belirlenmesi gereklidir.	.....	Ortak hedef için uzun süre yürütülen karşılıklı işbirliği örneğin ABD, UK, İsrail Stratejik Ortaklık için örnektir. Zaman/mekân açısından sınırlı hedefler için sürdürülen ilişkiler ise stratejik işbirliğine örnek olabilir. Afganistan için Türkiye, ABD gibi.	.....	.....	.....
A38		2	2	Politika üretilmeli, müteakiben bu politikanın hedeflerine ulaşacak strateji belirlenmelidir.	Birlik, ünite müşterekliğinden kurumlar arası müşterekliğe uzanan bir müştereklik kültürü oluşturulmalıdır. (TSK Taslak Müştereklik Konsepti iyi bir dokümandır.)	İşbirliği: Ortak menfaatler doğrultusunda hareketi gerektirir. Ortaklık: Hedef dâhil müşterek seçim gerektirir.	.....	.....	.....
A39		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A40		2	2	Strateji daha önemlidir.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A41		3	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A42		2	1	Politika öncelikli olmalıdır.	Milli menfaatlerin sağlanmasında öncelikle Milli hedefler belirlenmelidir.	.....	.....	.....	.....
A43		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
A44		2	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

A45		2	2	Politika izlenecek yol demektir. Strateji daha geniş anlamlıdır. Politikayı da içerir. Strateji bilimsel öngörüdür. Fikirselsel birlikteliktir.	Stratejik fikir birliği sağlanmasından (ulusal düzeyde tüm kurumların konu ile ilgili değerlendirmeleri alınmadan) Milli bir strateji oluşturulamaz. Eksik kalır.	Stratejik İşbirliği; belirli bir konuda ülkelerin veya şirketleri yaptığı belirli süreler için oluşturduğu birliktelik. Stratejik Ortaklık; belirli bir konu süre vb. tahdit olmadan oluşturulan birliktelik. (Sürekliliği var)	Belirlenen hedeften geriye bulunduğumuz yere doğru tüm alternatif yolları seçecek şekilde bakıştır. Ancak bu bakış bilimsel verilere dayanmalı, üzerinde fikir birliği oluşturulmalıdır.	İlkokuldan itibaren tüm okullarda (üniversite dâhil) konu ile ilgili öğrencinin yaşına uygun derslerin müfredata konması.	Strateji oluşturmada küreselleşmenin etkisini göz ardı edemeyiz. Giderek artmaktadır. Çünkü dünya gelişen teknolojik imkânlarla bir köy haline gelmektedir. Yani dünyanın herhangi bir yerindeki bir olumlu veya olumsuz olay dünyanın diğer yerlerini de anında etkilemektedir.
A46		2	1	Politika genel hedefleri belirler. Strateji politikanın belirlediği hedeflere nasıl ulaşılacağına dair bir çalışmadır.	TÜMAS dokümanı gibi bir çalışmanın hükümet tarafından da yapılması gerekir.	Ulusal stratejide başka ülkelerle Stratejik İşbirliği ve Stratejik Ortaklık olmaz menfaatlerin örtüşmesidir.	Strateji ayrıntıları olmayan genel bir programdır. Komutan harekât tasarısı stratejiyi açıklayan bir belgedir.	Terim birliği sağlanmalıdır.	Küreselleşme her şeyi değiştirdiğine göre strateji oluşturma çalışanlarını da etkilemelidir.
A47		3	1	Stratejiler belirlenmeli (ulusal). Politikaya göre değişmemeli. Gelen her politikacı bunları tartışmasız uygulamalıdır.	Milli Güç unsurlarının koordinasyonu bir (tek) elden tespit edilmeli ve uygulanmalıdır.	Ulusal menfaatler boyutunda tespit edilmeli.	Stratejiler ulusal olarak belirlenmeli	Algılamalar ortadan kaldırılmalı buna göre çalışmalar yapılmalıdır.	Küreselleşme olgusunda stratejiler unutulmamalı ve iyi yönlendirilmelidir.
S48		4	1	Politika belirlendikten sonra strateji de belirlenmelidir.	Milli güç unsurlarıyla desteklenmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum.	Stratejik ortaklık, stratejik işbirliğinin bir adım daha önündedir.	.....	.....	.....
S49		4	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

S50		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S51		3	1	Politika öncelikli belirlenmesi gerekir.	Koordinasyon yoksa hedefte strateji yoktur.	.....	.....	.....	.....
S52		3	1	Strateji	Saptama öncelikli.	Stratejik ortaklık öncelikli olmalı.	Yapılması gerekenler.	Belirlenen hedeflerle ilgili sivil otorite dinlenmelidir.	Küreselleşme yalandır.
S53		3	1	İkisinin de birbirinden ayrılmaması gerekir.	Tüm kurumların birlikte hareket etmesi sağlanarak.	Birinde ortak menfaatler gözetilir, birinde menfaatler için.	.....	.....	.....
S54		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S55		2	1	Strateji politikadan önce gelmeli, oluşturulan stratejiye göre politikalar belirlenmeli.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S56		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S57		2	2	Ulusal düzeydeki politika ve stratejiler öncelikli olmalıdır.	Milli güç unsurlarının koordinasyonu ile ilgili karşılıklı bir kurumsal koordinasyon alınmalıdır.	.....	.....	.....	.....
S58		3	1	Politika doğrudan uygulama ile ilgili olup strateji ise daha uzun bir öngörüye dayanmalıdır.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S59		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S60		2	2	Önce strateji belirlenmeli, bu stratejiyi gerçekleştirmek için politikalar belirlenmeli ve izlenmelidir.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....



