PHILOSOPHICAL ARCHITECTONICS AND THEATRICALITY IN GILLES DELEUZE’S THEORY

Abstract: Theatricality, as a methodological basis of Deleuze’s theory, insinuates a new thought of Being/beings by emancipating philosophy from its anthropological orientation. Despite the fact that the phenomenological methodologies attempted to link the transcendental with the empirical domain, the source of reflexivity was still the subject. Deleuze’s ontological repetition maintains the infinite reflection of the transcendental and the empirical domains into each other, yet it posits the symbolic order as the third order where the infinite reflexive expansion between concept and matter becomes immanently transcended. By taking this formulation as its point of departure, this article analyzes how Deleuze’s notion of theatricality operates as the self-reflexive and excessive origin of thought.

Keywords: Philosophical Architectonics, Theatricality, Onto-Topology, Action-Thought, Repetition

GILLES DELEUZE’ÜN KURAMINDA FELSEFİ ARKİTEKTONİK VE TEATRALLİK

Öz: Deleuze, kuramının metodolojik temelini oluşturan teatrallik kavramı aracılığıyla felsefeyi antropolojik yöneliminden özgürleştirerek Varlığı ve varlıkları farklı bir düzende düşünmeyi sağlar. Fenomenolojik metodolojiler aşkın ve ampirik düzlemleri birbirine bağlasa da düşününmsellikin kökeni yine öznedir. Deleuze’ün ontolojik tekrar kavramı ise simbolik düzeni kavram ve madde arasındaki yansımanın aşılığı üçüncü bir düz olarak kurar. Bu makale Deleuze’ün kurduğu felsefi sistemin arkitektonik yapısı üzerinden düşününmsellik ve aşılık kavramlarını teatrallik kavramı bağlamında incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Felsefi Arkitetektonik, Teatrallik, Onto-Topoloji, Eylem-Düşünce, Tekrar

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1. Introduction: Ontological Repetition as a Radical Thought of Being

There is a force common to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. (Peguy would have to be added in order to form the triptych of priest, Antichrist and Catholic. Each of the three, in his own way, makes repetition not only a power peculiar to language and thought, a superior pathos and pathology, but also the fundamental category of philosophy of the future. To each corresponds a Testament as well as a Theatre, a conception of the theatre, and a hero of repetition as a principal character in this theatre: Job-Abraham, Dionysus-Zarathustra, Joan of Arc-Clio.1)

Deleuze’s notion of ontological repetition, transcendental empiricism, surmounts the limits of phenomenological anthropology by proposing a radical thesis concerning a new way of thinking about Being/beings. Transcendental empiricism is a non-anthropological philosophy where Being/beings are conceived of as pre-individual, impersonal, and singular repetitions. With the intent of emancipating thought from the limits of anthropological disposition, Deleuze proposes this new way of thinking about Being/beings through his notion of ontological repetition, that is, being able to think the unthought, the radical outside, without subjectification.

Transcendental empiricism subverts the epistemological contrast between intellect and sensibility by positing the Idea as a question/problem determined by the sensible transcendent exercise of thought: “the transcendental element which belongs essentially to beings, things, and event. It is the…theatrical…discovery of the Idea, and…the discovery of a transcendent exercise of sensibility” (Deleuze 1994, p. 195). According to Deleuze, theatricality opens up the possibility of “a philosophy of the future”: “They [Kierkegaard, Nietzsche] invent an incredible equivalent of theatre within philosophy, thereby founding simultaneously this theatre of the future and a new philosophy” (p. 8). Theatricality, as a methodological basis of Deleuze’s theory, insinuates a new thought of Being/beings by emancipating philosophy from its anthropological orientation. Despite the fact that the phenomenological methodologies attempted to link the transcendental with the empirical domain, the source of reflexivity was still the subject. Deleuze’s ontological repetition maintains the infinite

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reflection of the transcendental and empirical into each other, yet it posits the symbolic order as the third order where this infinite reflexive expansion between concept and matter becomes immanently transcended:

There is still a third moment...Not from image to concept, or from concept to image, but the identity of concept and image. The concept is in itself in the image, and the image is for itself in the concept. This is no longer organic or pathetic but dramatic, pragmatic, praxis, or action thought. (Deleuze 1989, p.161).