S61		3	1	Önce strateji belirlenip bu doğrultuda politikalar oluşturulmalıdır.	Ekonomideki yönetimde milli bir strateji olmadığı için her gelene göre değişmemesi gerekir. Eğitimde aynı durum var, dış politikada dost ve düşman ülke algılaması her dönemde değişmektedir. Son derece yanlıştır.	Kimle hangi konuda ortak olacağının belirlenmesi gerekir.	.....	.....	.....
S62		3	1	Birlikte ve stratejilerin bir arada değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum.	Milli menfaatlerin sağlanmasında önce hedeflerin saptanması ile buna uygun olarak milli stratejiler belirlenmesi gerekir.	Öncelikli milli menfaatlerin sağlanmasında stratejik işbirliğine gidilmesi amaçlanıp ortak olması halinde stratejik ortaklığa gidilmesi gerekir.	.....	.....	.....
S63		2	2	İki kavram arasında bir öncelik durumu söz konusu değildir. İkisi de aşamadır. Ancak politikanın, stratejinin hayata geçirilmesindeki uygulama aşamasında ortaya çıkan bir kavram olduğu düşünülmektedir.	.....	Stratejik İşbirliği Stratejik Ortaklığa göre daha gerçek bir etkileşim biçimidir.	.....	.....	.....
S64		4	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S65		1	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

S66		2	1	Strateji uzun soluklu olup öncelik taşımaktadır.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S67		2	1	Strateji öncelikli olması gerekir.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S68		2	1	Politikanın belirlenmesi	Siyasi iradenin milli güç unsurlarıyla desteklenmelidir.	.....	.....	.....	.....
S69		2	1	İngilizce dilindeki policy ve politics ayrımını yapmadığımız için bu sorunuza yanıt veremiyorum.	Kuzey Irak ve Irak politikasızlığı/strateji yoksunluğu tipik örnektir.	.....	Strateji kalitesi bilgi (güncel ve tarihi bilgi) birikimine göre nitelik kazanır. Devlet ve devlet aygıtlarının davranış analizleri ayrı.	.....	.....
S70		4	2	Politika, varılması gereken hedef, strateji, bu hedefe ulaşmak için uygulanan yol, yöntem.	.....	Stratejik İşbirliği, belirlenen hedefe gitme. Stratejik Ortaklık, sözleşme yapmak işi başkalarına yaptırılabilir.	.....	.....	.....
S71		4	2	Ulusal politika ve strateji öncelikli olmalı. Böyle bir ankette bu sorular olmamalıdır.	Koordinasyonun üst ve orta seviyede sürekli olması şart.	Stratejik İşbirliği ve ortaklık hem ulusal hem kurumsal düzeyde olmalı.	.....	.....	.....
S72		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S73		2	2	Strateji öncelikli olmalı, politika onun üzerine uygulanmalıdır.	.....	.....	Gelecek perspektifi.	Koordinasyon ve işbirliği.	Etkilemekte ve yönlendirmektedir.

S74		2	1	Ulusal düzeyde politika ve stratejinin öncelikli olması bir ulusun geleceği açısından zorunludur.	Örneğin sivil toplum örgütlerinin kullanılması.	Stratejik İşbirliği ve Stratejik Ortaklık farklılık arz etmektedir.Stratejik ortaklıkta coğrafik şartlar gündeme gelmektedir.	.....	.....	.....
S75		3	2	İşletme düzeyinde her doğru, ulusal düzeyde doğru olmayabilir. Amaçlar her düzeyde farklı çelişebilir.	Devletin tüm güçlerini ve yapılarını halk benimsemeli ve güvenmelidir.	Kuralları başkasının (hâkim ortağın) belirlediği yerde hiçbiri para etmez; kandırmadır.	Az da, küçük de olsa sıkılmış yumruk gibi olmayan milletler için hiçbir önemi yoktur!	Konuya bakış açılarının aynı olması gerekmez, ama kim kimin ne açıdan niçin baktığını bilmeli, anlayabilmelidir.	Genellikle teslimiyetçilik...
S76		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S77		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S78		3	2	Politika önce olmalıdır.	Çok önemlidir.	Böyle bir işbirliği ve ortaklık Türkiye için söz konusu değildir.	Ciddi bir hareket tarzıdır.	Başbakanlık tarafından giderilmelidir.	Etkisi büyüktür. Ciddi şekilde ele alınmalıdır.
S79		3	1	Politika daha üst düzeydedir. Stratejiler politikalara uyumlu olmalıdır. Politika önceliklidir.	.....	Stratejik ortaklık işbirliğinden daha kapsamlıdır.	.....	.....	.....
S80		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S81		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S82		2	1	Strateji uzun soluklu olup öncelik taşımaktadır.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S83		2	2	Stratejiyi gerçekleştirmek için politikalar belirlenmeli ve izlenmelidir.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

S84		2	1	Politika öncelikli belirlenmesi gerekir.	Koordinasyon yoksa hedefte strateji yoktur.	.....	.....	.....	.....
S85		2	1	Politikanın belirlenmesi	Siyasi irade milli güç unsurlarıyla desteklenmelidir.	.....	.....	.....	.....
S86		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S87		2	1	Strateji öncelikli olması gerekir.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S88		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S89		2	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S90		3	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S91		3	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S92		3	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S93		3	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
S94		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ö95		2	2	Strateji, daha uzun vadeli ve öncelikli. Strateji önemli.	.....	Stratejik ortaklık daha kuvvetli.	.....	.....	Son derece etkili olduğunu düşünüyorum. Küresel trendlerin ve ihtiyaçların ne yönde gelişeceğini öngörmek etkin bir strateji oluşturmak için önemli.