By taking these formulations as its point of departure, this article analyzes how Deleuze’s notion of theatricality operates as the self-reflexive and excessive origin of thought through the notion of ontological repetition:

When we say...that movement is repetition and that this is our true theatre ...
We have in mind the the theatrical space, the emptiness of that space ... we think of how repetition is woven from one distinctive point to another, including the differences within itself. (Deleuze 1994, p. 10)

Despite frequently referring to the notion of theatricality, the post-war French philosophers did not embark upon analyzing the relation between theoretical mediation and theatricality thoroughly. The notion of theatricality has a long history of being championed in the service of theories of the self, the discourses of psychoanalysis, semiology, forms of performativity, and articulations of political thought. However, rather than being conceived of as an essential element in the formation of thought itself, it has been reduced to the status of a mere representation. The role of theatricality in Deleuze’s philosophy cannot be delineated by means of strategically using theater as a metaphor in the service of theory. As Deleuze indicates, theatrical philosophy “puts metaphysics in motion, in action...no longer reflects on the theatre...neither...sets up a philosophical theater” (8). My main objective in this paper is to explicate why, and moreover how, theatricality operates methodologically in the dialogue between theatre and philosophy. This article examines and charts the dialogue between theatricality and Deleuze’s philosophical architectonics, paying particular attention to the spatio-temporal dimension and exposition of thought structures.

2. Structuralism and Dramatic Topologies

In his paper entitled The Method of Dramatization, presented to the Société française de Philosophie in 1967, Deleuze describes Ideas as dynamic structures with a specific orientation, width, force, direction, speed, length, and rhythm. The most radical and novel contribution of the presentation, however, is Deleuze’s delineation of these tendencies, or what he calls “dynamisms”, of the Ideas as dramatic: “I will try to define dramatization more rigorously: they are dynamisms, dynamic spatio-temporal determinations” (p. 107). The notions of spatiality and temporality play here the main
role in apprehending the dramatic truth of Ideas: “Everything changes when the
dynamisms are posited no longer as schemata of concepts but as dramas of Ideas”

M. de Gandillac, one of the participants of Deleuze’s presentation of *The Method of
Dramatization*, requests, in the discussion session, for “some supplementary
clarifications on the theme of dramatization” (p. 106). Yet still unconvinced by
Deleuze’s reply, he questions further: “But in order to translate all of that (which I
grasp only in a slightly confused way), why this term dramatization?” (p. 107).
Gandillac is not the only one among the participants who expresses his wish for the
further elucidation of the notion of dramatization with regard to space-time. M. J.
Merleau-Ponty also finds Deleuze’s usage of the term obscure: “You spoke at several
points in your presentation of spatio-temporal dynamisms and it is obvious that this
plays a very important role, which I think I have partly understood” (p. 111). And, R.P.
Breton, one other audience, raises a further question: “To what exactly does your
method of dramatization apply? In what precise horizon of reality do you pose the
topical questions?” (p. 114).

In his reply, Deleuze situates the drama of space-time by drawing on psychoanalysis,
by maintaining the architectural account of ideas:

> When you make such a system of spatio-temporal determinations...it seems to me
> that you substitute a drama for a logos, you establish the drama of this logos...a
> family drama (on dramatiser en famille). Some psychoanalysts employ this word, I
> think, in order to designate the movement by which logical thought is dissolved
> into pure spatio-temporal determinations, as in sleep...It is indeed a drama, to the
> extent that the patient simultaneously organizes a space, manipulates a space, and
> expresses in this space an unconscious Idea. (p.108)