Ö96		2	1	<p>Politikaların, net ve toplumsal uzlaş ve katılımlar belirlenmesi gerekir. Ulusal stratejilerin ise belirlenen ulusal politikalara uygun hedeflere ulaşılması için devlet kurumları arasındaki uzlaş ile belirlenmesi gerekir. Şirket hedeflerinin esas alınması belirlenen politikaların uygulanmasında şirket stratejilerinin belirlenmesi çok kritik öneme sahiptir. Bunların da işletme departmanlarının konsensüsü ile sağlanması gerekir.</p>	<p>Öncelikli olarak milli menfaatlerin kısa, orta ve uzun vadeli olarak tanımlanması gerekir. Bundan sonrasında, bu hedeflerin önemlendirilmesi ve kaynak ve kuvvet tahsisatının önceliklendirilerek belirlenmesi gerekir. Tüm organizasyonun temel unsurlarının mutabık kaldığı stratejilerle, oluşturulacak faaliyet planları, kapsamlı bir koordinasyonla yürütülmelidir.</p>	<p>Kısa süreli çıkarlar için kalıcı olma kaygısı taşımayan işbirliklerini stratejik işbirliği, kalıcı ve uzun vadeli ortaklıkları ise stratejik ortaklık olarak tanımlayabiliriz.</p>	<p>.....</p>	<p>Bu konuda akademik çalışmaların artırılması ve somut vakalar üzerinde farkların ortaya konması gerekir.</p>	<p>Ulusal ya da kurumsal çıkarların, yöresel düzeyden çıkarılarak uluslar arası alana taşınması her yere erişimin dışında kalınmamasını, hem de çıkarların daha üst seviyede gerçekleşmesini sağlar.</p>
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Ö97		2	2	Genel kullanılan anlamında politika ve stratejililerin uzun vadeli hedeflere ulaşmayı sağlayacak şekilde oluşturulması gerekir, dolayısıyla, birbiri ile ilgili olmakla beraber öncelik söz konusu değildir. Politika işletmenin ne şekilde faaliyet göstereceğini belirlemekle birlikte, strateji hedefe nasıl ulaşılacağı konusu ile ilgilendiğinden farklı kavramlardır. Öncelik söz konusu değildir.	Milli strateji tek organ tarafında birleştirici bir şekilde belirlenmiş milli hedeflerin gerçekleştirilmesine yönelik olmalıdır. Bu hedefler belirlenirken milli menfaatlerin sağlanması zaten garanti edilmiş olmalıdır. Koordinasyon fonksiyonu menfaat konusu ile kafasını yormak zorunda olmamalı hedeflere odaklanmış olmalıdır.	Hem ulusal hem de işletme stratejisi boyutlarında stratejik işbirliği ve ortaklık bireysel çıkarların sağlanabilmesi için daha hızlı ve açık bir şekilde pazarlığın yapılabileceği bir alışveriş ve iletişim ortamının kurulmuş olduğu bir ilişkiyi ifade eder. Dolayısıyla karşı tarafın çıkarlarının gözetileceği manası içermemektedir.	Strateji kavramının çok farklı anlamlar ile algılandığını, kullanılan anlamların bazılarının taban tabana zıt olduğunu, anlaşmazlıkların bir kısmının bu nedenle oluştuğunu düşünüyorum.	Sivil hayatta strateji kavramının algısında en çok hatanın yapıldığını gözlemliyoruz. Dolayısıyla sivil yöneticilerin bu konudaki eksikliklerinin bir an önce giderilmesi önemlidir. Bu mümkün olmazsa bürokrat kadroların desteği sağlanmalıdır.	Küreselleşme dış ortamda karşı koyulamaz değişiklikler meydana getirmektedir. Ulus ve işletmeler hedef belirlerken bu değişimden maksimum fayda alacak şekilde mevcut hedeflerin revize etmelidir. Dolayısıyla stratejiler de globalleşme olgusuna göre yeniden şekillenecektir.
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Ö98		2	2	<p>Politika, milli hedeflerin belirlenmesi, strateji ise bu hedeflere (siyaset anlamı dışında) nasıl ulaşılacağını planlanması olarak düşünüyorum. Çok benzer olmakla birlikte şirketlerdeki temel fark = kar (uzun vadeli) olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bu hedefe ulaşırken izlenecek politikaların içinde çevreye önem, topluma katkı, uzun vadeli bakım açısı, etik değerler vs. gibi farklı unsurlar da olmalı.</p>	<p>Her üç başlık da çok önemli. Ana hedef milli menfaatlerin sağlanması olmalı, bu kapsamda belirlenecek milli hedeflere nasıl ulaşılacağını planlandığı bir milli strateji belgesi olmazsa olmazlardan diye düşünüyorum.</p>	<p>Stratejik ortaklık her düzeyde de çok daha kapsamlı bir işbirliği olarak düşünüyorum.</p>	<p>Uzun vadeli, büyük resmin tamamını içeren, esnek/değişikliğe açık, iletişimi (ilgili partilerle) çok net yapılmış.</p>	<p>Mevcudiyetinden şüphe yok. Giderilmesinde en kritik konunun iletişim ve koordinasyonunun artması, kişisel çabalardan ziyade sistematik olarak bu konunun çalışılması, gerekli süreçler mekanizmaların kurulmasının doğru olacağını düşünüyorum.</p>	<p>Kapsamı, parametreleri, değişkenleri çok arttırdığı kesin. Strateji oluşturmayı zorlaştıran ama önemini de bir o kadar arttıran bir olgu.</p>
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Ö99		3	2	Politika öncelikli olmalı buna uygun strateji geliştirilmeli. Aynı hiyerarşi içinde geçerli olmalıdır.	.....	Genel politikaya hizmet çok çok stratejilerin bir parçası olarak bu kavramlar gündeme girebilir. Burada çıkarlar, ortak hareket noktalarının net olarak belirlenmesi ve belirli zamanlarda ölçülerek durumun doğrulanması gerekir.	Öncelikle politikanın belirlenmesi gereklidir. Ör. Türk dış politikası örneğinden gidersek yakın komşularla iyi ilişkiler şeklinde bir konumlanma varsa buna uygun stratejiler gerekir. Stratejiler esnasında taktikler oluşturulur. Ör. İkili ticaret anlaşmaları, yeni gümrüklerin açılması gibi.	.....	Küreselleşme, tüm kurumları rekabete açık hale getirmiştir. Bu nedenle strateji ve buna uygun taktik plan geliştirme rekabet için ön koşul zorunlu hale gelmiştir.
Ö100		3	1	Belirlenen politikalar belirlenen amaca uygun stratejiler geliştirilmekte, önceliği politika belirlemekte. İşletme düzeyinde ise daha küçük ölçekte, somut ve zaman kesiti olarak süreli süreçlere yönelik daha fazla strateji ağırlıklı modeller üretilir.	Modern demokratik gelişmiş ülkelerin başarısı, tüm toplum katmanların ve sivil toplum örgütlerinin katılımı ve paylaşımı ile oluşturulan bu süreçler sonrası belirlenen Milli Stratejilerin uygulanmasıdır.	Stratejik işbirliği sınırlı ve süreli amaçlara yönelik yapılmaktadır. Stratejik ortaklık ise daha geniş tabanlı ve süreç içerisinde gelişime açık amaç birliğidir.	Bir girişimin temel uzun vadeli amaç ve hedeflere ulaşabilmek için gerekli kaynakların tahsisi ve hareket tarzının geliştirilmesi planlamasıdır. Başarılı olmasının temel unsuru sayılabilir.	Hiyerarşik organizasyonel yapı, görev tanımı ve beklentileri çerçevesindeki farklılıklar strateji algılamaları konusunda farklılıklar oluşturmak etkindir. Giderme yolları açık sağlıklı ve sürekli karşılıklı iletişimin sürdürülmesi ile geliştirilebilir.	Küreselleşme olgusu, strateji oluşturmada ulusal ve işletme düzeyinde belirleyicilerin daha fazla işbirliğini geliştirmesini ve birlikte karar alınmasını gerekli hale getirmiştir.



Ö101		2	1	Ulusal düzeyde kesinlikle strateji öncelikli olmalıdır. Ancak politika da önemli ve stratejinin destekleyicisi olmalıdır.	En kritik konu Milli Stratejiyi kimin, hangi kurumun nasıl belirleyeceğidir. Bu bir tarihsel süreç midir yoksa günün koşullarına göre mi belirlenir? Kaynak tahsisi ikincil önceliktedir.	Stratejik işbirliği ekonomik işbirliğidir. Günümüzde stratejik ortaklık kavramı ve iddiasının artık geçerli olmadığını ve bunun yerini tamamen ekonomik işbirliklerinin aldığını düşünmekteyim.	Gittiğiniz yol yanlış ise doğru uygulama ve çaba daha da kötü sonuçlara sebep olur. Ancak strateji doğru ise söz konusu boşluklar ortadan kalkar.	Her işletmenin stratejisi amacı ile belirlenir. Amaçlar yaklaşır ise söz konusu boşluklar ortadan kalkar.	Küreselleşme hem uluslar hem de işletmeler için bir fırsat olduğu kadar aynı zamanda tehdittir. Aradaki farkı strateji belirler.
Ö102		3	2	Politika öncelikli olmalı, strateji politikalar çevresinde yol planı oluşturmayı da kapsar, politika stratejiye yön verir. Yukarıdaki ifadem aynen geçerli.	Milli stratejiyi oluştururken öncelikle verilmek istenen hedefler milli menfaatler çerçevesinde belirlenir, tahsis edilebilecek güç unsurları stratejiyi oluştururken dikkate alınmak zorundadır.	Stratejik işbirliği aynı stratejiye sahip olmayı gerektirmez, stratejilerin örtüştüğü noktalarda beraber hareket etmeyi gerektirir. Stratejik ortaklık ise ortak bir stratejiyi yürütürken sorumlulukları paylaşarak aynı hedef için yan yana çalışmayı ifade eder.	Mevcudiyetsizliği hedefe ulaşmayı zorlaştırır.	Eğitim ortak bilincin oluşması için gereklidir.	Ulusal ve işletmeler düzeyinde stratejiler oluşturmak kaçınılmazdır ve bu stratejilerin işbirliği içinde harmoni içinde çalışması gereklidir.