This dramatic topology insinuates a new approach to thought by describing Ideas as
dramas with spatio-temporal coordinates. As spatio-temporal dramas, Ideas “can only
be determined with the questions who? how much? where and when? in what case? –
all forms which trace its true spatio-temporal coordinates” (p. 92). Ideas express their
ontological structure through their topological exposition. Consequently, problems
posed by Ideas are neither conceptual nor material problems. They are spatio-temporal
problems, whose genesis can be traced through their topological exposition. Consider
the Ideas of line and circle. The difference between a line and a circle is, indeed, the
difference between being a straight line and being a curved line: “the dramatization of
the Idea of a line in so far as it expresses the differentication of the straight from the
curved” (1994, p. 218). What I would call the trans-formation from the straight to the
curved position is inscribed in the Idea of a line. Line is thus the differential of its
straight and curved expositions: “It is precisely the dynamism which divides the
concept of line into straight and curved” (p. 96). It is therefore possible to conclude that
the dramatic Idea of a line manifests itself as the differential of its straight and curved
expositions. Put otherwise, line is constituted through its spatio-temporal trans-
formation from the straight to the curved.
This dramatic mode of inquiry, according to Deleuze, is an “integral calculus performed unknowingly” (p. 174). Dramatization thus operates as the methodological basis of Ideas by taking derivatives. Based on the Idea of line, the “integral calculus” is to be understood as the differential of the straight and curved expositions. That is to say, the spatio-temporal displacement from straight to the curved line posits the Idea of a line as the relational difference between becoming-straight and becoming-curved. If the Idea of a line constitutes itself through its passage from straight to curved position, then the structural essence of the Idea is trans-formation. Idea acts as the differential of its situational incarnations in its different expositions. Therefore, Idea becomes posited as the differential of its continuous restructuration.

In his essay How Do We Recognize Structuralism, Deleuze undertakes a structural elaboration of the symbolic order in the following terms:

The first criterion of structuralism, however, is the discovery and recognition of a third order, a third regime: that of the symbolic. The refusal to confuse the symbolic with the imaginary, as much as with the real, constitutes the first dimension of structuralism. (p. 171)

Here Deleuze articulates the symbolic order in terms of what he calls the third order, the notion which he frequently uses to describe the symbolic structure of Ideas. His use of the notion third order necessitates a detailed discussion for it entails a radically new reformulation of the structuration of Idea. In The Time-Image, for instance, the third term/moment is outlined as follows:

There is still a third moment, equally present in the two previous ones. Not from image to concept, or from concept to image, but the identity of concept and image. The concept is in itself in the image, and the image is for itself in the concept. This is no longer organic or pathetic but dramatic, pragmatic, praxis or action thought. (p. 161)

This text demonstrates the dramatic account of the third moment by disclosing that the third order demarcates neither a conceptual nor a material order, in that it does not imply the conceptual determination of matter/image (“not from image to concept”) or the material/imagistic determination of concept (“from concept to image”). This ontotopological approach maintains the conceptual determination of matter and the material determination of concept but formulates the symbolic order as the dramatic order of Ideas, by and through which the reciprocal determination of concept and matter becomes immanently transcended. It is therefore possible to argue that Deleuze’s formulation depicts the symbolic order as the third order, where the conceptual and material determinations have become resolved, and the Idea, freed from its determinations, becomes posited as a spatio-temporal dynamism. It is by the emancipation of thought from the limits of conceptual and material determinations that the Ideas express their pure spatio-temporal expositions. The orientation, direction, force, speed, and rhythm of the Ideas express themselves as the intensive
and pre-individual forces. The symbolic order is thus the per-formative order where ideas perform their intensive and pre-individual spatio-temporal coordinations.

Therefore, the notion of symbol must not be understood either as a concept or matter, but rather as the spatio-temporal exposition and expression of the Idea. Symbol cannot be reduced to a concept or matter for it does not belong to any conceptual or material domain. The symbol could only be comprehended within the horizon of another order: “Finally, in depth we can distinguish axiomatic varieties which determine a common axiom for differential relations of a different order” (p. 187). The symbolic order is thus the third order compared to the material and conceptual orders. More precisely, symbol is the third term with regard to matter and concept. Concerning the material, conceptual, and symbolic orders, Deleuze writes: “We can enumerate the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic: 1, 2, 3” (p. 172). It follows from this observation that the real refers here to the material order, the imaginary to the conceptual, and the symbolic to the order of symbols or the third order. Therefore, the symbolic order is not composed of any real or imaginary contents:

What does the symbolic element of the structure consists of? ...Distinct from the real and the imaginary, the symbolic cannot be defined either by pre-existing realities to which it would refer and which it would designate, or by the imaginary or conceptual contents which it would implicate. (p. 173)

Therefore, that which posits and transcends the concept-image pair in a single act is the third element: “Finally, the differential relation presents a third element” (Deleuze 174).