Ö103		2	2	Bence her ikisinde de strateji ve politika aynı farklılığa sahip, Strateji daha uzun vadeli, belirsizlikleri de içeren, ulaşılacak istenen hedefi tanımlarken politika, bu hedefte ulaşmada izlenecek ilkeler bütünüdür. Her iki kurum içinde strateji öncesinde belirlemek ve bu strateji doğrultusunda politikalar oluşturulmalıdır. Aksi kurumların sürdürülebilirliği için tehlikelidir.	Milli hedeflerin saptanması ve ilgi koordinasyonun milli menfaatleri kapsayacak şekilde yapılandırılması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Menfaatleri içermeyen hedefler ve strateji ülke yararına sonuçlar doğurmayacağı gibi ülkeyi bölme ve kaos yaratmada da etkili olabilir.	Stratejik işbirliği ve stratejik ortaklık farklı iki kavram bana göre. Ortaklık organik bir bağ gerektirirken, işbirliğinde bu organik bağın olmadığını ve daha az güçlü bir yapılanma ve yöntem olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ulusal boyutta, risk unsurlarının yüksekliği sebebiyle işbirliklerinin daha fazla olması, işletme seviyesinde ise tarafların bağlayıcılığını artırmak için ortaklıkların daha etkili olduğunu söyleyebilirim.	Bu kavramın, altı boş her cümlede ve yetkinliği olmayan herkes tarafından kullanılmasının engellenmesi gerektiğini söylemek isterim.	Akademik seviyede bir desteğe ihtiyaçları olduğunu düşünüyorum insanların. Eğitimi verilen her disiplinde bu konudaki içeriğin aynılaştırılması gerekiyor.	Oyun alan değişikliği strateji için kritik bir girdi. Lokal seviyedeki hedeflerimiz ile küresel etkilerin kurum üzerinde yaratacağı baskıyı yönetemezsiniz. Dolayısıyla strateji oluştururken, küreselleşme olgusunu içeren senaryolarınız olmalı ve bunun üzerinden çalışmalısınız.
Ö104		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Ö105	3	1	<p>Politika, stratejiye nazaran dönemsel, değişken, ayrıntılıdır. Hatta strateji ile çelişme potansiyeline sahip ve bu bakımdan da tehlikeli ve sakıncalı bir yönetsel zeminde güç odaklarının etkisi altındadır. Tüm unsurların uyum içerisinde yönetilmesi anlamını taşıyan strateji düzen ve tasarım anlamında düşünsel zeminde işler. Taktik ise stratejinin oluşturduğunu düzen içerisinde uygulamanın ayrıntılarını tasarlar, alternatiflerini oluşturur ve tatbik eder.</p>	<p>Milli menfaat kavramını telaffuz ederken kastedilen derinlik, çok unsurluluk, tarihsel arka plan vb. elemanların oluşturduğu bütünlük, hedef saptaması, koordinasyon ve uygulama alanındaki konjonktürel çatışmaların etkisiyle sekteye uğrayabilir. Örnek olarak 18. yy. Osmanlı döneminden günümüze değin sürdürülen ve cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında "yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh" ritüeliyle kitlelerin de içselleştirdiği denge politikası ve statükocu yaklaşım dış politikanın omurgasını oluştururken, 80'li yıllarda konjonktürel durum ve dönem iktidarının görece öznel irade ile petrol kaynaklarının zengin olduğu Musul ve Kerkük'e operasyon düzenlenmesi için ABD nezdinde yürütülen lobi faaliyetleri, Osmanlı'nın küçülmeye başladığı tarihten bu yana toprak kazanamayan bir ülkenin bu sayede</p>	<p>Ulusal düzeyde stratejik işbirliği, eylem öncesi istişare gerektiren bir yapıdır. İşletme düzeyinde ise rekabet avantajı, üretim faktörlerinin optimizasyonu, küresel müşteri profiline oluşması vb. etkenlerin ortaya çıkardığı bir eğilimdir. Stratejik ortaklık ise ulusal düzeyde politika oluştururken, işletme düzeyinde ise planlama ve yatırım süreçlerinde ortak hareket etmeyi gerektirir.</p>	<p>Strateji en geniş manada, mevzu bahis eleman nezdinde, tüm unsurların tutarlı birlikteliğini belirli bir amaç yönlendirme işidir.</p>	<p>Askeri yönetici zümresinde daha az olmakla birlikte, var olan boşlukların, birçok konuda olduğu gibi kavram kargaşasından kaynaklandığı aşikârdır. Kavramların kitlelere sunulma şekil ve zamanı, algıyı tümüyle biçimlendirdiğinden, etkili yol, içselleştirmeyi sağlayacak eğitim süreçleridir.</p>	<p>İletişim kanallarının neredeyse herkese eşit bir şekilde ulaşmasının yarattığı kitle ortak profili, her alanda işbirliği ve aktörler arası bağımlılığı bu anlamda ön plana çıkartmıştır. Bu da ister ulusal ister işletme düzeyinde olsun ve hatta bireysel olarak bile tek düzlemde ve tek başına işletilen süreçleri başarısızlığa sürükleyecektir.</p>
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Ö106		3	1	Öncelikli olması gerekir. Ulusal düzeydeki politika ve stratejilere paralellik arz etmesi önemli.	Avrupa Birliği müzakerelerinde ve daha mikro anlamda MGK toplantılarında muhalefetine yer alması (aklıma şu an gelen ilk örnekler) olumlu etki yapacaktır.	Menfaatlerin ortak paydası olarak algılıyorum.	Kısa, orta ve uzun vadeli öngörü, tüzel ya da şahsi.	Yeni bir anayasal düzenek ile boşluk/gri alan giderilebilecektir.	Olumlu olduğu kadar olumsuz yönleri de var.
Ö107		2	1	Strateji uzun vadeli sonuçtur. Politika uzun vadeli sonuçlara ulaşmak için bugün belirlenen esaslar bütünüdür. Önce strateji gelir. Dinamikler sık değiştiği için stratejiler değişkendir.	Milli staretji belirlenirken saptanan milli hedefler ve menfaatlerin yeterince açık olmadığı ve bu stratejiye katkı sağlayacak milli güç unsurları tarafından yeterince içselleştirilmediğini düşünüyorum.	St. İşbirliği bu vadeli veya dar kapsamlı, ortaklık uzun vadeli amaç ve hareket birliğini tanımlar. İşbirliği bir proje için ya da işin bir boyutu içindir.	Varılmak istenen sonuçların uzun süre öncesinden planlanarak alınacak aksiyonların belirlenmesidir.	Özel sektör yöneticilerinin staretjinin önemini her geçen gün daha iyi anladığını ve önemsedüğün düşünüyorum. En iyi örnek olabilecek olaylar özetlenecek algı artırılabilir.	Küreselleşmenin, rekabeti yükseltmesi nedeniyle gerek ulusal gerek işletmeler düzeyinde strateji oluşturma gerekliliğini ve baskısını artırdığını düşünüyorum.
Ö108		1	2	Strateji öncelikle belirlenip bura uygun politikalar üretilmelidir. Öncelikle strateji belirlenmelidir.	Milli strateji için öncelikli hedef belirlenmelidir. Ancak belirlenen hedefin, milli menfaatlerin sağlanması öncelikle doğru koordinasyon kurullarının oluşturulması ve düzgün işlemesine bağlıdır.	Kurumların farklı konulardaki ortak çıkar gözetimine yararlı çabalar stratejik işbirliği, aynı konuda yapılan anlaşmalar stratejik ortaklık algısı yaratmaktadır.	Daha çok askeri bir terim olarak benimsenmiş olsa da her kurumun nihai olarak önceden belirlenmiş bir strateji doğrultusunda planlama yapıp önceliklerini belirlemesi gerekir.	Öncelikle stratejinin salt askeri bir kavram olmayıp bilimsel bir metot olduğu algısı yerleştirilmelidir.	Küreselleşmenin kaçınılmaz etkileri strateji belirlememiş şirketleri olumsuz yönde daha çok etkilediğinden bu etkilerden olumlu yönde faydalanmak için strateji geliştirmek kaçınılmaz olacaktır.
Ö109		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Ö110		3	2	Yürütmekte olduğunuz politika için doğru ve sağlıklı stratejik planlar gerekmektedir. Aslında mikro açıdan da çok farklı değil. Ne doğrultuda hareket edeceğiniz , yani neyi , nasıl, ne şekilde yapacağınız sizi sonuca götüren yegâne unsurdur.	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
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Ö111		1	2	Stratejinin öncelikli olması. Strateji belirlendikten sonra buna göre bir politika oluşturulması gerekir. Strateji öncelikli olarak, politika ve stratejinin eş zamanlı oluşturulup piyasaya hızlı adaptasyonu gerekir.	Millet menfaatleri her vatandaş için ortak olabileceği gibi bazı gruplar bu ortak menfaatler dışında isteklere de sahip olabilir. Bu nedenle kaliteli ve bilgili yöneticilerin milletin fikirlerini yadsımadan, milletimizin imajını sarsmadan kullanılabilecek tüm araçları kullanarak milli menfaatleri sağlaması gerekir.	Stratejik işbirliği uygulamasının başlıca nedeni müşteri ihtiyaçlarını ve tercihlerinin benzeşmesi, küresel üretimde ölçek ekonomisinden yararlanmak, uluslar arası ticaret engellerinin azaltılması, ortakların birbirine bilgi ve teknoloji aktarımları ile destek vermesi olduğu fikrindeyim. Stratejik ortaklıkların ise, siyasi , ekonomik ve askeri anlamda çok sıkı çıkar ilişkileri bulunan ülkelerin oluşturduğu ortaklıklar olduğu fikrindeyim.	Belirlediğiniz amaca ulaşmak için kullandığımız yol ve araçlar.	Askeri yönetici, ülke güvenliği ve oluşabilecek tehditleri önceden tahmin ederek bunları önleme amaçlı stratejiler oluşturması gerekir, bu stratejiyi oluştururken ilerde oluşabilecek sorunları da öngörmeliler.	Küreselleşen dünyada, stratejilerde birbirleriyle benzeşecektir, çıkar ilişkileri ve rekabet ortamında işletmeler ve uluslar ortak stratejiler etrafında yoğunlaşacaktır.
Ö112		1	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ö113		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Ö114		2	2	Politikaların belirlenmesi önceliklidir. Politikaların yürütebilmesi için ilgili stratejilerin oluşturulması 2. Sırada yer alınmalıdır.	.....	.....	Belirlenen politikaların sonuca ulaştırılması ve gerçekleştirilmesi sürecinde izlenen yol ve yöntemler bütünü.	Her üç alandaki yöneticilerin bu konudaki akademik gelişim ve eğitim alt yapıları buldukları işletmeye olumlu /olumsuz birebir etki etmektedir. Askeri yöneticilerin bu anlamda daha standart bir eğitim aldıkları görüşümdedir.	Küreselleşme ile birlikte uluslar arası firmaların yayılması, hem ulusal hem de işletmeler düzeyinde strateji oluşturma olgusunun standardizasyonu ve bu anlamda aynı dilin oluşturulması açısından çok önemlidir.
Ö115		3	1	Strateji politikanın önünde olmalı. Politika bir stratejiye dayanmalı. Strateji ön planda olmalı.	Yukarıda belirtilen unsurların tüm milli güç unsurları boyutunda eş güdümlü olanak da alınmalı ve planlanmalıdır.	Aynı kavram olduğunu düşünüyorum.	Uzun vadeli şirketin hedefleri ve bu hedeflere ulaşmasını belirten planlar.	.....	Küreselleşme, bilgiye çok kolay ulaşılan bir dönem. Bu nedenle işletmeler üzerinde çok özenli katkısı olacak.
Ö116		3	1	Stratejinin, politikadan önce gelmesi kanaatindeyim. Her ikisinin birlikte kullanılması, gerektiğinde herhangi birine ağırlık verilmesi düşüncesindeyim.	Herhangi bir fikrim yoktur.	Benzer kavramlar. Ancak, stratejik ortaklık daha bağlayıcı unsurlar içerir düşüncesindeyim.	Belli kesimlerde büyük önem verilmesine rağmen, ülkemizde gereken önem verilmemektedir.	Fikrim yok.	Hem ulusal, hem de işletmeler düzeyinde stratejilerine iyi ayarlayamayanlar ekonomik krizleri daha yoğun yaşamaktadırlar.

Ö117		3	1	Ulusal düzeyde iyi bir strateji örneği şu anda paylaşılmıyor, ama yinede kanun ve yönetmelikten getiriliyor. Strateji ile bir süre sonra olmak istediğin yere nasıl varacağını tanımlarız, politikalar ise tatbikattaki yap ve yapmalardır.	X zaman sonraki oluşacak ihtiyaçlar, rakiplerin durumunu da bilmek gerekir. Örneğin enerji ihtiyacı, su ihtiyacı, iş imkânı, nüfus artışı vb. gibi parametrele bakıldıktan sonra ne olunması hedeflenmeli ve buna uygun stratejiler oluşturulmalıdır.	Arada bir hedef olması gerekir. Bundan sonra ulaşılabilecek noktada ne durumda olunması gerektiğine karar verdikten sonra, strateji oluşturulur.	Esasında stratejik sadece devlet ve işletmeler için değil, bireyin hatta kariyerini planlarken de düşünmesi gereken bir yaklaşımdır.	Strateji geliştirme ve amacı ile ilgili bir kolaylaştırıcı materyal sanırım iyi bir yaygınlaşma sağlar, şu aralar geçmekte olan değerler, vizyon ve misyon kavramlarına da değinmek gerekir.	Küreselleşmenin kısıtlama ihtimali değerlendirilmelidir. Her işletmenin Küreselleşmeden etkileneceği alanlar belirlenmeli ve pozitif olmayanları için strateji geliştirilmelidir.
Ö118		3	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ö119		3	1	Politika en üst düzeyde amaçları ve bun yönelim şeklini belirler. Strateji bu amaçlara ulaşma yöntem ve hedeflerini açıklar.	Bu koordinasyon vazgeçilmez bir unsurdur. Ulusal düzeyde bu koordinasyon politik karar alma sürecinde bir parçasıdır. Burada hiyerarşik bir yapılanma modelinden çok Matris örgütlenme politika-strateji-koordinasyon vs. düşünülmelidir.	Daha uzun vadeli alanlardaki ortak yönelimler için söz konusu edilebilir. Ancak temel olarak politik hedefler ve yönelimler birbirlerin destekler mahiyette ise söz konusu olur. Politik hedefleri farklı birimlerin stratejik ortaklığı olmaz. Belki işbirliği olur ama oda daha çok taktik düzeyde görülebilir.	Strateji, politika, strateji, operasyon, taktik hiyerarşik modelinin içinde yer alır. Ama hayat (ulusun veya şirketin) hiyerarşik bir süreçler bütünü sunmaz. Klasik strateji kavramı değişip daha hayatın içinde geliştirilmelidir.	Boşluk ve gri alanlar politika, strateji,taktik gibi kavramların uygarlık içinde tanımlanmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Yani uygarlığın insanoğlunun bir hareketi vardır. Bu dikkate alınarak yeniden tanımlanmalıdır.	.....