This third element denotes here the pure repetition of the singular universal: “repetition as universality of the singular” (Deleuze 1). That is to say, the ontological repetition refers to the repetition of the singular universalities, that is, to “the Same of that which becomes”: “To repeat...in relation to something unique or singular...They do not add a second and a third time to the first, but carry the first time to the nth power” (1). The multiplicity inherent to the singular universality posits itself as the becoming-itself of the single nth time. In other words, the singularity of the pure multiplicity differentiates itself from itself by repetitively referring to itself: “Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself” (p. 41). One could, then, claim that the Same is self-referential, that is to say, it recurs appearing identical to itself: “The eternal return does not bring back the same, but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes” (41). Deleuze construes the Same of the infinite repetition as the Idea: “The differential of the Idea is itself inseparable from the process of repetition” (p. 201). In and through the Idea, the mediation between concept and form becomes resolved: “that of the universal and singular reunited...dissolves the mediations” (p. 7). The Idea, free of all its determinations, becomes immediate mediator mediating itself with itself in an infinite movement towards itself; the Idea differentiates itself from itself to become for-itself. However, since its for-itselness manifests a pure differential identity, it can only become for-itself by being the Same of that which differentiates itself from itself. Hence, self-referentiality and self-differentiation occur simultaneously. The self-referentiality of the differential causes the difference to self-differentiate, while
simultaneously this self-differentiating difference causes the differential act to be self-referential, that is, the Same of the differential. The self-referential and the self-differentiating movement are the one and the same movement, because it is necessary for anything self-referential to refer to its beyond in order to arrive at the Same. Concerning the sameness of the self-referential and self-differential act, Karatani indicates the following:

The self-referential formal system is dynamic because of incessant internal slippage (self-differentiation) …the law of the excluded middle cannot be established in these conditions, the necessity of choosing “either this or that” is replaced by “both this and that”. (Karatani, p. 93)

In other words, the Idea (the differentials of thought) differentiates itself from itself by referring to the differentials of thought (itself). The self-referentiality of the Idea is doomed to be infinite, simply because the self-differentiating difference can never close in on itself. Yet, at the same time, it can only differentiate itself by referring to itself, that is to say, by closing in on itself. It is this tension of the “self-referential paradox”, which puts things into repetitive movement. This dialectical movement of the repetition is infinite: “the indeterminate horizon of a transcendental problem...once it is a question of setting dialectic in motion” (p. 188).

3. Symbolic Architectonics

Commenting on Cantor’s conception of set theory, Karatani writes:

Cantor saw infinity not as limitless but as a number. With this, the paradox of set theory emerged, which can be described as follows: ‘if we grant the theorem “Given any set, finite or infinite, a set with more elements can always be obtained”, then the moment one considers “the set of all the possible elements”, a contradiction arises’. (1995, p. 52)

What does this paradox of set theory, which Karatani calls “self-referential paradox” (55), imply here? What is its relation to theatricality and Deleuze’s philosophy?

Deleuze formulates his theories by using physical and mathematical symbols, which are neither conceptual nor material, but dramatic and multi-dimensional. In order to imagine Ideas as active and dynamic structures, one needs to abandon a two-dimensional approach to Deleuze’s conception of Idea. Consider Deleuze’s explanation of infinity through set-theory:

All framing determines an out-of-field: ...when a set is framed, therefore seen, there is always a larger set, or another set with which the first forms a larger one, and which can in turn be seen, on condition that it gives rise to a new out-of-field ...The whole is therefore like a thread which traverses sets and gives each one the possibility [...] of communicating with another, to infinity. (1989, p.16)
This frame within a frame approach based upon set theory can never be comprehended by projecting it onto a two-dimensional surface. If it is imagined as circles inside each other drawn on a flat surface, then the nuances of the way these sets act and interact will disappear. The interaction between the sets is multi-dimensional. To this end, set theory is crucial in order to delineate what is meant here by the multiple infinities, and hence, multi-dimensional structures:

The real frontier defining modern mathematics lies not in the calculus itself but in other discoveries such as set theory which, even though it requires, for its own part, an axiom of infinity, gives a no less strictly finite interpretation of the calculus. (Deleuze, 1994, p. 176)

Deleuze defines Ideas as the multiplicities of multiplicities. He expresses it as follows: “Ideas are varieties which include in themselves sub varieties” (187). The sub varieties of the Ideas are its subsets, that is to say, all the possible combinations of the elements that the set contains.

Let us take a set that contains two elements as an example: set A = (1, 2). The subsets of set A can be expressed as follows: [(1), (2), (1,2), (Ø)]. The ‘self-referential paradox’ to which Karatani alludes is the gap between the set A and its subsets. In other words, the self-referential paradox operates through the gap between the structure of set A and its metastructure. According to Alain Badiou’s theoretical description of set theory in Being and Event, the metastructure of set A implies the subsets of a set: “the gap between structure and metastructure, between element and subset.” (2006, p. 11) Concerning the gap between the structure and metastructure, Badiou writes: “The subsets of a set necessarily contain at least one multiple which does not belong to the initial set. We will term this the theorem of the point of excess.” (p. 11) Therefore, the metastructure of a set, or the subsets of the set, is always in excess of the structure of the set. Karatani’s ‘self-referential paradox’ precisely refers to this disjunction between the structure and the metastructure of an enclosed entity such as a set; as Badiou writes: “every structure calls upon a metastructure.” (p. 11)

The significance of Cantor’s theory is its disclosure of the “self-referential paradox” with regard to the gap between the structure and metastructure of a set. This paradox can be expressed as follows: once “the set of all the possible elements” is enclosed within a set, or when the set closes in on itself by forming one out of itself, it delimits itself. The question then becomes: what occurs outside of its limits? Another way of asking the same question is: if, as set theory suggests, every set has subsets, then the infinite set, “the set of all the possible elements”, has subsets as well. Yet, if ‘the set of all the possible elements’ is the infinite set, how can the subsets of the infinite set, its metastructure, be in excess compared to the infinite set? By definition, the infinite set is infinite, in that everything belongs to it. How can the infinite set have a metastructure? The reason is the following: once a set closes in on itself, it not only determines its own limits, and hence, constitutes itself, but simultaneously, it determines its out-of-field (metastructure), which does not belong to the set itself. Consequently, “the set of all the possible elements” is not “the set of all the possible elements”. If all does not
belong to it, it is not infinite. However, it is infinite at the same time, because an infinite set could exist only in the condition of having a set with “all the possible elements”. The “self-referential paradox” thus implies the fact that any set, by closing in on itself, makes this closure simultaneously possible and impossible. As we can see, the self-referential act (the set becoming one by closing in on itself) and self-differentiating act (by closing in on itself, it differentiates itself from its out-of-field) are one and the same movement. It is thus necessary, according to Karatani, for anything self-referential to refer to its beyond to arrive at itself: “The self-referential formal system is dynamic because of incessant internal slippage (self-differentiation)” (p. 93). The out-of-field or the metastructure of any set is located beyond the limits of the set itself. That is, the metastructure is located beyond the structure of the set but is not transcendent to it. On the contrary, the beyond is with-in at the same time that it is with-out. Therefore, the infinite set, ‘the set of all the possible elements’, is a set that has become one or self-referential by closing in on itself. That is to say, it is only through its limits that a set becomes infinite. However, by the same token, it becomes finite. What, then, is located beyond the limits of infinity?