Ö120		3	2	Strateji. Politika.	Kıbrıs türü federe devletinin kurulup, tüm dünya ülkelerinde tanınması.	NATO ülkeleri ile stratejik işbirliği ve stratejik ortaklık içinde olduğumuz bir gerçektir. Ancak kalitesi düşüktür.	Kurumların veya ülkelerin hedeflerine ulaşmaları öncesinde uyguladıkları bir dizi işlem sonrası amaca ulaşmaktır.	Askeri, sivil ve özel sektör yöneticilerinin milli menfaatleri koruma ve milli amaç ulaşma konusunda, hedef belirleme ve stratejik planlama için ülke çıkarlarına birinci öncelik vermeleri grileri yok edecektir.	Ulusal hedefler ve işletme stratejilerinin belirlenmesinde, uluslar arası olma ve globalleşme kriterlerinin gerçek yaşamda varlığını yadsımak olası değildir. Ancak ulusal ve işletmeler düzeyinde stratejileri ulusal çıkarları küreselleşmenin getirdiği ortamın üst platformuna çıkarmak şarttır.
Ö121		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Ö122		3	2	Politika ve strateji amaca bağlılıkları yönünden birbirlerine çok benzerler. Ancak strateji amaçla daha yakından ilgilidir. Strateji bir işletmenin amaçlarının ve politik yönelmelerinin toplamını oluşturur. Politika ise saptanmış amaçlara ulaşma yollarıdır. Strateji politikayı da içeren daha genel bir kavramdır.	Stratejiye sahip olmayan bir devlet amaçlarını açıkça ve kesin bir şekilde saptayamaz. Amaç saptamak için gerekli hesapları yapamaz ve yeni girişimlere öncü olacak bilgilerden yoksun kalır. Kurumlar arası koordine eksikliğinde kaynaklar etkin ve verimli kullanılamazlar.	Stratejik işbirliği tüm devletler ve işletmeler için cazip olmaktadır. Çünkü 1.Yeni bir işe başlamanın yüksek riskini azaltır. 2. Küçük firmalara dev işletmelerle rekabet etme ve onlar arasında yaşama imkânı sağlar. 3. Yeni teknolojileri kolayca elde etme imkânı sağlar. Ayrıca maliyet düşürme, atıl kapasiteyi azaltma, gelişmekte olan ülkelerin endüstri gelişimine katkıda bulunur.	İşletme yönetiminde strateji, işletmenin çeşitli fonksiyonları arasında meydana gelen karışıklıkları açıklığı kavuşturan ve genel amaçları belirleyen özellikleri düzenleyen ekonomik bir ortamda, işletmenin optimuma geçmesi ile ilgili seçmeli bir kararlar bütünüdür, diye düşünüyorum	.....	Küreselleşme işadamları için artan kar ve güç stratejisi ve hükümetler içinde devlet gücünde artış demektir. Küreselleşme tek merkezli veya tek boyutlu bir süreç değildir. Ekonomik olduğu kadar siyasi, teknolojik ve kültürel boyutlu bir süreçtir. Devletlerin birbirine olan bağımlılıkları artmaktadır. Hiçbir ülke tek başına yeterli değildir.
Ö123		3	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ö124		3	1	Politika. Strateji öncelikli olmalıdır fikrindeyim.	Bu ideal bir düşünce, milli stratejinin zaman zaman masaya yatırılıp bu koordinasyonun verimli olup olmadığının irdelenmesi varsa yeni yöntemlerin hayata geçirilmesinin iyi olacağı fikrindeyim.	Aynı yapıya sahip kurumlar arasındaki işbirliği ve ortaklıklar ulusal ve işletme menfaatlerini koruma altına almakta daha geçerli olacağı kanısındayım.	Bir amaca en emin ve kısa zamanda ulaşmanın temin için düşünülen yöntem.	Yukarıdaki birimlerin asgari müştereklerde birleşerek, anlaşarak ortak paydada fikir birliğine varıp stratejilerini tayin etmeleri gerektiğine inanıyorum.	Şu zaman dilimi içersinde, zamana ayak uyduramayan (strateji oluşturamayan) ulus ve işletmelerin varlıklarını koruyabilmesinin çok güç olacağı kanısındayım.
Ö125		3	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Ö126		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ö127		3	1	Strateji öncelikli olmalı, uluslar arası rekabete ayak uydurabilecek seviyeye gelinmeli. Ulusal Pazar ve ihtiyaçları çok iyi tespit edilmeli. Policy öncelikli olmalı ve işletmelerin yöneticilerinin tecrübeli yöneticilerden faydalanacak yenilemeyi, yüksek teknolojiden faydalanmayı ön planda tutmalı.	Milli stratejinin belirlenmesi ve hedeflerin saptanması ve tahsis edilecek güç unsurları koordinasyonun yine akademisyenler, özel sektör, askeri yöneticiler, kurum yöneticileriyle (konusunun ehli kişilerle) bu gruplar arasında geniş bir konsensüs ve diyalog yaratılarak sağlanabileceğini düşünenlerdenim.	Rekabet gücünü artıracak, istihdama yönelik, ulusal menfaatlerimizde gözetilen, ulusal ve işletme düzeyinde her türlü stratejik işbirliği ve stratejik ortaklığa açık olunması gerekliliği düşüncesini paylaşan biriyim.	Ulusal menfaatleri göz ardı etmeksizin, küresel literatür takip eden, yetişmiş tecrübeli yöneticilerin bilgi birikiminden, tavsiyelerinden faydalanarak, ara ürün ithalatına dayalı ihracat modeli yerine, istihdama yönelik yatırımları öne çıkararak ve küresel pazar ve pazarın ihtiyaçlarının öncelikli kalemlerinin doğru tespit etmek.	Söz konusu yöneticiler arasındaki strateji algılama konusunda muhakkak kurumlarındaki yapılanmadan kaynaklanan boşluklar ve gri alanların mevcut olmaması mümkün olmakla beraber, bu boşlukların giderilme yolu sadece inovasyon ve etkin diyalogdan geçtiği kanısındayım.	Küreselleşme olgusu, ulusal sermayeyle bir yarış için olma zaruretinden dolayı, verimli, kaliteli, yüksek teknolojiye dayalı üretim ve üretim maliyetlerinde rekabete uygun hale getirilmesi gerektiği görüşündeyim.
Ö128		2	1						
Ö129		3	1						
Ö130		1	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ö131		2	2	..					
Ö132		1	1	..					
Ö133		2	1	..					

Ö134		1	1	Her iki düzeyde de fark gözetmeksizin, strateji, politika, taktik, operasyon gibi alt kırımların ana belirleyicisidir. Çeşitli alternatifler gözden geçirilerek ulaşılmak istenen amacın ve temel prensiplerin belirlenmesi sürecidir. Politikalar, stratejinin yönlendirdiği şekilde amaca ulaşırken uygulanması en etkin alternatif ve aksiyonların belirlenmesidir.	Aslında sorunun yanıtı 18. Sorunun kendisi. Demokratik süreçlerle ilgili tüm tarafların katılımı sağlanacak temel bir strateji belirlenmesi esas alınmalıdır. Aynı düzlemde harekete başlayan tüm taraflar kendi alanlarında bununla paralel politika ve taktikler geliştirerek uyum içerisinde hareket edebilmelidir.	Ortak hedeflere ortak yaklaşımla erişmek isteyen parklı partilerin birlikteliğidir. En önemli farkı, sinerjik sonuçlar, başarılar sağlanmasına fırsat ve olanak sunmasıdır.	Strateji kavramının liderlik kavramıyla paralellik gösterdiğini düşünüyorum. Her ikisi de temelde doğru olanın yapılması kararının verilmesine dayanıyor. Bu aynı zamanda uygun ya da doğru olmayan bir seçeneğin reddedilebilmesi anlamına geliyor.	.....	.....
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Ö135		3	2	<p>Özel sektör yönünden strateji ön sıradadır. Üretilen ürünün yeni ülkelerde gerek kalite gerekse fiyat yönünden diğer rakiplerin önüne geçmesi önemlidir. Bu konuda ülkelere göre strateji tayin edilir. Politika ön plandadır. Üretilen ürün için kalite politikası ve satış politikası hazırlanır ve bunlar bir üretim şirketi için olmazsa olmazlardandır.</p>	<p>Milli strateji devletin öncülüğünde yapılır fakat bunu desteklemek için sivil toplum örgütlerinin, sendikaların, komitelerin fikir üreterek, devleti yönlendirmesi gerekir. Örn. İlaç İşverenler Sendikası, ülkemizin ilaç üretimi, ihracatı ve diğer ülkelerle ilgili rekabetler konusunda hazırladığı stratejik raporları Sağlık Bakanlığı ile yaptığı ortak çalışmalarla belirler.</p>	<p>İşletme stratejisi düzeyinde cevap verebilirim. İşletmeler öncelikle maliyet açısından birbirleri ile baş kapasitelerini verimli kullanmak, işçilik maliyetini düşürmek, seri üretim yapmak için kendi aralarında işbirliğine ve ortaklığa gidebilir.</p>	<p>Globalleşen dünyamızda, ülkeler rekabet ortamı içindedir. Kaliteli, ucuz ve ulaşılabilir ürün üretilmesi gerekir. Bunun için gerek yurt içinde gerekse yurt dışında devamlı fikirler üretilmeli, araştırma yapılmalı ve yeni stratejiler oluşturulmalıdır.</p>	<p>Sivil ve askerî stratejileri farklı olabilir. Fakat her ikisinin de ortak amaçları ülkemizin geleceğini ve devamını hazırlamalıdır. Bu konuda sivil ve askerî yöneticilerin daha neler yapılabilir konusunda daha iç içe olması gerekir. Askerî yönetici çalışma hayatı boyunca çok değişik konularda görev aldığından uzmanlaşmıyor. Bu konuda devamlı sivil yöneticilerden faydalanabilir. Örn. Ankara'da ordunun ilaç fabrikası vardır. Burada görev yapan ecz., dr., biyolog, kimyager subaylar tayin ile gelmekle ve belirli bir süre görev yapmaktadır. Uzman olmaları ve bilgileri ile verim vermeleri beklenemez. Burada sivil yöneticilerden faydalanabilir.</p>	<p>Küreselleşmeyle, stratejinin önemi artmıştır. Bu konuda çalışmayan, hazırlık yapmayan işletmelerin ayakta kalması imkânsızdır.</p>
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Ö136		1	1	<p>Stratejilerin oluşumunda yıllar boyunca uygulanan politikalar belirleyicidir. Hükümetlerin değişmesiyle bazı politikalar değişebilir. Ancak ülke stratejisi bu politikaların değişmesine anında cevap vermez. Politikamın daha öncelikli olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bu politikaların uzun vadede uygulanmasının şirket stratejilerini belirlediği görüşündeyim.</p>	<p>Milli stratejilerin belirlenmesinde, milli hedeflerin saptanması ve milli güç unsurlarının koordinasyonu kritik önem taşır. Buradaki zafiyet milli strateji olgusunu zayıflatır. (Doğru) saptanmayan milli menfaatler doğru şekilde sağlanamaz.</p>	<p>Örnek vermek gerekirse, Stratejik işbirliği ulusal seviyede Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerine benzetebiliriz. Öte yandan İngiltere - ABD örneği stratejik ortaklık kavramı dahilinde değerlendirilebilir. Ortaklık daha köklü ve uzun vadeli (politikalara göre değişmeyen) işbirliği güncel politikalar sonucunda oluşan kavramlardır.</p>	<p>Strateji, tarihte askeri bir terminoloji olarak karşımıza çıkar. Bu ulusun işletmenin benimsenen politikaları sonucunda veya bu politikaların oluşturulmasında stratejiden söz edebiliriz. Stratejiler bugünden yarına değişmez. Belirlenen hedefe hizmet ettiği sürece uygulanır.</p>	<p>Strateji kavramının sivil hayata taşınmasıyla kavram genişlemiştir. Önceleri askeri anlamda taktiksel bir yanıtma/şaşırtma üzerine dayalı olan strateji bugün işletmeler/uluslar seviyesinde vizyonu gerçekleştirmek için kullanılan/geliştirilen politikaların uzun vadeli sonucudur.</p>	<p>Küreselleşme olgusunun ulusal ve işletmeler düzeyinde strateji oluşturmayla ilgili olarak paradigma değişikliğine sebep olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Var olan ve geliştirilen tüm stratejilerin küreselleşmeden bağımsız düşünülmesi bu stratejilerin boşa çıkmasıyla sonuçlanacağını söylememiz pek de yanlış olmaz.</p>
Ö137		2	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

Ö138		2	1	Hükümetler değişse bile bazı konularda devlet politikası belirlenmeli ve oluşturulacak stratejilerde temel anlamda bu politikalar göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır. Strateji oluşturulmasında belli unsurlar göz önünde bulundurulmakla birlikte politika değişikliği ve strateji oluşturulmasında daha esnek ve dinamik davranabilir.	Gelecekteki hedeflerin net olarak belirlenmesi ve hedefe yönelik olarak tüm unsurların çalıştırılması sağlanmadan sonuç elde edilmez.	.....	Geleceğe yönelik riskleri, olası durumları ve hedefleri belirleyerek yöntem, plan ve yol haritası belirlemek önem kazanmaktadır.	.....	Özellikle küçük ve orta boy işletmeleri tehdit eden bir olgu olduğunu düşünüyorum. Büyük-küresel tek tip ürün- işletmeler piyasayı ele geçirip yerelliği öldürüyor. Bu konuda son dönemde bankaların KOBİ kredileri önemli bir destek.
Ö139		1	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Ö140 141		2	1	...					

## CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE CANDIDATE

Nazmi Çeşmeci graduated from the Naval Academy in 1973. He served as a naval officer up to Destroyer Captain and Squadron Commodore in the navy. In addition, to the staff duties, such as military adviser to the ambassador of WEU in Brussels and Strategy Department in the TGS. He also served for educational institutions as academic instructor in Naval Academy, Naval Training Center, War Colleges and Strategic Research Institute.

### EDUCATION

In addition to Naval Academy, some of the many education programs he graduated/participated are as follows:

#### Schools

- Naval Staff College: 1987, graduation diploma with “very well degree”
- Armed Forces College: 1989, graduation diploma with “very well degree”
- NATO Defense College: 1991 efficiency report with “very well suited to take up a NATO appointment”.
- Universite Libre de Bruxelles CERIS Program, 1994–1995 Graduate Studies in International Politics.



## Seminars

- US–European Security Issues, May–June 1999, USA
- Naval Land Attack Weapons Systems, November 1999, London SMi Seminar
- Defence and Security Policy–The Challenges of the New Millennium, October 1997, MOD Bulgaria
- Total Quality Management

## PUBLICATIONS

Articles on the subjects of “NATO, EU, WEU”, “Reflections on Strategic Foresight”, “From Metaphysic Community to Homo Economicus”. Seamanship Culture, Strategic Culture.

## CURRENT STATUS

Nazmi Çeşmeci is currently teaching “Strategic Foresight” and “International Security Strategies” at Strategic Researches Institute and “Safety and Security at Sea” at Galatasaray University and Piri Reis University. He participates in seminars and symposiums on the subjects of security issues and strategy.