Beyond the limits of infinity, there are other infinities. Thereupon, the infinite set is infinite, but it is not the only set that is infinite. The infinite set has an infinite number of subsets, which, in turn, have infinite numbers of sets with which, once again, infinite numbers of subsets with infinite numbers of sets can be constituted. Or rather, as Deleuze states, “the parts belong to various sets, which constantly subdivide into subsets or are themselves the subset of a larger set, on to infinity” (1989, p. 16). Therefore, there are multiple infinities, each of which has multiple infinities, each of which in turn has multiple infinities, and so forth. By revealing the multiplicity of infinities, what Karatani calls Cantor’s “self-referential paradox” demonstrates that there are multiple infinities that are interlocked within each other. These multiple sets of infinities are inter-active. More precisely, the inter-action between different layers of sets makes the structure of communication among the sets multi-layered and infinite. They act and inter-act simultaneously at and within multiple layers of space.

The primary purpose of the philosophical architectonics is to examine the topological structure of thought by displaying ideas as spatial and temporal entities. The basic thesis of the architectonics of philosophy is that the ideas are, simultaneously, spatial and temporal structures, or rather, they have an architectural form. Karatani calls the philosophical inquiry whose aim is to reveal the structural formation of thought “the will to architecture”, which encompasses; both the will to construct thought-structures and the will to know the ways by which these structures have been constructed (1995). The will to know implies the desire to know the architectural form - the topological structure- of things, ideas, and events. The architectural conception opens the possibility of considering ideas as multi-dimensional entities, which, on the one hand, move in space and time, and, on the other, are made up of space and time. Only in this
expanse could the ideas be considered as entities, which can condense, displace, disguise, dilate, contract, rotate, expand, stretch, graft, compose, and decompose. Consequently, movement becomes the basic constitutive fabric of the ideas. Conceiving of the ideas as spatio-temporal movements posits the matter of truth as the problematic of space and time. Therefore, the truth of ideas can be traced in their spatial and temporal trajectories that are constitutive of their structure. What is at stake here is not the conceptual or material determination of the idea, but its spatial and temporal exposition.

Deleuze’s procedure for establishing his theoretical framework compels one to ascribe a spatial account to his textual work. The spatial enactment of the texts puts thought into action. Here, thought is not conceived of as a two-dimensional textual practice but rather as a topological act: “Multiplicity is neither axiomatic nor typological, but topological” (1988, p. 14). This multi-dimensional dynamism gives movement to the act of thinking by registering the Ideas as plastic constellations made up of space. Consequently, the inter-actions among Ideas are played out in the spatial register. The structure of an Idea is in topological contact with the whole set of structural relations. Therefore, Ideas are determined topologically via their inter-action.

The consequence of this topological determination is twofold: on one hand, an Idea is determined by the whole set of relations; on the other hand, the Idea itself determines the whole set of relations. The reason for this reciprocal determination is the fact that the Idea constitutes itself by differentiating itself from the relational whole, which determines its existence. Basically, an Idea is determined as part of the whole while the whole is simultaneously determined as part of the Idea. As part of the whole, the Idea becomes singular by differentiating itself from the whole. However, in differentiating itself from the whole, the Idea encompasses the whole and then transcends it immanently, by differentiating itself from the whole that it has encompassed. Thus, the Idea differentiates itself from the whole by differentiating the whole that it has encompassed, once again, from the whole that it has encompassed. The fact that the whole is infinitely differentiated in itself indicates division, and hence multiplication of the whole. This amounts to saying that there is not one whole, but rather multiple wholes that are interlocked within each other. Ideas infinitely differentiate the wholes from the wholes, or the infinities from the infinities. Therefore, Deleuze’s aforementioned frame-within-a-frame approach, based upon set theory, can never be fully comprehended by projecting it onto a two-dimensional surface. It does not imply a two-dimensional and successive expansion, growth, or progression of the sets. If the concept of infinity is imagined as circles inside each other, drawn on a flat surface, then the nuances of the manner in which these sets act and inter-act will disappear. The basic reason for this is that, for Deleuze, there is not a single infinite but rather multiple infinities that are interlocked within each other.

Deleuze’s theory is multi-dimensional because central to his theoretical formulations is the notion of multiplicity, which can only be grasped within the horizon of dimensionality. The basic parameters of this formulation prompt a multi-dimensional
approach to the notion of thought: “An Idea is an n-dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity” (1994, p. 182). Ideas are n-dimensional entities, but n is equal to one: “Infinite comprehension is the correlate of an extension=1” (1994, p. 11). Thus, ‘the set of all the possible elements’ becomes one with itself as it simultaneously becomes an infinite set. Or rather, infinity becomes singularized when the infinite set becomes one with itself.

4. Singularity and Theatricality

Now, the notion of singularity maintains a critical place in the discourse of theatricality. Commenting on the role of theatricality in Deleuze’s theory, Foucault writes, “it makes the event indefinite so that it repeats itself as a singular universal […] if the role of thought is to produce the phantasm theatrically and so repeat the universal event in its extreme point of singularity (emphasis mine)” (theatrum philosophicum, p. 224) To fully understand the implications of Foucault’s comments, let us return to Deleuze’s statement, which expresses this relation clearly: “as Peguy says, it is not Federation Day which commemorates or represents the fall of the Bastille, but the fall of the Bastille which celebrates and repeats in advance all the Federation Days” (1994, p. 1). What are the implications of this remark on the rapport between singularity and theatricality?

The fall of the Bastille encompasses all the Federation Days or all its commemorations once and for all. The singularity of the fall of the Bastille is structured to repeat itself infinitely. This event, the fall of the Bastille, exposes itself as the singular expression of its repetitions by and through the Federation Days, which then in turn commemorate the singularity of the event. By the same token, the singular event becomes one with itself only in the condition of being infinitely repeated. Its singularity thus implies the variations that it encounters in each of the Federation Days that have taken, are taking, and will take place; the differential identity of the fall of the Bastille becomes identical with itself by passing through its repetitive commemorations. Thus, the fall of the Bastille is an event whose singularity is constituted so as to repeat its variations infinitely once and for all. It displays the one and same of all it will have become by encompassing all the Federation Days.

It follows that the fall of the Bastille has happened only in order to be commemorated or repeated: “To repeat…in relation to something unique or singular…They do not add a second and a third time to the first, but carry the first time to the ‘nth’ power” (1994, p. 1). The first time, the one, becomes infinite by being carried to the nth power. However, as we have previously indicated, n is equal to one. Thus, infinity becomes singularized. Therefore, the one, the fall of the Bastille, already envelopes all its repetitions, which carry it ‘to the nth power.’ Its repetition via the Federation Days is
already inscribed in the structure of the event itself. What infinitely repeats itself is thus nothing but the one. The one repeats itself n times.

However, what is at stake here is not the repetition of the same, but the same of the repetition. The repetition of the same is to repeat something for the second, third or fourth time, whereas the same of the repetition implies the determination of the second, third or fourth time as the essence of the first time: “what is important in principle is n times as the power of a single time, without the need to pass through a second or third time” (1994, p. 3). The point to emphasize here is that the same never repeats itself. It is by and through the repetition itself that the same or the one becomes constituted: “The eternal return does not bring back ‘the same’, but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself” (1994, p. 41). Repetition is thus the essential foundation of the same, which continuously varies: “Repetition in the eternal return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the different” (p. 41). Consequently, what determines the differential identity of the Idea is its recurrence or repetition: “The differential of the Idea is itself inseparable from the process of repetition” (p. 41).

It is precisely in this regard that Deleuze attributes theatricality to the act of thinking: “Only the extreme, the excessive returns; that which passes into something else and becomes identical. That is why the eternal return is said only of the theatrical world of the metamorphoses and masks” (p. 41). With its particular focus on the notion of excess, this statement articulates two theses. First, it theorizes self-identity as a passage: “that which passes into something else and becomes identical”. Second, it proposes that this passage is theatrical. Therefore, the two theses converge on the theatricality of repetition with variation, which is, in turn, the condition of self-referentiality. In other words, only through the act of moving away from itself does something turn back upon itself. As such, this variation is regulated by what Deleuze establishes as theatrical repetition. The Idea becomes singularized by “pass[ing] into something else and becom[ing] identical” (p. 41). More precisely, this theatrical repetition functions as the differential identity of that which is identical to itself. Things become differential only under the condition that they continuously recur by turning back upon themselves.

Hence, the self-referential and self-differential movement is the same movement. The self-differentiating difference can never close in on itself. Yet, simultaneously, it can only differentiate itself by referring to itself, that is, by closing in on itself. This tension of the “self-referential paradox”, the tension between the structure (the interior of a set) and the metastructure (the exterior of a set), is theatrical.

Karatani explains the “self-referential paradox” by drawing on Godel’s mathematical logic:

Godel discovered a...seemingly self-enclosed movement. By means of this calculation he ingeniously set up a self-referential paradox wherein meta-mathematics,
understood as a class, gets mixed into the formal system as a member of that class (emphasis mine) (p. 55).

If the ‘self-referential paradox’ is predicated on the relation between the interior and the exterior of a set, the theatricality of the ‘seemingly self-enclosed movement’ can only be grasped within the horizon of space. Therefore, the question of how to map the theatricality of this movement should be posed in spatial terms. And, central to this “seemingly self-enclosed movement” is the notion of singularity.

What is theatrical, according to Deleuze, is this repetition of the same, which is simultaneously self-referential and self-differential. It is precisely in the framework established here that Deleuze takes up the question of the role of theatricality in philosophy:

Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself ...Such an identity, produced by difference, is determined as “repetition”. Repetition in the eternal return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the different. However, this conception is no longer merely a theoretical representation: it carries out a practical selection among differences according to their capacity to produce – that is, to return or to pass the test of the eternal return. The selective character of eternal return appears clearly in Nietzsche’s idea ... Only the extreme forms return –those which, large or small, are deployed within the limit and extend to the limit of their power, transforming themselves and changing one into another. Only the extreme, the excessive, returns; that which passes into something else and becomes identical. That is why the eternal return is said only of the theatrical world. (1994, p. 41)

Something can be identical to itself (self-referential) only by becoming one and the other at the same time. That which is simultaneously one and the other is nothing but the excluded middle. In other words, the excluded middle is the third term compared to the one and the other. It is the limit of the one and the other, and thus, it takes place in-between (interval). It self-differentiates and self-preserves in a single stroke. Therefore, I think, self-differentiation is the identity of the excluded middle or, what one might call, the third term. The excluded middle, I believe, is the Same of the one and the other; ‘the Same of that which becomes’. As Deleuze emphasizes, eternal return (infinite becoming) is the repetition of the Same; the Same, which infinitely displaces and disguises itself in order to be identical to its differential identity: “Repetition is truly that which disguises itself in constituting itself, that which constitutes itself only by disguising itself...The same thing is both disguising and disguised”. (Deleuze, p. 17). The self-referentiality of the Same is excessive: “Only…the excessive returns; that which passes into something else and becomes identical. That is why the eternal return is said only of the theatrical world of the metamorphoses and masks” (p. 41). The self-referential excess, the middle/third term of a system, constantly disguises and displaces itself precisely because it is excessive in itself: “A self-referential formal system...is multicentered and excessive (62)...as Godel
demonstrated, formal systems are destined to result in self-referentiality...that generates excess” (Karatani, p. 98-99). What is theatrical is this self-reflexive supplement, that is to say, the differential being of the Idea. Hence, ontology of repetition is a theatrical ontology.

5. Conclusion

In order to surmount the limits of the so-called phenomenological anthropology, it was necessary to formulate a radical thesis concerning a new thought of being. Deleuze’s ontology of repetition, transcendental empiricism, proposes this new, “radical thought of being”. Transcendental empiricism does not link/distinguish the transcendental form from the empirical matter on the basis of any subjectivity, because Ideas, as Deleuze explicates them, belong to the symbolic order of the pre-individual singularities. In that sense, it is crucial to search for thought, which is neither conceptual (subjective) nor imagistic (objective). Deleuze’s ontology of repetition, theatrical ontology, succeeds inventing this new way of thinking about being, that is to say, being able to think the unthought without anthropologizing.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


